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Chapter One 
Re-membering Memory: Beyond Mere Storage 
Forget about the memory you are used to.   
This idea is not as radical as you might think.  I’m not suggesting that you purge 
your hard drives, forget the lifetime worth of memories you have in your mind, or even 
weed through your photo albums and discard the images you haven’t looked at in years.  
Instead, memory needs to be rethought.  On the surface, digital memory resembles 
ancient Greek mental storehouses of memory due to the remarkable potential for storing 
everything.  By looking a bit deeper, I suggest that digital memory is much more than 
excess storage.  Digital memory is a flexible memory—we can store what we want, in the 
ways we want, the quantity we want, and the quality we want.  Because of this flexibility, 
it is my aim to suggest that memory, one of the five canons of rhetoric, needs to be 
reworked in relation to interactive technologies.  By reworked I do not mean restarted, 
but rather graciously revamped.  At the outset of the book Lingua Fracta: Towards a 
Rhetoric of New Media, Collin Gifford Brooke anticipates a struggle between old(er) 
constructions of rhetoric and new(er) forms of media.  His solution is a compromise—
new media must react to and learn from rhetoric in a similar fashion that rhetoric must 
respond to technologies.  Like Brooke, in this chapter I present some of the ways 
rhetorical memory is responding to newer media.  Contemporary rhetoric must refigure 
the idea of memory away from storage (which might be difficult since the notion of 
digital memory is so often storage based) and into one of production.  To accomplish this 
task, in this chapter I suggest some of the possibilities for rethinking digital, rhetorical 
memory.  Although massive server space is capable of storing literally everything we 
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want, contemporary rhetoric should not limit the role of memory by viewing it as an 
updated and unending ‘storehouse.’  Additionally, the concept of memory must also 
escape the remembered-or-forgotten binary.  Rather, contemporary rhetoric needs to 
rethink the new roles memory inhabits by looking at the ways digital memory is created, 
shared, reproduced, and utilized.  By moving digital memory away from the trope of 
storage, I argue that digital memory must be reconceived as a creative and productive 
concept instead.  
In Lingua Fracta, Brooke draws on the concern about the limits of criticism and 
suggests two pathways that English departments create when trying to understand texts.  
Criticism, Brooke argues, entails “evaluating work that has been done, rather than 
focusing on invention—on what might still be done with new media” (Brooke 10, 
emphasis in original).  The difference between “has been” and “might still” points to 
what I am recognizing as the distinction between digital memory as storage and digital 
memory as creation.  On the one hand, digital memory as storage (“has been”) is limited 
to a storehouse, a place-based memory structure whose main purpose is holding onto 
what “has been done” in the past.  On the other, digital memory as creation (“might still”) 
transforms the flat, stored memories into round, lively memories re-created with each 
use.   
I am able to foster the connection between the “has been” and the “might still” 
forms of memory by introducing the rhetorical term techne to illustrate the creative and 
productive features of contemporary memory.  Transforming “has been” to “might still” 
embodies the shifting essence from statically stored memory and into fluid and creative 
memory.  Although I explore techne in great detail in chapter two, I find it useful to 
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briefly overview how exactly I define this concept in order to make the argument that 
contemporary memory is a creative formation a bit clearer.  To make such a claim, I 
suggest three interpretations of techne: as a process that is inherently productive; as a 
force that renegotiates contemporary sources of power; and as a skill that balances expert 
knowledge with instrumentality.  Using techne to examine the role of contemporary 
memory is a unique approach, one that has not been explicitly examined in much (if any) 
of the literature I have encountered.  Throughout this dissertation, however, I will 
demonstrate how techne is one of the most useful concepts through which we can 
understand the new shapes of contemporary rhetorical memory. 
Since our capacity to store information is unlimited, we often capriciously delete 
files or pictures from our hard drive without a second thought.  Speaking for myself, I 
have declined photo ops knowing that I can find better, clearer, more interesting photos 
of the same landmarks online.  In a sense, I can use someone else’s memory to 
supplement my own.  I argue that such popular consumerist appeal should be a prime 
opportunity for several academic fields to take notice.  In particular, the field of rhetoric 
should seize this opportunity to revisit and reclaim one of its own canons.  Cicero’s five 
canons of rhetoric (invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery) were established 
as a method by which orators could accomplish all of the tasks involved in speech 
preparation.  However, in the centuries since the canons were created, memory has 
unfortunately been sloughed aside in favor of the other four.  For example, in the 
sixteenth century, French rhetorician Peter Ramus argued that there are only two parts of 
rhetoric (style and delivery), relegating the other three (invention, arrangement, and 
memory) to the dialectic.  Within the past decade, Kathleen Welch argues in Electric 
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Rhetoric that current composition textbooks emphasize invention, arrangement, and style 
while at the same time ignoring memory and delivery. Some other texts in rhetoric and 
composition utilize phrases and theories that, without explicitly naming memory, 
implicate the canon while mobilizing related terms instead.  For instance, The New 
London Group uses the term “designing” to signify a process through which “meaning 
making” occurs, whereas “redesigning” is the creative result of interactions with 
available designs in order to produce a new result (Cope and Kalantzia 23). Much like 
“meaning making” as a design theory, I argue that “making memory” as a rhetorical 
theory is ultimately concerned with the creative aspect in the production of memories.  
Since information technologies easily allow users to make, create, reproduce, and 
manipulate memory, my project is a fresh perspective on an obviously important, albeit 
neglected, topic.  My dissertation, therefore, revisits and interrogates these moments 
where memory and techne have simply been implied in order to question the repeated 
oversight of the canon of memory in the digital age.   
Interestingly, while technological devices that offer expanded memories woo 
consumers everyday, I wonder why contemporary rhetoric continues to ignore the one of 
its foundational aspects.  My research, consequently, is prompted by instances of 
‘forgotten’ memory in the field of rhetoric in relation to our culture’s growing desire to 
increase external, digital memory in personal computing devices.  This chapter explores 
the presence of memory studies in academic circles, while also showing that the canon of 
memory in rhetoric has, for some reason, been “forgotten.”  Consequently, I aim to 
present contemporary memory as a productive and creative concept, and not limit 
memory to mere storage, the past, or forgetfulness.  To riff on Aristotle’s distaste for 
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Gorgias’ use of “mere rhetoric” for a profit, I suggest that contemporary memory is more 
than “mere storage” that is bought and sold as upgrades and to stockpile as much as 
possible.   
Also, by utilizing the term “contemporary memory,” I am moving away from the 
concept of memory-as-storage while instead emphasizing memory in its digital form, a 
form that allows for malleable reconstructions and shared responsibility.  Such flexibility 
also makes contemporary memory a rhetorical technology in that its creative 
opportunities expand the available persuasive possibilities at one’s disposal.  By looking 
at digital archives, photo manipulation, and digital networks in the later chapters, I 
demonstrate that the contemporary memory is a persuasive technology that we use to re-
make and manipulate memory. However, one of the larger issues with contemporary 
memory, as Brooke has also noted, is that instead of adapting the canons alongside 
changing media, rhetoricians continue to use the models that were designed for oral and 
early print cultures, not the digital texts with which we deal today.  Rather than 
dismissing the canons, I argue that rhetoric should focus on updating the canons for 
contemporary audiences.  If the canon of memory is to be resuscitated, then it must 
respond to digital texts differently than it did previous media constructions.  By utilizing 
techne in order to rethink contemporary memory, I explore the creative potential that 
interactive technologies pose to the canon of memory.  
Fortunately, though, the canon of memory has not been entirely neglected, but I 
do believe that rhetoricians have not aggressively looked beyond memory as anything 
beyond remembered-or-forgotten.  The ways we think about memory creation, 
reproduction, and utilization must all be reexamined, and I intend to explore in what ways 
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memory itself needs to be refashioned with present day digital texts.  I choose to 
“refashion” memory instead of redefine, rework, or even reassemble because of this 
term’s reference to older media.  Some of the texts I examine later in this dissertation, 
like archives, are not new structures, but are instead refashioned along the lines of what 
David Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin call “remediated.”  For Bolter and Grusin, 
remediation is refashioning—it is the act of borrowing from or paying homage to an older 
media form.  For example, the photograph refashioned the oil painting; while the subject 
might still be the same (say, someone sitting for a portrait), the medium itself has 
changed (gelatin-silver paper instead of canvas).  Similarly, although the subject memory 
might remain constant (I will always have memories my thirtieth birthday), the ways I 
choose to remember and replay those memories (I have my own photos and I have also 
been “tagged” on Facebook in other’s) have the potential to be radically different because 
of the technologies we use to shape the memory itself.  
In what follows, I overview some of the ways memory has peeked through the 
rhetorical curtain in several fields outside of English.  Afterwards, I follow the 
development of contemporary memory by riding three distinct waves: natural and 
artificial memory, externalized memory, and memory presence.  I aim to leave this 
chapter with a thorough understanding of how memory has evolved since antiquity and 
by demonstrating the creative possibilities for contemporary memory. 
Wait, Wait Don’t Tell Me: Finding Our Rhetorical Memory in Other Fields 
Despite few attempts to move memory to the fore of the rhetorical canons, 
memory has not been entirely neglected, surfacing sporadically within English 
departments as well as in different academic circles throughout its long history.  For 
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instance, memory has been the focus of several significant recent publications.  The book 
series Cultural Memory in the Present has published several trans- and inter-disciplinary 
humanities texts emphasizing “the close attention to the detail of the cultural object” to 
highlight the interpretation and “the meaning of the object for a present that is not 
amnesiac” (“Cultural Memory”).  Launched in 2008, the interdisciplinary journal 
Memory Studies emphasizes the critical study of memory in the humanities and social 
sciences, indicating the desire to ‘remember’ memory in this contemporary moment.  
Even still, several aspects of memory studies have been emphasized in some important 
recent texts.  Svetlana Boym’s The Future of Nostalgia accentuates nostalgia as the 
memory of a time or longing for home that no longer exists (xiii).  In Jose van Dijck’s 
Mediated Memories, she questions the stability of memories by interrogating the 
technologies we employ in order to actually recall specific personal events.  While 
Bernard Stiegler’s recently translated Technics and Time, 2: Disorientation maintains 
that memory is indeed a technological tool, Matthew Kirschenbaum’s Mechanisms 
reminds readers that memory “storage today is both an accessory, something you hold in 
your hand or slip into your pocket (your iPod or memory stick), but is also increasingly 
disembodied and dematerialized” (4).  Although these books are critical to my project 
because they highlight the recent interest in digital memory studies, these texts all ignore 
digital memory’s immense potential for rhetorical practice.  Because interactive 
technologies greatly expand the “available means of persuasion” in the sense that they 
can bend, mold, and make unique memories out of existing ones, I am interested in what 
interactive technologies can actually ‘do’ to memory.  
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Other disciplines, such as sociology and communication, have several well-
known studies of monuments and memorials as inscriptions of contemporary memory.  
Take, for example, Ekaterina Haskins’ study of the United States Postal Service’s 
collection “Celebrate the Century,” in which she recognizes the affectivity of several 
national iconic “pop” images that were immortalized in the postage stamp series. Such 
focus on the construction and interpretative value of various national events highlights 
the tangibility as well as the flexibility of such memory markers.  Haskins suggests that 
“because contemporary icons serve an important emotional and political function,” the 
possibility for “counter-hegemonic interpretations” of widely recognized historical events 
is almost inevitable (2).  Such personal renderings are all informed by unique memories, 
causing conflicts between the national historic events that the stamps immortalize and the 
individualized interpretations of the remembered occasions.  Conversational inquiries 
such as “where you when Kennedy was shot?” represent the tension between national 
history and the personal memory studied in Haskins’ article.  In chapter three, I return to 
the idea of national memory by utilizing Alison Landsberg’s concept of “prosthetic 
memory” to argue in favor of memory creation from a distance.  As another example of 
memorial studies, visitor contributions at national monuments, such as the Vietnam 
Memorial Wall in Washington D.C., shift the rigidity of monuments into fluid structures 
marked-up with material memories (e.g., notes to loved ones left at the wall and military 
identification tags).  Although monuments like the Vietnam Memorial Wall are meant to 
encapsulate a memory of national importance, Carole Blair argues that the frequency 
with which personal effects are left at/on the wall are alterations to the actual text of the 
stone monument (272).  However, such contributions do not remain part of the 
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memorial’s permanent “text,” since all the personal effects are removed regularly.  The 
digital archives I examine in chapter three suggest that the current shape of memorials is 
dramatically different because users’ contributions actually create the permanent text of 
the digital site.  Also in chapter three, I distinguish between closed memory museums 
(such as the Vietnam Memorial Wall the personal effects left at the site) and open 
memory museums (the digital archives that thrive on users’ contributions for its 
existence).  
While each study is significant in its own ways, neither connects memory and 
techne as the motivation behind the memorials’ flexibility.  Although Haskins and Blair’s 
arguments both note that the constantly shifting text of monuments make the historical 
markers fluid memories, there are more relevant examples (like digital archives) of 
“making memory” that need consideration.  Personal devices like iPods, smart phones, 
and digital cameras encourage their users to Tweet, blog, or shoot video in order to make 
and share memories, but rhetoric has not yet critically engaged with these ubiquitous 
forms of persuasive possibilities that new technologies inspire.  As a result, I argue that 
the ease of creating, reproducing, sharing and “making” digital memories should signal 
an important moment to think about memory and techne together.  
I also want to emphasize the importance of such an expanded notion of rhetorical 
memory for understanding the interactions of subjectivity, sociality, and persuasion 
today. I am particularly interested in thinking through contemporary rhetorical memory in 
reference not only to the Greek tradition, but also to a much more recent segment of 
Western intellectual history: the “big theory” era of the critical humanities in the 80’s and 
90’s and the multiple claims in the past decade concerning the “death of theory” and the 
  
10 
 
 
 
end of this era.  Indeed, while the status of memory as a crucial concept in twentieth-
century rhetorical theory and pedagogy has been a degraded one, many of the pre-modern 
vectors of memory returned both implicitly and explicitly in the initial days of 
postmodern critical theory. Thus, even a quick review of some of postmodern theory’s 
“greatest hits” reveals that the notion of “meaning making” (similar to The New London 
Group’s claim mentioned earlier) was often mediated through a rethinking of memory. 
For instance, in Derrida's influential “Plato’s Pharmacy” the importance of memory to 
Greek thought and its role in the struggle over (Platonic) philosophy and (sophistic) 
rhetoric is the lynchpin through which the now famous postmodern “critique of presence” 
(to which I will return at the end of this chapter) and of the logocentrism of the Western 
metaphysical tradition is articulated.  
Similarly, although the most popular legacy of Lyotard’s The Postmodern 
Condition is its prediction of the collapse of “grand narratives” and the parallel 
resurgence of localized knowledges, Lyotard’s thematizing of sea-changes in 
epistemology, politics, and pedagogy is undergirded by a more general argument about 
the changing status of memory and information in postmodernism. On the one hand, 
Lyotard writes of the increasing importance of “memory” as it is stored in nonhuman 
realms: “the traditional teacher is replaceable by memory banks, didactics can be 
entrusted to machines linking traditional memory banks (libraries, etc.) and computer 
data banks” (50). On the other hand, as nonhuman memory sites become central to 
human learning and social life (Lyotard calls technological memory “nature” for 
postmodern man), there is a shift in what counts as intelligence and skill in humans. 
Although the “modern” conception of genius may have been the individual who has 
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recourse to personal, specialized knowledge, the “postmodern” genius is the individual 
adept at exploiting and making innovative connections between the vast and accessible 
“stored” knowledge located in networks of information technology (51-52). 
Memory was also a crucial concept in Foucault’s “archaeological” method 
through his focus on “the field of memory” woven by archival materials (64) and later in 
his “genealogical” work wherein, as C. Colwell glosses, the “counter-memory” of 
genealogy is used as a critical wedge against the “collective memory of a particular social 
group” (2). To provide just one more example, memory was equally important to Fredric 
Jameson in periodizing postmodern culture and aesthetics from that of the high modern, 
the former having lost the sense of “deep memory” so pivotal to the sensibilities of the 
latter (36).  All of these works hailed both rhetorical memory’s earlier character as an 
interface between the interior and exterior of human subjectivity, as well as, much like 
the early Greek association of mnemosyne and lethe, the recognition that the present and 
future of memory as a capacity is bound up with that of forgetting. More specifically, 
they all focused on the fragility of traditional notions of memory and the need to create 
new tools of critical sense-making (cognitive mapping, archaeology, language games, 
deconstruction, genealogy) and the potentially liberatory power of such tools to challenge 
the domain of collective or personal memory and, by proxy, totalizing systems of 
knowledge.  
Let’s return to finding memory in other disciplines.  Memory has also been a 
popular subject in some major Hollywood films such as The Bourne Trilogy, Eternal 
Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, Memento, and Slumdog Millionaire.  While I am not a 
film scholar (as a tired grad student, I fall asleep during too many movies anyway), I am 
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interested in the popularity of these films because they emphasize the co-dependence of 
memory creation and technology.  Memento, for instance, follows the main character 
Leonard Shelby (played by Guy Pierce), a man who is unable to create new memories 
due to an injury incurred while fighting off his wife’s murderers.  As a result of his 
accident, Shelby can recall everything previous to the attack, but injuries sustained in his 
assault prevent him from creating new memories.  Because he relies on physical 
reminders, such as Polaroid pictures and tattoos, these material memories do not simply 
supplement his personal memory, but they are his only form of memory. In Memento, 
Shelby is relying upon the permanency of the memories he makes in order to function.   
The correlation between biological memory (Shelby’s is damaged) and 
externalized “made” memory (on which Shelby depends) is another example of the 
tension in which I am interested throughout this dissertation.  Much like Leonard Shelby, 
individuals supplement their biological abilities by placing their memories in external 
memory devices more regularly.  Further, our growing reliance on externalized memory 
simultaneously requires users to place trust in apparatuses that are not limited by self-
control as biological memory is thought to be.  For instance, because Wikipedia entries 
can be modified by anyone, the information contained on certain pages can be 
intentionally falsified.  During an episode of The Colbert Report, comedian host Steven 
Colbert jokingly denounced Wikipedia and its users’ inability to distinguish between true 
or misleading information.  To demonstrate, Colbert encouraged his viewers to update the 
Wikipedia entry on African elephants to note that its population had tripled in size in six 
months (“Episode 128”).  Because viewers were successful at updating the site’s content, 
this modification suggests that the line between true and false information can be 
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misleading.  Similarly in Memento, characters purposely mess with Leonard’s inability to 
remember—a hotel clerk charges him for two rooms, an informant hides pens so Leonard 
cannot take notes (i.e., make memories).  The Colbert Report and Memento both suggest 
that externalized memory is vulnerable to malicious actions; furthermore, these instances 
of manipulated memory represent the apprehension about total reliance on externalized 
memory.  Even though externalized memory still causes a certain amount of hesitation, I 
intend to show that contemporary memory does not always end in deception, but instead 
memory as a techne can be created and designed for productive ends.  
All of the examples noted above accentuate the fact that memory is a continually 
intriguing topic within academic and pop-culture circles, but it also highlights that 
memory has unfortunately been of little interest to rhetoric studies in English departments 
today.  Because certain sites encourage users to contribute to universal knowledge, new 
media outlets such as Twitter, (the now defunct) Google Wave, Wikipedia, and blogs 
explicitly increase the possibility for persuasiveness by way of collective memory.  While 
these platforms have been engaged through pedagogical inquiry and questioned about 
their social implications, rhetoric has not rigorously investigated these programs and their 
persuasive content.  In what follows, I highlight how memory has been a continual force 
since its inception as a canon of rhetoric; however, by tracing memory’s history, I argue 
that it has detoured from its original rhetorical aims by neglecting to critically engage 
with the available means afforded by contemporary digital media.  In order to engage 
rhetoric, memory, and interactive technologies, I feel it is best introduce some critical 
terms that I will be employing when discussing memory and rhetoric; these terms will be 
utilized throughout this first chapter in order to strengthen the connections between 
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memory, techne, and technology.  The three terms that are most important to employ in 
this chapter are: natural and artificial memory, externalization, and presence. These 
terms trace the development of memory from its classical rhetorical origins to its 
theoretical implications within recent contexts.  I have selected these three terms because 
of their correlation to the development of memory as a rhetorical structure and also 
because they highlight memory’s drift away from rhetoric, signaling a dire need to return 
to its roots.  Because I am defining memory through the intersection of techne and 
technology, these three terms also showcase the influence of technologies on the creation 
of new memories. 
The Practice of Storage: Natural and Artificial Memory 
In the oral culture of the ancients, an expansive and trained memory indicated that 
an individual had a great storehouse of knowledge; more importantly, a trained memory 
was essential because print culture was underdeveloped and underemphasized, forcing 
individuals to ready their memory with practice and storage techniques.  Many ideas and 
theories of memory have been informed by stories about individuals with large memory 
capacities.  For example, the tale of Simonides has been captured and retold by numerous 
rhetoricians—Cicero and Quintilian’s accounts are among the most popular.  In sum, 
Simonides was the sole survivor of a ceiling collapse that killed everyone else attending a 
dinner party, but he remembered each individual who was fatally wounded by recalling 
where they sat (Yates 2).  Simonides was able to remember all of the guests because he 
recalled each of their places at the dinner table, a technique that later translated into using 
“places” or loci to remember practically anything.  In The Art of Memory, Frances A. 
Yates’ extensive text on memory, she references many writers who have titled Simonides 
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the “inventor of the art of memory,” a result of how the importance of place and a 
heightened sense of sight influenced later rhetoricians’ theories of memory (82).  More 
recently known as mnemotechnics or “mnemonic devices,” this method of memory 
storage linked words or ideas with visual representations designed to trigger the memory.  
To explain, when I was memorizing a timeline for an exam in a high school history 
course, I was able to remember that Marco Polo returned from his Asian voyage in 1295 
because I created an image in my mind—a polo shirt with a price tag for $12.95.  The 
fact that I still remember it to this day speaks to the effectiveness of such mnemonic 
techniques; but the ancient method of memorization went a bit further.  In order to build a 
strong memory, Quintilian believed that one should place different ideas or topics for a 
speech in various places in an imaginary house, that way the orator could mentally walk 
among the loci and retrieve information, with accuracy and without fail, in any order and 
at any given time while delivering long speeches (11.2).  Accordingly, I might have 
visualized that Polo shirt hanging in a closet so that as I was “walking” through the 
house, I could see the garment and remember the facts I attached to it.   
Others in antiquity have also created elaborate memory systems in order to 
organize thoughts; for instance, Quintilian refers to Metrodorus who created a memory 
system based upon the zodiac, expanding the twelve signs into thirty-six, and eventually 
finding “three hundred and sixty places in the twelve signs through which the sun moves” 
(qtd. in Yates 40).  Each of the three hundred and sixty loci could be used to store 
information, allowing the orator to be prepared to speak on any topic and in any given 
order.  To name just one more example of memory places, in the Middle Ages, Guilio 
Camillo created a theater initially centered upon seven planetary gods and expanding 
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each segment seven-fold, noting that the intricate structure of this celestial system relied 
on “the affective or emotional appeal of a good memory image” (Yates 144).   
Because the loci emphasize visual, imaginary constructs, the ancients also 
believed that the senses were vitally important to memory, causing significant rifts 
between the memory theories of Aristotle and Plato.  In the case of Aristotle, he argued 
that the senses outside of the body created such strong impressions, that he likened their 
mark on one’s memory to the imprint left by a wax seal (On Memory 170).  Aristotle 
placed such importance on the visual in relation to memory, he states in his treaty On 
Memory and Recollection that, “it is not possible even to think without an image” (168).  
Plato, on the contrary, believed that memory was inherent, and that senses only allowed 
an individual to remember what had been dormant (“Theaetetus” 151d-e).  For Plato, the 
role of memory was merely to recall what was already known, or innate, in each 
individual.  Essentially, and unlike my definition of contemporary memory, Platonic 
memory was not ‘in the business’ of making new memories.   
The notion that memory is aided by the senses and improved through the creation 
of images suggests that our biological brains, as they are, need some additional help from 
outside sources.  Recognizing this split in the Rhetorica Ad Herennium, Pseudo-Cicero 
divided memory into two categories: natural and artificial.  In the Ad Herennium, natural 
memory is defined as “memory which is imbedded in our minds, born simultaneously 
with thought” while artificial memory is characterized as “memory which is strengthened 
by a kind of training and system of discipline” (207).  This division was important for the 
ancients because of their primarily oral culture, and thus a trained and readied memory 
was crucial for an orator to appear polished and prepared for any situation.  The stronger 
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the artificial memory, the more easily the rhetor could perform at any time, and speak on 
any given topic.  Much like Simonides in the earlier example, in order to bolster natural 
memory, one fortified artificial memory by creating images of places and backgrounds 
where one could place ideas to be remembered for later use.  Pseudo-Cicero combines 
natural and artificial memory by linking the words of a verse with related images.  In the 
following passage he explains, for example, the necessity of coupling words and images 
in order to remember content more effectively: “But such an arrangement of images 
succeeds only if we use our notation to stimulate the natural memory so that we first go 
over a given verse twice or three times to ourselves and then represent the words by 
means of images. In this way art will supplement nature” (217, emphasis added).  
Artificial memory, therefore, mimics the inherent processes of natural memory and is 
strengthened through repetition and image creation.  Pseudo-Cicero asserts that replaying 
an idea and also matching it to a related image in the mind is the ultimate mode of 
memorization.  
As the previous examples highlighted, an organized memory is the co-
development of natural and artificial memory, a synchronized relationship between 
biology and practice.  If natural and artificial memory becomes more powerful as 
separate processes, then the combination of the two is a reliable and ironclad system, as 
demonstrated in De Oratore, Cicero’s encompassing text on oratory and orators.  In that 
text, Cicero examines the individual’s capacity to speak well in any given situation. To 
achieve this state, Cicero suggests that a full and organized memory is a useful tool in 
proportion to the weight of the other four canons (40-41).  In order to prepare one’s 
memory for oration, Cicero acknowledges that practice and training is the most 
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successful combination (43).  As a result, a well-stocked storehouse of memory assists 
the orator, allowing one to draw on numerous examples and ideas at a moment’s notice to 
reinforce or refute an argument.  In sum, Cicero emphasizes memorizing a great number 
of others’ writings as well as creating your own syntheses between them.  By 
encouraging our students to gather research in order to figuratively enter the 
conversation, this practice is one we continue in college writing courses even today by 
instructing our students to collect theories, ideas, and arguments in order to synthesize 
them with their own informed opinion.  For Cicero, gathering ideas aided the memory so 
that orators could recognize the connections between those ideas, allowing one to commit 
the connections to memory more easily.  Cicero remarks that memory is strengthened 
over time through experience; a prodigious memory is the result of practice and training, 
trial and error.  
 Jump forward a few millennia and we can see that the coupling of natural and 
artificial memory is still an active force in discussions about contemporary memory, but 
any mention of rhetoric is now missing from the picture.  Even though many of us cannot 
remember our closest friends’ or relatives’ phone numbers, it does not mean that we are 
incapable of ever phoning them.  Instead, our memories are displaced into external, 
artificial systems used to aid our natural processes of remembrance.  In the next section 
of this chapter, I review the shift from the internal juxtaposition of natural and artificial 
memory towards a displacement of memory as a non-biological process altogether.  
Because externalization symbolizes and acts on the desire to move memory outside of the 
body and into other apparatuses, it is important to begin tracing that journey by first 
examining Plato’s own hesitation about writing.   
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Thinking Outside of the Brain: Externalization 
The next phase of memory that I am exploring, externalization, is a natural 
successor to the coupling of natural and artificial memory.  Because natural memory is 
limited by biology, and since age and disease can affect our ability to remember, artificial 
systems must be developed to increase the efficacy of memory.  The two systems I have 
already explored are all designed to shape one’s ability to organize memory internally, 
although the development of print literacy increased the possibilities to locate memory 
outside of the body.  Alongside the evolution of print culture, the growing number of 
“available means” of persuasion also increased exponentially, drawing some rhetoricians 
to question the ethics of externalized memory.  In what follows, I explore the 
evolutionary co-development of rhetoric and externalized memory, recognizing that with 
external sources, a growing distrust of externalized memory erupted. 
In an age before print literacy, the emphasis on orality reinforced the power that 
the remembered word held over the written; in fact, memorization was so favored that 
even Plato and Quintilian have suggested that writing destroys the memory.  In the 
Phaedrus, Socrates winces at the suggestion that Phaedrus recite Lysias’ recent oration.  
Socrates counters Phaedrus recommendation by stating that any copy of the speech is 
unnecessary when they could simply go to Lysias himself for ‘an instant replay’ of his 
oration.  Later in Institutio oratoria, Quintilian, acknowledging Plato’s influence, 
demonstrates just how writing weakens personal memory: “Yet I find it said indeed by 
Plato that the use of letters is a detriment to memory, because, as he intimates, what we 
have committed to writing we cease, in some degree, to guard, and lose it through mere 
neglect” (11.2).  For Quintilian, memory does not always stay with us, but instead returns 
  
20 
 
 
 
after being lost.  In order to recapture “lost” memory, one should emphasize organization 
techniques in order to help the brain process information more quickly.  When the 
memory is trained and efficient, there should be no lag time between inventing and 
arranging the argument and delivering the speech clearly.  Today, it seems easy to 
remedy forgetfulness by writing down information, an act that Socrates and Quintilian 
were both vehemently against.  Siding with Plato, Quintilian argues that what we commit 
to writing we lose to mere neglect, for it cripples our memory.  Whereas the natural and 
artificial memory focused on strengthening memory internally, new developments in 
print and digital culture increase the possibility for additional externalized sources of 
memory.  
Even so, when Socrates first lashed out at Phaedrus, it was an important moment 
for rhetoric.  Socrates’ distaste of externalization represents a move away from the nature 
of rhetoric, summed up later in Aristotle’s classic definition: “the faculty of observing in 
any given case the available means of persuasion” (Rhetoric 6).  This early shift towards 
the externalization of memory recognizes some of the fears that arise from transferring 
our biological processes into non-biological mechanisms, one that has not disappeared 
even in this current digitally-dependent age.  Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric is a good 
place to begin recapturing the canon of memory in this contemporary moment, namely 
because the notion of “available means” can be interpreted differently and more 
encompassing since the onslaught of externalization.  For early rhetoricians, being 
prepared for oration meant collecting and having argumentation organized and readied 
for any given situation.  One of the means to accomplish effective oration was to exercise 
the memory so that during a speech, one could quickly employ a number of memorized 
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techniques as evidence.  The ability to efficiently recall these effective approaches 
allowed the orator to appear natural; rather than having to create appropriate evidence in 
the moment, the orator would simply retrieve what he already held in his memory.  This 
‘storehouse’ of techniques is similar to today’s ideas of external memory storage—digital 
spaces allow individuals to store an infinite amount of information, while mundane 
activities, such as Googling, fill the gaps in one’s knowledge. With Google aiding our 
memory to the point where no one needs to “forget” anything, the modern emphasis on 
externalized memory sharpens our mental reflexes so that the information we need to 
retrieve can occur more rapidly.  Even though it is too reductive to claim that information 
technologies simply offer ‘more’ in terms of storing available means, it is helpful to 
characterize the available means as the method by which the information can be sorted, 
tagged, and informed by the user in order to be recalled quickly and utilized effectively.  I 
am suggesting that the crucial issue with contemporary memory is not how much we can 
store, but rather the structures and networks we develop in order to process and use that 
information efficiently, an idea that I examine thoroughly in chapter five.   
Digital memory is constantly scrutinized because there is such a hesitation to rely 
on it completely.  For example, we tend to see an age gap between those who bond with 
technology and those who are hesitant to let it come into their lives.  My parents’ 
generation, for one, is becoming more tech-oriented, although there is still a dramatic 
learning curve.  For a while, my dad’s favorite computer activity was reformatting his 
computer’s hard drive when something went wrong (my brothers and I still believe he 
just liked DOS too much to let it go, and we’re hoping those days are behind us).  Even 
though my parents are slowly learning about the computer, and they are more apt to e-
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mail or text one of us when they want something, they do not have Facebook pages or 
blogs that might give them a little more “tech cred” among younger generations.  So why 
are they so slow to adopt new technologies into their lives?  One reason might be drawn 
from years of schooling that reinforced the importance of memorization techniques, and 
perhaps they feel that using technology to supplement and replace the skills they have 
learned over a lifetime is, in a sense, “cheating.”  My peers (the last few years of the Gen 
Xers) do not feel the resistance that our parents’ generation feels.  Even though we were 
not born into the world of ubiquitous computing like those of the Gen Yers (or whatever 
people are calling them these days), my generation has fully accepted the additional 
capabilities that external technologies afford the individual.  Admittedly, many of my 
peers do not have facts about each other memorized.  Maybe I’m a bad friend, but 
without my iCal, I would not remember my friends’ birthdays; further, if you ask me for 
one of their phone numbers, I am at a blank.  Conversely, my mom keeps track of these 
details by writing them on the calendar in her kitchen and the phone numbers written in 
her phone book.  However, there is an important and significant difference between these 
two types of storage.   
When Socrates insisted that writing degraded the memory, a suggestion which 
sparked the division between print literacy, rhetoric, and memory, the distinguishing 
feature between the written memory of my mom’s calendar and her phone book and the 
digital, externally stored memory of my iCal and cell phone database is the automaticity 
of the latter.  To explain, each January my mom rewrites everyone’s birthday on her new 
calendar, forcing her to be reminded of each date.  This reminder then serves as a 
recollection, or re-memorized fact—she may have forgotten the date over the year, but by 
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re-writing it at least once, she recalls the details in specific relation to a date.  The 
Spanish rhetorician Ramon Llull devised a memory technique that he called “chew it 
over”—if there is a fact you would like to remember, you should keep it present in your 
mind and keep “chewing” it until you have “digested” the important information 
(“Memory Training”).  The digested information could then be regurgitated as needed.  
When my mom rewrites (externalizes) the important dates on each new calendar, she 
chews on the facts as she rewrites them.  More importantly, even though she might say 
that her memory is slipping from age, she actually has all of the birthdays on the calendar 
memorized (and with twenty siblings and in-laws, over forty nieces and nephews, and a 
dozen or so friends, this is no small feat).  Her constant return to the calendar and the 
annual act of rewriting the birthdays represents that writing does strengthen the memory 
when an individual returns to the original site in order to replicate the act.   
 Let’s turn to my system now, which I find easier and much less time consuming.  
Once I learn of someone’s birthday, I open my iCal, create a new “event” for that 
occasion and simply select “repeat every year” and, voila, my work is done—for good.  I 
do not have to sit down each January with a new, blank calendar and transfer the dates—
the dates are automatically transferred for me.  I do not have to, as Llull argues, “chew on 
it” to keep it in mind.  Since my iCal is also linked to many of my devices, such as my 
iPad and my e-mail, reminders are simply handed to me with a sound and a message 
notifying me of the important event.  Because the device “remembers” for me, once I 
enter a new event, it no longer requires any ‘memorization’ on my part.  I have delegated 
my memory to a device that ‘does the dirty work for me.’  Even though some 
technophobes argue that technological devices are destroying the memories of adults in 
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my generation, I disagree with those sentiments.  For instance, although my memory is 
being shifted from my biological memory into technological devices, I am not necessarily 
forgetting the events.  Just as my mom’s calendar reminds her of family members’ 
birthdays, my iCal reminds me in the same way.  The difference between the two types of 
externalization lies in active and passive memory.  My mom’s annual tradition of filling 
in the dates requires a much more active memory, whereas my iCal, which automatically 
repopulates itself each year, takes almost no action on my part and is a passive type of 
memory.   
The passivity (and some might even say “automaticity”) of digital organization 
systems tends to be a major rift between those that endorse the benefits of technological 
memory (like my peers) and those that shy away from it (my parents’ generation).  The 
work of Merlin Donald, a cognitive psychologist who has studied the intersection of life 
systems and information systems from early hominid development to the current moment 
of high technology, is particularly helpful in beginning to think through the relationship 
that techne played in the role of organization and arrangement that is now most 
associated with information technologies.  Donald is not the first to highlight the 
influence of technology on biology.  To name just two others, Eric Havelock and Walter 
Ong have also suggested that technological advances are reflected in biological 
developments. Havelock, for instance, notes that when writing and written texts gained 
popularity, many were hesitant to rely on these written records, believing that they could 
be easily altered – more so than biological memory (100-1).  In Orality and Literacy, 
Walter Ong points to a split in the oral tradition.  By differentiating “primary orality” (a 
culture untouched by knowledge of writing or text) and from “secondary orality” (our 
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present-day high-technology culture which depends on writing and print for their 
existence), Ong recognizes the dependence of written technology on our recent biological 
progress (6, 11).  However, Donald’s work is especially important to my argument 
because the central focus of his most recent work is the co-implication of biological and 
cultural evolutionary mechanisms, particularly how these processes intersect through 
what he names ‘storage systems.’  We tend to think that human evolution primarily takes 
place through biological responses to environmental changes and that culture or 
technology intrudes in the process, but the shift towards externalized memory highlights 
the fact that technology has co-opted biological memory.  Donald suggests that cultural 
changes have long been implicated in biological evolution and those cultural 
developments, such as the advent of language and literacy, have directly impacted 
biological evolution, rewiring not only the human mind but also the physiological brain.  
The relation between the dual mechanisms of evolution fore grounded by Donald is most 
apparent with the introduction of the external symbolic storage (ESS) system. Donald 
defines ESS as the establishment of various organized spaces into which humans place 
knowledge that can be accessed at any given time in the future (308).  Coupled with the 
ubiquitous utilization of devices such as smart phones, flash drives, and GPS navigation, 
use of ESS infers that there is a decreased dependence on internal (natural) memory and 
increased dependence on externalized (artificial) memory, emphasizing the fact that the 
assimilation of these instruments into many daily activities has been practically 
subliminal.  Furthermore, the most important feature of ESS is that it proves that the 
brain’s size and capacity are increasing, but that this expansion is actually occurring 
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outside of the body.  Further still, ESS represents that the accumulation of knowledge is 
no longer restricted by the brain’s physical storage limitation.  
It has been important to trace the resistance of externalization from Plato to 
Donald in order to highlight the tension between rhetoric and memory, especially because 
several aspects of the digital are wrapped-up in memory. In the final section of this 
chapter, I explore how the idea of presence is an equally critical concept by which to 
refashion memory. In what follows, I explore some of the difficulties that rhetorical 
memory encounters in relation to presence.  Keeping digital memories present (or at least 
not forgetting memories by haphazardly deleting them) is one of the largest roadblocks 
concerning contemporary memory.  If we can easily store and remember every event, 
then forgetting them is no less of a challenge. Presence, then, provides an insight into 
how contemporary memory is complicated by the tension between memory and 
forgetting. 
Up Close and Personal: Presence  
When I hear the term “presence,” a few ideas come to mind.  Most likely, 
presence suggests the here-and-now, a sense of being in the moment, or a reappearing 
(like a ghost or specter).  For memory studies, presence is always a contested term.  At 
the start of Memory, History, Forgetting, French philosopher Paul Ricoeur questions 
Aristotle’s connection between memory imprints on the body and the soul: “What is it 
that we remember? Is it the affection or the thing that produced it? If it is the affection, 
then it is not something absent one remembers; if it is the thing, then how, while 
perceiving the impression, could we remember the absent thing that we are not at present 
perceiving?” (Ricoeur 17).  Like Ricoeur questions here, I, too, wonder what is recalled 
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in the process of memory.  For instance, the item that enables a spontaneous recollection 
(think of the madeleine made famous in Proust’s Remembrance of Time Past) allows us 
to recall an event in a certain contextualized package, but we are unable to recreate the 
actual presence of the past event.  As a result, absence becomes the crux of the “presence 
problem”—memory does not (and cannot) recreate what “has been” or what has been 
stored.  Contemporary memory, on the contrary, is highly invested in the possibility of 
the “might still,” or the creation of moments that spark spontaneous recollection.  French 
philosopher Jacques Derrida is an important contribution to my conception of presence.  
By examining the unconscious in texts like Archive Fever, by coining the term différance 
in Of Grammatology, and even considering the lingering effects of Marxism in Specters 
of Marx, Derrida’s work is tightly bound up with the ideas of presence.  In this section, I 
will use Derrida’s theories to inform my own thinking about presence and memory.   
However, even before Derrida wrote Archive Fever, other philosophers were 
grappling with the suggestion that memory is a creative force, and that recollection is the 
result of reinterpreting the unconscious.  Although the term “unconscious” was not 
prevalent in the Enlightenment, John Locke argued that memory, which he argues is 
inherent in all individuals, surfaced through sensory perceptions, a notion that is certainly 
a precursor of Freud’s unconscious (67).  Locke’s process of creating and gaining 
knowledge was the benchmark for most other Enlightenment thinkers.  Because the 
Enlightenment weighed empiricism and fact-based evidence so heavily, Locke 
maintained that truth in the world was an attempt “to understand knowledge as a 
psychological phenomenon,” a stark contrast to those who believed that knowledge could 
be attained through perception alone (Bizzell and Herzberg 697).  From this perspective, 
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Locke’s theory of memory, or what he calls “retention,” is the storage of a sensation once 
the object of that sensation is removed (96).  Later, Proust’s madeleine is another good 
example of this theory—once he encountered the treat, the madeleine caused the 
individual to recall an event he once thought long lost, one that was buried so deeply that 
he did not even know the memory had faded.  Whether through the senses, the madeleine, 
or a shuffled song on your iPod, recalling memories is always a process that involves 
retracing old paths via new connections and, arguably, new technologies.  
In the essay “The Technical Substrates of Unconscious Memory,” Patricia 
Ticineto Clough interrogates the distanced relationship between Derrida and Freud 
throughout Archive Fever.  In Archive Fever, Derrida explores the role of unconscious 
memory as a collection of events that an individual may have forgotten he forgot about.  
Derrida argues that the way an event is stored changes the way it is remembered, thus the 
technological developments that were not around in Freud’s lifetime (e.g., e-mail) would 
have made a larger impact on his psychoanalyses (Archive 18).  Clough introduces the 
term “teletechnology” as a way to represent our current subjectivity in relation to 
technologies.  For Clough, teletechnology represents our vulnerability of exposure, and 
ultimately our powerlessness, to decide whether to turn technology on or off (384).  
There is an important distinction between public and private, and teletechnology does not 
negate those spaces; rather than deterritorialize, teletechnology actually reterritorializes 
social spaces.  Clough defines this new space of teletechnology as the “increased 
possibility of the release of the human subject’s agency from non-reflexive relationships 
to tradition, community, and large social structures” (384).   What this means for human 
agency, then, is that the reflexive power of non-human agents (i.e. teletechnologies) is 
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forcing humans to act unconsciously in relation to them.  Furthermore, these unconscious 
reflexive acts represent the blurred lines between human and machine, the ontological 
and the technological, fantasy and reality (Clough 385).  These unconscious interchanges 
between humans and machines are critical ideas for rethinking memory because they 
represent the capacity to produce new memories while overcoming the limitations 
biological memory.  
Rather than opposing the unconscious and the machine, Derrida’s reading of 
Freud in Archive Fever fills in the gaps with the technologies that were absent in Freud’s 
lifetime. Clough states, “it is possible to understand Freud’s treatment of unconscious 
memory as compensating for what could not be thought without the machine metaphors 
yet to come in the future” (386).  The unconscious does not simply record and replay 
memories.  Instead – and this is a crucial moment for my dissertation – the unconscious 
makes new memories by forcing new paths of memory.  As Derrida explains it, there is 
always a trace of a memory but how we arrive back at that memory will always be 
different—it will never be the same event we originally remembered because we are 
recalling it from a privileged standpoint.  A present memory, then, is never a recollection, 
but is a recreation, a new memory altogether.  It is impossible to recall an event exactly 
as it occurred because many things have happened in the in-between, forcing our 
perception to change, if even slightly.   
Derrida’s term “différance” helps to explain this idea more thoroughly. Différance 
is defined as the lag time between understanding the signified and its sign 
(Grammatology 62).   If recollection is always new, we are experiencing the delay 
between the past (remembered) and the present (recollecting) moment as an original 
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event.  Because there is always a delay between the two moments, the lag will always 
cause the recollection to be the creation of something new.  “In relation to unconscious 
memory,” Clough argues that, “the text is always produced through a ‘supplementary 
delay,’ a secondary revision of an event that has never been lived in the present” (391).  
Furthermore, this supplementary delay is why Derrida argues that the memory archive is 
always for the future, never for the past or the present.  The archive is created in the past, 
but can only be understood in the future. 
To illustrate this idea, in Archive Fever, Derrida examines Freud’s “mystical 
writing pad,” a child’s toy where you can write on the surface, pull back the film on the 
top, and the writing disappears.  Even though the writing on the top of the pad is erased, 
the imprint of the original writing is still left in the wax beneath.  Therefore, all the 
writing and drawing ever done on the surface of the pad is permanently retained in the 
wax underneath.  Freud likens this toy to unconscious memory—we always have a copy 
of our memories, but they might not be visible or readable.  This copy is what Freud calls 
“behind perception,” or the brain’s palimpsest of every event we have ever experienced.   
 The “mystical writing pad” also represents the different ways we recall events. 
For example, if I write the word “memory” on the surface of the mystical writing pad, the 
wax underneath will be a pure copy of the word on the surface.  Once I lift the film to 
erase the word from the viewing surface to write another word, the wax below will still 
have the word “memory” written in it.  Let’s say I write the word “unconscious” on the 
blank surface; now, the wax will not only have the word “memory,” but it will have the 
word “unconscious” carved in it as well.  When we look at the wax with the two words, it 
might look like a jumbled mess, but if we look closely enough, we could probably trace 
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the original words.  After repeated use, the wax will become increasingly more difficult 
to decipher—using the mystical writing pad for a week, the wax might look like a bunch 
of scribbles with no decipherable text.   However, I know that the words “memory” and 
“unconscious” are still imprinted in the wax, but the route to find them will be changed or 
unclear with every new word written over them. 
 The example of Freud’s mystical writing pad illustrates just how memory is 
creative—each new memory (or on the writing pad, each newly written word) creates a 
new path by which to make older memories present.  The exchange between memories is 
a result of a creative co-production by which old memories are rewritten just as new ones 
are written.  For Derrida, Freud, and myself, unconscious memory is a creative, memory-
making apparatus, not a memory-keeping one (Clough 388).  This is a critical distinction 
for my dissertation, especially when thinking of techne as a creative and productive force 
of contemporary memory. 
 Furthermore, Derrida acknowledges that even though there is repetition in 
memory, he argues that it is not the memorized content that is repeated, stating: 
“repetition is an ‘originary’ repetition; it is not the repetition of an original” (Clough 
388).  In other words, a memory is only stored once, but its recollection is always an 
original event.  During recollection, what was retained in the wax will always force an 
original perception of the event that was stored because the path to arrive at that memory 
will be different.  Recollection is not repetition.  Instead, recollection is creative, not 
static, because the interactions between memories during the act of recollection force an 
individual to recreate the event in relation to all of the accrued events that occurred 
between the original memory and its recollection.  This is an important idea to keep in 
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mind for my project because many other theories of memory have argued on the contrary, 
suggesting that recollection was simply the surfacing of an old, stored idea.    
Making Memory, Using Techne: Conclusion 
To wrap up this chapter, I want to share one more example of memory as a 
productive concept rather than one of storage to highlight the importance of introducing 
techne into the conversation.  Even though I am not a gamer by any stretch of the 
imagination, years ago I recall playing Kirby’s Dreamland for the Nintendo GameBoy for 
days on end.  Without counting the hours of Solitaire I have under my belt, Kirby is still 
the only video game I have ever beaten.  During my quest to conquer the game, I 
distinctly remember dreaming about the music, the challenges, the enemies, and the 
mistakes I made trying to “level-up.” Surprisingly, I beat Kirby’s Dreamland after a few 
days of playing and as many days dreaming about it.  While dreaming about the video 
game, my brain retraced and replayed that day’s events not to provide me with a play-by-
play, but to help me learn something new about the situation.  Recent studies conducted 
on video gaming and dreaming have suggested that when a gamer concentrates on a 
certain game for long periods throughout the day and before bedtime, she awakens with a 
renewed ability to complete the tasks more efficiently (Stickgold, et al).  During sleep, 
the brain revisits the pathways by which we attempted to complete the task, and while the 
unconscious forms new connections that will help us the next morning when we pick up 
the game again.  
To illustrate, let’s say you are in your car and stuck on a snowy road, but you 
desire to turn around and head home.  You put the car in drive, maybe go a couple of feet, 
get stuck and switch the car into reverse to try again.  This event may occur a few times 
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until you give-up, too exasperated to continue.  A little while later, you decide to give it 
another go, only this time you maneuver your car into the tracks of a car that has just 
passed you—success!  The final effort of waiting and tracing another’s path represents 
what transpires in our brains when we are asleep.  During sleep, our brain forms new 
connections by reprocessing memories we made while we were awake to help us learn 
new ways of completing a task even when we are not consciously participating in the 
learning process.  
Researchers who discovered the connection between sleep, learning, and memory 
asked participants to play both Tetris and the downhill skiing simulation game Alpine 
Racer II for hours during the day while researchers noted their (oftentimes poor) 
performance (R. Stickgold, et al 1056).  What is most interesting about this study is the 
majority of participants dreamed about methods by which they could increase their 
performance in the game (“The Sleep-Memory”).  The next morning when the 
participants were asked to play Tetris and the ski simulator game once again, everyone’s 
performance dramatically improved, suggesting that the brain creates new connections 
and pathways based on the memories of lived events.  If the possibility exists to create 
mental connections based on unconscious memories that we made ourselves, then what 
does this discovery suggest for research in rhetorical memory?  Because advances in 
information technologies allow us to create sharable “memory files,” how does a digital 
archive function within a collection of memories over which the original user does not 
have complete control?  Finally, is the seemingly arbitrary tracing and resurfacing of the 
unconscious similar to the undetermined ends of a digital memory?   
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I will explore these questions along with others in the upcoming chapters.  As a 
creative and productive force, the coupling of memory and techne highlights the 
necessity of refashioning memory for contemporary rhetoric.  While the evolution of 
memory has been witnessed through three specific waves (natural and artificial, 
externalization, and presence), all three represent the gradual shift from memory as a 
strict biological attribute into its contemporary place in technological apparatuses.  The 
importance of the latter offers an entrance into several reconceptualizations of 
contemporary rhetorical memory; but the specific use of techne will allow me to focus on 
how memory is being produced for future use.   
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Chapter Two  
Techne Three Ways 
 Each semester in my technical writing classes, my students are required to write 
instructions, a standard assignment for practicing engineers.  Because the students select 
their own topics, I usually end up with an assortment of complex and sophisticated 
subjects, ranging from detailed origami folds to in-depth instructions on various computer 
programs.  The students always find it difficult to teach someone what they know so 
well—one of the most frequent complaints I hear is, “I just know how to do it, I don’t 
know how it’s actually done.”  When I hear this complaint (aside from thinking it is an 
undergraduate cop-out), I realize that we feel this way at different levels of education and 
our careers.  Thinking back to my first semesters of teaching composition, I did not feel 
competent teaching other students how to write—I did not know how the words appeared 
on the page, they just, well, happened.  In those first few semesters of teaching, I 
identified more closely with those students qua student than with my role as their 
instructor.  In retrospect, my lack of solid teaching skills and confidence was certainly 
because my own pedagogical abilities were in need of serious practice and understanding.  
In fact, it turns out that the words do not magically “ just happen,” and I eventually 
figured out not only my method of teaching writing but also the ways to circumvent 
classroom mishaps, like failed classroom discussions or poorly designed writing 
assignments.  As Ryan Moeller and Ken McAllister have suggested, learning how to 
overcome seemingly random classroom occurrences is not just “beginner’s luck,” but the 
culmination of experiences is the “trick” to successful adaptive techniques (201).  The 
difficulties with the instruction assignment may have fallen into the “failed assignment” 
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category in my earlier days of teaching, but with some decent classroom experience 
under my belt now, when I hear my students moan over the pending deadline for their 
instructions, I bring out the play-dough.   
The audience of technical documents is oftentimes a phantom one—we do not 
know whom, yet alone how many people, will read what we have written.  In order to 
help my students think critically about teaching a skill with which they are quite familiar 
to a phantom audience, I find it helpful to level the playing field.  So on that fateful Play-
dough day in the semester, I drag containers of the gooey, smelly, malleable childhood 
putty across campus.  Unless they have children of their own or are employed as a 
childcare provider, the majority of the students have not played with Play-dough since 
they were quite young.  The students stare, flatten, and roll around the Play-dough until 
(seemingly miraculously) a clay sculpture is created.  Afterwards, the students are 
required to draft instructions so that another group can replicate their original design.  As 
straightforward as this seems, the results are often quite messy—literally.  Here’s how it 
usually plays out: in almost every group, the instructions tend to omit certain steps 
because the designers thought the other group would “get it” or just know “what we 
meant by X.”  Groups leave out measurements, sizes, and directions for placement, 
resulting in a confused mass of Play-dough only somewhat resembling the original idea.  
Once each group completes writing their own and replicating another group’s 
instructions, my students and I discuss the pitfalls of such an assignment—Why is it so 
difficult to teach someone how to follow a process?  Is it because the directions need to 
be created and followed precisely?  Is it a language “thing”?  What strikes me, however, 
is how difficult it is to teach a task and follow someone else’s instruction to a tee.   
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Both the Play-dough exercise and the instruction assignment are not just some 
coincidental nod shared between techne and technical writing.  In 2002, Technical 
Communication Quarterly devoted its entire spring issue to techne, with particular focus 
on how technical communication as a field might benefit from incorporating the practices 
and techniques of techne into its theoretical applications and individual pedagogies.  
Techne is a great fit the classroom, particularly in the technical writing classroom, 
because of the ways we (as teachers) must encourage our students to see beyond the 
constrictions of workplace document templates and instead view technical writing as a 
mode of anticipation, one that thoroughly understands the readers’ perspective (Moeller 
and McAllister).  Much to my satisfaction, the Play-dough activity always reminds me 
that the concept of techne is much more complex than simply repeatability or 
teachability, and that to actually have a techne is even more difficult.  One of the most 
interesting, albeit frustrating, aspects of techne is its widely debated definition.  Not only 
do Plato, Aristotle, and even Isocrates have widely ranging interpretations and 
applications of the term, but the debate rages on even in today’s rhetoric circles.  As a 
result, the definition of the Greek term techne has always been a critical debate, largely 
the result of the inability to locate a precise word by which to translate it.  Techne is 
frequently translated as “skill” “craft” or “art” but more regularly techne has become 
grouped along side – or even absorbed completely – by the use of the word technology.  
Because their linguistic roots are nearly identical, it is not unusual to see the words 
“techne” and “technology” used interchangeably, although sometimes incorrectly, for one 
other.  For example, in his essay “The Question Concerning Technology,” Martin 
Heidegger searches for the essence of technology, employing techne in order to 
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differentiate between making and bringing-forth.  Edwin T. Layton, Jr. opens his essay 
“Technology as Knowledge” by borrowing two aspects Charles Singer’s classic 
definition of technology: “how things are commonly done or made” and “what things are 
done and made” to explore the epistemic implications of techne in recent technology 
studies (31).  Carl Mitcham reminds us in Thinking Through Technology that, “virtually 
all historians use the word ‘technology’ to refer to both ancient and modern, primitive 
and advanced making activities, or knowledge of how to make and use artifacts, or the 
artifacts themselves” (116).  Additionally, Jan Edward Garrett also comments that, 
“‘technology’ would not be a bad modern translation of ‘techne’” (Garrett 286).  
Certainly the linguistic tendency to swap technology and techne is an easy one—they 
both sound and look alike.  In fact, this substitution now happens so naturally that those 
of us in digital studies utilize “technology” as a blanket term to cover any process of 
advancement, the tools used to move forward, and as a suggestion of the future itself.  In 
this chapter I will explore the relation between techne and technology in order to rethink 
the canon of memory. I am arguing that the differences between techne and technology 
lead directly to the contemporary questions we face when thinking about “making” 
memories.  Because my interest extends beyond thinking of memory as storage capacity, 
I am interested in the ways users can create new memories from their interactions with 
various technologies. As a result, the intersection between memory, techne, and 
technology leads me to wonder if memory is now a technology, and if memory is now 
“made” usable through its externalization, is memory a techne? 
But before I can make such a claim, I must first explore what techne actually is.  
Because of the recent combinations of techne and technology, this chapter is an attempt 
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to explore techne by focusing on the most accurate translations and frequent usages of 
techne in ancient and contemporary rhetorical scholarship.  Even though such fertile 
arguments about techne are helpful for my task, it also proves to be equally difficult to 
sift through and determine which definitions of techne are the most effective to pair with 
memory.  In order to whittle my definition of techne from of the existing block of 
critique, I define techne three ways: as creativity or production; as a renegotiation of 
power; and as a balance of expert knowledge and instrumentality.  This chapter will be 
devoted to reviewing the most prevalent debates on the definition of techne by focusing 
on Plato and Aristotle while at the same time incorporating some more recent 
interpretations of techne suggested by David Roochnik, Joseph Dunne, Carl Mitcham, 
Robert Johnson, Frances Ranney, Martin Heidegger, and Janet Atwill.  The detailed work 
of these scholars indicate that the wide range of interpretations of techne cannot be 
subsumed under one single definition, so by offering a complete and complex look at 
techne, I avoid reducing or ignoring the existing body of scholarship.  
But why the turn to techne?  For many philosophers, techne suggests a sense of 
making, production, or use value.  Although such terms are in themselves loaded, they 
signify an insightful view into contemporary memory.  We constantly store memories 
outside of own neuronal capacity by posting personal photos to Flickr, upcoming events 
and important dates to our iCals or smartphones, even saving our dissertations as a 
Google Doc.  As a result, the idea of “making” memory becomes more apparent when we 
think about all the ways we actually produce and use memory for current and future 
purposes.  In what follows, I employ three categories that encompass much of the techne 
scholarship: making, expert knowledge, and use.  I argue that these three categories 
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highlight the most important characteristics of techne, especially in relation to my notion 
of contemporary memory.  
As examined in chapter one, interest in memory in contemporary rhetoric is not 
simply characterized as memorization techniques or retaining information in bulk, but is 
instead focused on how efficiently we use the memories we make.  In this dissertation, I 
intend the term “making memories” to be used quite literally—our memories are not only 
remembered by ourselves, but we transform them and make them useable by storing them 
on flash drives or sharing them through online networking sites such as Twitter or 
Facebook.  By linking memory and techne, this chapter will ultimately consider two 
specific questions: What is the tension throughout history between techne and 
technology? How does the tension between these two influence, shape, and determine the 
nature and relevance of the canon of memory? 
As I argued in the previous chapter, since memory has been neglected in 
rhetorical scholarship, I believe it is critical to resuscitate the canon of memory 
immediately, particularly at a moment when digital technologies afford the individual 
multiple occasions to literally remember everything.  However, I am interested in pushing 
the conversation forward; rather than thinking about memory as storage alone, I suggest 
that combining memory with techne and technology will provide rhetoric with some fresh 
perspectives on this canon.  More specifically, by viewing memory as a producible 
commodity, the relationship between interactive technologies and the users who 
contribute to such spaces must be rethought.  Because digital memory is indefatigable, a 
look at how digital memories are being produced will of primary importance to this 
dissertation.  The making of memory today involves much more than rote memorization 
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techniques; instead, memorization today is unlike techniques of the past.  Our reliance on 
digital technologies – from small personal devices like phone number databases on our 
cell phones, to larger memory collectives like Wikis – all involve the individual in the 
creation of memory.  Perhaps contemporary views on memorization are not what we 
typically think of as “storing for our own later use,” but instead “storing for shared later 
use.” The importance of linking techne with memory is the notion of sharing and 
collaboration—my memories no longer belong to just me, but they are shared and made 
available for others’ use, too.  In my research, I have discovered that a significant amount 
of ink has been spilled in two areas related to my interests: 1) memory and technology, 2) 
techne and technology.  However, there is a scant amount of research that connects and 
involves all three.  As a result, my work looks at how technology, the common thread 
between the two, invigorates memory and techne together by discovering memory’s 
resurgence as an increasingly “made” product.  
Making  
Several scholars have suggested that one major way of defining techne is a 
process involving the making of some sort of product.  I begin with this category not only 
because it appears most frequently in techne scholarship, but as my dissertation’s “title 
track,” it is also pivotal to my central argument.  Later, I will rely on ‘making’ to 
elaborate on the differences between the storage techniques practiced in ancient rhetorical 
memory and those used today, and also to strongly emphasize that the networks we create 
and strategies we employ in contemporary memory are exemplary models of techne-as-
making.  When I use the term making, I am employing it quite generously to cover all 
materials and ideas that are reified rather than suppressed or kept to oneself.  Opposed to 
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an inward trait such as moral virtue, making produces a secondary product that is 
independent of its agent.  In other words, making always involves three separate entities: 
someone who initiates the making, the product that is created, and the user who actually 
utilizes that product.  Making memory, then, implies the sending outwards, bringing 
forth, or physical non-biological sharing of memory.  
There are two prominent couplings of techne in Aristotle’s writing that I will use 
to elucidate the importance of making.  To commence this trek, I start with two of the 
most often cited Aristotelian texts in techne scholarship: Physics and the Nicomachean 
Ethics.  In each of these texts, Aristotle narrows his definition of techne by balancing it 
against another term, physis (nature) and poiesis (the act of making) respectively.  By 
looking at techne in comparison to the other two terms, it becomes easier to recognize 
how differently techne functions in relation to nature and the act of making. The first 
coupling appears in the Physics where techne (art) is contrasted with physis (nature) to 
examine the actuality and potentiality of something coming to be, in particular how the 
produced object retains or veers away from the natural.  The second coupling appears in 
the Nicomachean Ethics; in this text, techne (again translated as art) is compared to 
poiesis (the act of making) to differentiate between action and making.  Here, it is 
important to note that techne is not itself “making,” but is instead the habit of mind or the 
method associated with making.  In the true Aristotelian sense, poiesis translates as 
“making” whereas techne is the means of achieving that goal.  In what follows, I will 
unpack these two pairs in order to demonstrate how ‘making’ is a critical aspect of 
techne.  
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In the Physics, Aristotle is concerned with the process how something comes-to-
be: does an object naturally exist or is it made?  Aristotle distinguishes between the 
natural and the artificial in the following way: “For the word ‘nature’ is applied to what is 
according to nature and the natural in the same way as ‘art’ is applied to what is artistic or 
a work of art” (Physics II.193a32-33).  What classifies something as natural is when the 
object is its own end result.  It is, for Aristotle, a matter of determining actuality from 
potentiality.  To explain, animals exist and replicate themselves as they are—humans 
create other humans, elephants lead to more elephants.  “Of the things that exist, some 
exist by nature, some from other causes. By nature the animals and their parts exist, and 
the plants and the simple bodies (earth, fire, air, water)—for we say that these and the 
like exist by nature” (Physics II.192b9-11).  The natural represents what already exists in 
the natural world around us.  Trees, plants, water, insects, and animals: these all exist as 
an end in themselves, and there is no automatic potential to become something else.  
Although these natural items could become something else (i.e. a tree could become a 
desk or firewood), it exists in its natural environment for natural purposes (i.e., the tree 
absorbs harmful carbon dioxide while producing needed oxygen).  Even though the 
argument could be made that people have the potential to become someone else (for 
instance, a former addict could clean himself up and become a well-to-do professional), 
Aristotle is not interested in biological changes, but is interested in what something is in 
its natural state and also what something can become when molded by another.  He calls 
the movement from actuality to potentiality “motion”— the process of something 
coming-to-be as art (techne) and existing with the potential to become something else. As 
Aristotle explains it: 
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The form indeed is nature rather than the matter; for a thing is more properly said 
to be what it is when it exists in actuality than when it exists potentially. Again 
man is born from man but not bed from bed. That is why people say that the shape 
is not the nature of the bed, but the wood is—if the bed sprouted, not a bed but 
wood would come up. But even if the shape is art, then on the same principle the 
shape of man is his nature (Physics II.193b.7-12). 
 
Natural objects have the ability to replicate themselves as themselves; art does not since it 
needs something additional as its catalyst.  Techne is the method whereby something can 
be made that would not otherwise exist naturally.  For Aristotle, then, the outside agent is 
the distinction between nature and art.  There must be something or someone acting on 
the object in order to make it into a different object.  In the above passage, a bed is not 
made automatically; there are no trees in the forest that grow in such a shape.  However, 
a tree has the potential to become a bed if and only if an outside agent acts upon it.  A 
tree, too, can always be a tree but it has the innate potential to become something else.   
It is this moment of shifting from actual to potential that causes some debate in 
the techne community.  For example, some say that the mere existence of an object (let’s 
say the tree), represents an always-ready potential.  But how do we know for which ends 
this object should or can be used?  Certainly the tree can be used just as well in a dresser 
or in a fence, but what is the object’s “natural” use-value?  Although I discuss “use” a bit 
later in this chapter, it is worth commenting on briefly here. Some techne scholars 
suggest that the maker or the object itself cannot determine use, and the real value of an 
object must ‘wait’ to be determined until a user utilizes the object.  David Roochnik 
argues that since the value of techne is established after the fact, there is no way of 
inscribing techne as value-laden (71).  Roochnik’s interpretation suggests that techne is 
always a value-neutral process because its end is never pre-determined—the use-value of 
techne must be decided afterwards.  It is important to recognize Roochnik’s suggestion 
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because he implies that there is no “natural” or “given” use associated with any techne 
since its value cannot be established in advance.  In that sense, techne can never have 
contrary use because there was no intentional use in the first place.  For instance, if I 
gather all the ingredients to a birthday cake, all the components exists as separate ends: 
the eggs, sugar, milk, etc. When we see them on the shelf, we do not see them as a 
potential cake, but rather as eggs, sugar, and milk.  The eggs could potentially be used in 
an omelet, the sugar and milk as coffee sweetener.  When I bring these items together 
with the purpose of creating something new, it is at that moment that their potentiality is 
realized, not when they are just sitting around in the cupboard or fridge.  Their existence 
as individual ingredients is also represented as a coming-to-be: they can be manipulated 
and made into another object simply by being activated by an outside agent.  While the 
milk, sugar, and eggs are still sitting in the fridge and the cupboard, these ingredients are 
and are-not because they are in the process of becoming something; the eggs are no 
longer simply eggs but an important element of the cake.  Those particular eggs become 
part of the cake at the same time the eggs are not (and will never be) a part of an omelet.  
As this cake example illustrates, techne always has a clear finishing point whereas its 
counterpoint, physis, does not (Glazebrook 104).  As the cake-maker, I am the catalyst for 
the cake, or the end point. The ingredients by themselves are actualized as individual, 
natural products; but it is not until I combine them into batter that they are potentially 
something else.  Combined, the ingredients end as a cake, but we do not know their 
endings separately.  As Heidegger points out, “Techne has a special kind of 
rest…characterized as having-been completed, having-been-produced, and, on the basis 
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of these determinations, as standing-‘forth’ and lying present before us” (qtd. in 
Glazebrook 104). 
In another example, Walter Brogan’s essay “The Intractable Interrelationship of 
Physis and Techne” examines Heidegger’s use of techne as a balance for physis in order 
to better illustrate this process of something coming-to-be.  Brogan emphasizes 
Heidegger’s stance that techne does not represent making of any particular kind while 
also maintaining Heidegger’s philosophy that “not” is actually a characteristic of being.  
For example, we often classify an object by describing what it is (e.g., my new curtains 
are dark blue) and also what it is not (e.g., but the curtains are not as dark as blueberries).  
The characterization of “not” suggests that the object is one thing and is something else 
simultaneously; the essence of the object can be determined by differences.  The 
relationship between techne and physis highlights the differences between artificial and 
natural, between something made and something organic.  While techne and physis are 
not identical, they should not be thought of separately either; instead they are what 
Brogan calls “mutual favorings,” a term he uses to suggest their interrelationality (44).  
For Heidegger, this mutual favoring is so strong, that “there can be no techne, not even 
the absolute reign of techne without nature, outside of the relationship of techne to physis.  
But for Heidegger, […] the opposite is equally true. That is, there can be no revealing of 
physis without techne” (Brogan 44).  Following this logic, if we return to the example 
about the tree’s potential, Heidegger (and I think Brogan, too) would say that it is the 
mutual favoring between techne and physis that highlights how the natural and artificial 
cannot be separated.  If, as Heidegger suggests, an object always has the potential to 
become something else, then the object can be and not be at the same time; the tree can 
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be a tree but it can also not be a bed or not be a dresser, too.  Techne and physis are 
entangled with each other in such a way that, for Heidegger, the relationship transforms 
techne from something that signals making into a process that, “concerned with the realm 
of coming-to-be” (47).  Techne is the process that indicates something new, the becoming 
of an alternate object, and the motion of one object into something else.  As Brogan’s 
reading of Heidegger indicates, “techne approaches and relates to natural beings by also 
seeing them as they are coming to be, and thus not in their being” (50).  For Heidegger, 
techne is the whole process, from inception to completion, leading to the creation of an 
object.   
Coming-to-be is also considered by Jan Edward Garrett, who distinguishes two 
prongs of the art of making: and object’s presence and its yet-to-emerge aspects. When 
we are in the middle of a project, we do not ‘count’ the unfinished product as an absence; 
instead, it is still “in progress.”  For instance, when I am baking that cake I mentioned 
earlier, I do not view the batter as the final cake itself, but I do see it as a part of the 
process leading towards the end product.  The batter does not mean the cake will not 
exist, but it does mean that the cake does not exist yet.  In the following quote, Jan 
Edward Garrett explains the process of making from its initial stages, through the middle 
that is anticipating the final product, and ultimately the finished art: 
Consider a block of stone found lying about, ready for the sculptor’s chisel. Art is 
not responsible for any of its initial attributes A, B, and C. Now consider the same 
stone half way through the sculpting process. It will contain new attributes D, E, 
and F.  Anticipating completion, we can say that the finished sculpture will also 
contain attributes G, H, and I.  At the midway point, art is responsible for the 
presence of D, E, and F, but not for the absence of G, H, and I. However, any 
description of the making process now under way must mention both the presence 
and the absence; for so long as the making is under way, the sculpture is not 
characterized by full actuality (291).  
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In this example, Garrett shows that the potential of the block of stone to become 
something else relies exclusively on the sculptor; the stone could not become the 
sculpture on its own.  The outside agent is the critical difference between physis and 
techne.  Whereas physis always produces itself, techne never does, but instead something 
else must produce it (Glazebrook 106).  
The capacity of someone to make a new object leads directly into the next pairing: 
techne and poiesis.  Like techne and physis, techne and poiesis are tied very closely, but it 
is important to realize their differences.  It is generally accepted that in the Nicomachean 
Ethics (NE) techne is translated as ‘art’ and it is one of the five states of virtue by which 
the soul possess truth (knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophical wisdom, and 
comprehension are the other four).  Several scholars turn to Book VI of the NE for 
Aristotle’s most explicit statements about the nature of techne, and it is here that we can 
begin to see how techne and poiesis (making) partner up to define each other.  The 
relation between techne and poiesis is an especially demanding one.  Although the poiesis 
explicitly translates as ‘making,’ Aristotle distinguishes techne by defining it as the habit 
of mind that making requires.  For Aristotle, the relationship between phronesis (practical 
thought) and praxis (acting) is identical to the relationship between techne (art) and 
poiesis (making): the former is the habit of mind that enables the latter.  Praxis and 
poiesis are each set in motion by the initial actions of phronesis and techne respectively. 
Joseph Dunne helps to clarify these differences in the following: “Techne is not itself a 
useful thing but rather a generative source (arche) of useful things, a habitual ability 
(dunamis) of the maker through which he can reliably produce and reproduce them” 
(249).  As a result, techne is not the act of making, but it is the ability of the maker to 
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produce.  In relation to memory, techne is highlighted within the interactions between the 
user and the technology, an interaction that allows the user to produce a memory with 
certain tools.  To explain, Aristotle states that, “Making (poiesis) and acting (praxis) are 
different […]; so that the reasoned state of capacity to act is different from the reasoned 
stated of capacity to make. Nor are they included one in the other; for neither is acting 
making nor is making acting” (NE VI.4.1140a1-5).  For instance, I am an honest person 
and when I know that the milk in my fridge is beyond its expiration day, I will tell my 
partner not to drink it.  The capacity to act (being honest about the milk) is enough—it 
does not matter whether or not he drinks the spoiled milk because being honest is the 
complete action in itself.  The capacity to make, however, is different because I must 
actually produce something else to ‘prove’ my abilities: “techne has a useful, a visible 
product, which is produced through the application of rational and clearly communicable 
means” (Roochnik 24).  In terms of techne, because I say I can do something I must also 
be able to make good on that assertion.  Roochnik and others call this capacity to make 
“hanging a shingle”—I am advertising my capacity to make something specific, and to 
make it well.  To say it another way, techne is the capacity to make or produce (poiesis) 
something.  In order for me to have a techne of fashion design, I must actually have the 
capacity to make clothes; in other words, I can talk a big game, but I must be able to 
execute, too.  For Aristotle, the capacity to make indicates the capability to produce an 
object that is independent from the one who made it.  He maintains that techne always 
results in an end product that is a separate object from its maker; techne is a means 
leading towards a distinct end product.  Techne “is characterized by production in that the 
artist’s aim is to produce” (Latchford 1).  Contemporary memory, for example, is a 
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product that is separate from the person who stores it—the digitally stored memory is a 
new, external, separate end.  What is even more exciting (or complicated, depending on 
your view) is that the end product of contemporary memory is unknown at the time of 
storage—we do not know how, or who, will use our memories in the future.  While my 
digital memories might serve a specific purpose for my own recollections, someone else 
could just as easily use them for another purpose.  
 On the contrary, praxis indicates a specific action of whose end is contained 
within itself and, therefore, does not have a separate end: “For while making [techne] has 
an end other than itself, action [praxis] cannot; for good action itself is its end (NE 
VI.1140b.6-8, translations added).  Poiesis is not activity, but is an ethical action that 
results in the production of itself (e.g., moral virtue).  On the other hand, “Techne brings 
something into existence through the course of production. […] the good product, as the 
end result of an activity performed on material that, in turn, brings something into 
existence, is techne” (Latchford 2).  
To summarize this section, techne-as-making is an activity involving an outside 
agent who actually has the capacity to make a new product.  Compared with physis, 
someone else must always produce techne—it is not its own end.  Both comparisons 
highlight techne as a process of “making” albeit from slightly different angles.  As I will 
explore in the next section, the stability of that new product that techne produces is 
equally important as the one who made it, for the maker must be an expert and able to 
teach that skill. 
Expert Knowledge  
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In Of Art and Wisdom, David Roochnik effectively summarizes this next category 
of techne as someone who is knowledgeable enough to be able to “hang a shingle,” or 
advertise his expertise (25).  Clearly, when one has attained expertise of a trade, the 
benefit of such knowledge is the recognition of being a master in a given field.  Even in 
academia we are recognized through levels of expertise; completing the dissertation, for 
example, is the initiation into a career where our areas of “expertise” are determined by 
our focused research.  I would not go to a butcher to have my clothes tailored, but I 
would certainly visit the meat vendor if I needed a few steaks for a barbeque.  Techne 
represents a specific and limited level of expertise—one has become a master in one area, 
and one area only.  Renaissance men are not covered by techne; jacks of all trades, and 
masters of none are best ignored, too.  Instead, to have a techne is to show expert 
knowledge at a focused level of mastery in a single field to the extent that one is so 
recognized by and capable of demonstrating that in-depth knowledge, the individual is 
also able to teach it to others.  Think back to the Play-dough example that opened this 
chapter; because my students are not experts in clay-modeling, they displayed difficulty 
when attempting to deconstruct, teach, and provide directions for others to recreate their 
design.  In what follows, I argue that this category of possessing a techne is a tried-and-
true mastery of a single process, but one so precise that it has the ability to be repeated 
without fail.  
In order to explain the development of expert knowledge, David Roochnik notes 
that techne can be characterized at two different levels: “Techne 1” and “Techne 2.”  The 
former, T1, is a determinate knowledge where “end is identical to function” whereas the 
latter, T2, is stochastic, messy, less determinate, and its end is distinct from its function 
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(54, 52).  Stochastic is derived from the Greek verb meaning “to aim”; T2, therefore, 
merely aims at an end point but can arrive there differently every time (Allen 86).  T1 
represents situations where the outcome will always be the same, much like mathematical 
equations whose endings are never vary, given they are performed correctly.  T2, on the 
other hand, is used in situations where chance (tyche) interferes with the process, forcing 
someone with expert knowledge to take a different path to access an end.  For example, if 
a cruise ship is scheduled to leave its port in Florida and dock several hours later in the 
Caribbean, but a storm (a natural, albeit chance, occurrence) interferes with the planned 
journey, then the ship’s Captain must use his expertise to side-step the storm but still 
arrive at the same end point.  What is at play in this example is the Captain’s use of 
expert knowledge even in the event of natural forces acting against the original plan.  The 
Captain’s abilities to overcome chance by employing his expert knowledge averted a 
potential catastrophe between the ship and the storm.  Later, T1 will take center stage 
when I discuss the teleological effects on use and T2 will also resurface during an 
exploration of the role of “error.”  
To begin detailing the significance of expert knowledge in techne, I turn first to 
the Socratic dialogue the Laches where the “techne-analogy” is first introduced.  The 
techne-analogy is used to explain how specific expertise results in a specific, identifiable 
end product.  Socrates insists that we know when someone is an expert in his field when 
he can successfully demonstrate his skill: “You would not want to trust [expert teachers] 
when they said they were good craftsmen unless they should have some well-executed 
product of their art to show you—and not just one but more than one” (Laches 185e9-
186a2).  Complications arise, however, when Socrates questions the ability in Melesais 
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and Lysimachus to recognize virtuous teachers since virtue is a bit more difficult to spot.  
Socrates then questions how Melesias and Lysimachus might seek out an expert to teach 
their sons certain qualities such as courage and virtue.  They all decide that if their sons 
needed to learn gymnastics, for example, they could easily seek a good physical trainer 
(184e1-5).  The expert in physical activities is easier to recognize because he can 
demonstrate his skills by actually performing physical actions or by showcasing some of 
his students as “success stories.”  On the contrary, Socrates says that the expert in 
courage or virtue is more difficult to spot because these traits are more situation-oriented 
and involve several other factors (e.g., nature of the act in relation to one’s occupation).  
In conversation with each other, Melesais and Lysimachus are torn about whether certain 
virtuous acts have value or not, and decide to ask Socrates to cast the deciding vote.  
Insulted, Socrates remarks that since he is not an expert in that field, and subsequently 
lacks the in-depth knowledge to assess it properly, he is in no position to make such a 
judgment.  Moreover, Socrates insists that Melesais and Lysimachus would be foolish to 
decide by casting votes, and suggests that Melesais and Lysimachus should instead 
consult someone who is an expert in the specific arts in which they are interested.  Here is 
where the real issue arises: we can recognize a good craftsperson when he displays his 
products and we can also test the products’ effectiveness by using them.  We have 
trouble, however, assessing virtues like courage because we, too, must posses them to 
identify them.  Thus, virtues are not as easily recognized because they are actions in 
themselves; crafts represent the skill and expertise of the craftsperson, but are separate 
from their maker.  
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As a result of this exchange, many scholars have referred to this passage in the 
Laches as the “techne-analogy,” summarized nicely by Roochnik in the following: “as 
the expert, or technical trainer, is to the excellence of the body, so X, a technites is to the 
excellence of the ‘soul’” (2).  We can plug in a number of situations to explain the 
analogy: a butcher is to the excellence of carving proper cuts of meat, a doctor is to the 
excellence of providing a means toward health, and an auto mechanic is to the excellence 
of an efficiently running car.  The techne-analogy represents two aspects of art: the high-
level of mastery attained by an individual and the end result of that applied knowledge. 
Techne always incorporates these two details because it is always action initiated by an 
outside agent in order to produce a new product.   
The important distinction, here, is the way one arrives at the end product. Techne 
is a way of renegotiating the power orientation between art and physis (nature), as the T2 
cruise ship example showed earlier.  Janet Atwill maintains that, “art intervenes when a 
boundary or limitation is recognized, and it creates a path that both transgresses and 
redefines that boundary.  Fate and necessity may set temporary limits for invention, but 
their boundaries are perpetually redrawn by techne” (48).  In other words, techne is a 
means of reorganizing and manipulating the limitations of nature in order to overcome 
the very restrictions nature imposes.  Following this definition, I suggest that 
contemporary memory is T2 because of its flexibility and ability to overcome the natural 
limitations of biological memory. Even when natural forces attempt to steer techne off-
track, T2 renegotiates the relationship between art and nature.  Once again, the “mutual 
favoring” between physis and techne highlight the constant struggle between nature and 
art—techne always “creates a different order of power” (Atwill 7).   
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Like Prometheus stealing fire from the gods for human use, we, too, manipulate 
the elements of nature by taming its essence and reordering its original purposes.  When 
techne is used to restructure physis, that same action becomes the catalyst for nature’s 
rebuttal; nature will not disappear, but will return in another form that techne will again 
master.  The complication of power, as seen in the relationship between techne and 
physis, is what David Edward Tabachnick calls the “tragic double-bind of techne”: 
humans will continually mold and form the world around us to fit our needs and purposes 
only to be repeatedly subjected to nature’s wrath.  “Rather than allowing us to escape 
from the painful limitations of nature,” Tabachnick maintains that, “techne is an 
invitation to nature’s destructive power” (97).  The constant cycle of techne overcoming 
physis, physis regrouping, and techne gaining control again is never ending; techne and 
physis will always try to overcome each other ad infinitum.  Because “the technical 
imposition of human order is the spur for the violent renewal of the natural order,” the 
relationship between physis and techne is aggressive and constant (Tabachnick 98).   
However, overcoming nature does not happen by accident, but indicates a high 
level of mastery that overpowers natural restrictions.  In Rhetoric Reclaimed, Janet Atwill 
explores the power relationship between techne and tyche.  While techne can be 
characterized as a human’s manipulation of nature, chance (tyche) is defined as “an agent 
or cause beyond human control” (Atwill 93).  When someone possesses techne, she has 
complete control over the situation because of her in-depth knowledge, so much so that 
she knows multiple paths that will take her to the same end.  The difference, here, rests in 
a distinction between episteme (scientific knowledge) and techne: “scientific knowledge 
aims at knowing the world, technological knowledge [techne] at controlling or 
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manipulating it” (Mitcham 198).  The difference between the goals of episteme and 
techne are critical for understanding how art redraws the power structures of the world 
around us.  As stated in the Metaphysics,  
But yet we think that knowledge and understanding belong to art rather than to 
experience, and we suppose artists to be wiser than men of experience […]; and 
this because the former know the cause, but the latter do not. For men of 
experience know that the thing is so, but do not know why, while the others know 
the ‘why’ and the cause (I.980b.24-30).  
 
To utilize techne to overcome chance is a matter of “knowing-how” to accomplish a task 
even in the midst of nature’s rebuttal.  Epistemic knowledge does not extend as far as 
techne’s reach, for it only knows the “how-to” but not the “why.”  Rather than going 
straight from the Florida dock to the Caribbean port in the midst of the storm, for 
instance, the Captain veered off the original route, yet still arrived at the same end point.  
The Captain’s techne is recognized by its “rational prediction and control” in contrast to 
tyche that “lies outside of that domain because it is ‘contrary to calculation’” (Atwill 96).  
Techne’s aim is to defeat tyche through a renegotiation of power, with aims to 
subordinate nature once again (Atwill 96).   
Overcoming tyche, consequently, is not an easy or automatic task.  The level of 
expert knowledge that is required for various power renegotiations can be seen in what 
James M. Dubinsky characterizes as the difference between “know-how” and knowing 
“how-to.”  The former is “a rhetorical knowledge, contingent and governed by rules of art 
rather than rules” while the latter is merely just doing something without actually 
understanding the process (Dubinsky 131).  The difference between “know-how” and 
“how-to” is the level of competency in the acting agent.  A person who has the “know-
how” has the ability to react properly by shifting gears according to the situation, while 
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the person with episteme’s “how-to” does not possess the competence to respond to 
nature or chance.  We can parallel the ability to react properly to jazz musicianship; 
because jazz musicians understand their instruments and others’ musicality so well, they 
are able to improvise at a moment’s notice.  Therefore, being a jazz musician is not 
governed by rules, but instead is governed by reaction.  Jazz musicianship is not just a 
matter of “practice makes perfect” but also “practice makes possibilities”—even if the 
jazz musician does not know the next riff, he reacts and plays in accordance to the 
moment.  Sure, the jazz musician knows “how-to” play his sax, but the true jazz musician 
has the “know-how” to react to others’ beats and rhythms.  In other words, a classical 
musician (while equally talented) is directed towards a specific end and is not encouraged 
to veer off the path of the sheet music.  If an orchestra is performing Beethoven’s 5th 
Symphony, each musician is expected to participate only in the capacity of the part 
written for him or her.  Classical musicians replicate the same tune from beginning to 
end—there is little room for individual improvisation.  The jazz trio, on the contrary, 
might begin playing “Autumn Leaves,” but will most likely introduce new solos or jams 
to the mix.  Because the structure of the song remains the same, the audience will still 
recognize the tune; however, the additional riffs or extended solos occur because the 
musicians are reacting to the situation.  They arrive at the same end, but rarely the same 
way twice.    
Arriving at some end on purpose is not a matter of happenstance, and so “know-
how” encompasses the high-level of competency that is necessary for techne.  When a 
maker understands the topic with such depth, he knows where the task will end even if 
chance interferes along the way.  The jazz trumpeter will know when to back down for 
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his partner’s drum solo in the same way the ship captain steered around the storm.  The 
competency of the jazz musician and the captain exudes a level of know-how that is not 
automatic, but comes with a great deal of experience.  In Back to the Rough Ground, 
Joseph Dunne summarizes “know-how” as expertise, actually quite similar to Dubinsky’s 
claims: “Techne then is the kind of knowledge possessed by an expert maker; it gives him 
a clear conception of the why and wherefore, the how and with-what of the making 
process and enables him, though the capacity to offer a rational account of it, to preside 
over his activity with secure mastery” (Dunne 9).  It is because of the Captain’s “how and 
with-what” that the cruise ship still arrived safely in the Caribbean even in the face of a 
dangerous storm.  Through experience, the Captain possessed the “know-how” to control 
the vessel by veering around the bad weather system.  Such artistic “know-how” is what 
Aristotle calls “knowing the cause”:  “[Aristotle] accords those who ‘know the “why” 
greater respect, saying that they are “wiser” and possess both ‘knowledge and 
understanding’” (Dubinsky 132).  For Aristotle, the artist is wiser than the man of 
experience because of the combination of knowledge and understanding; such wisdom 
can then be applied in order to overcome encounters with chance.  With techne, 
understanding the “why” of the situation fares better than experiences alone.  Jazz, like 
teaching or captaining a ship or any other T2, “is an art that requires flexible attentiveness 
to the situation and audience” (Dubinsky 138).  Per Roochnik, “The rhetorician, then, is 
one who is flexible, able to sniff out what is appropriate and respond accordingly” (80).  
Because the jazz saxophone player understands the instrument so thoroughly, he can 
recognize the prime moments that are ripe for improvisation by renegotiating the power 
structure between the original song and the additional riffs. The jazz musician’s power re-
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structuring is also what Martha Nussbaum calls the “systematic grasp.”  Like Atwill, 
Nussbaum notes that control over tyche is one of the defining features of techne because 
the “systematic grasp” of techne provides the artist with “some way of ordering the 
subject matter, that will take him to the new situation well prepared, removed from blind 
dependence on what happens” (qtd. in Gordon 148).  Even though “Autumn Leaves” is a 
distinctly recognizable tune, the jazz musician can redraw the boundaries of the original 
song by introducing new rhythms and solos.   
Yet “knowing the cause” introduces another level of mastery to the techne 
conversation—the role of error and failure.  Techne scholars Frances Ranney and David 
Roochnik place significant emphasis on the importance of error in relation to techne.  
Because the expert has such a thorough understanding of his field, he knows when and 
how to manipulate the situation favorably.  Error is only acceptable because a technites 
(one who has/practices techne) understands the complete picture; he has the foresight and 
the understanding to provide a complete account of the intended action.  Again we come 
to the distinctions between T1 and T2; T1 is never susceptible to error or failure because 
it is so stringent.  Contrary to T1, T2 then is the only place where error and techne are 
compatible because it provides “rules of thumb” rather than strict guidelines.  T2 
“requires appropriate responses to particular occasions, and is compatible with failure” 
(Roochnik 52).  By linking techne and failure, expert knowledge is not only “knowing-
how” but also “knowing-when”: when to retreat, relax, or err in specific situations. 
“Knowing-when” is often used to explain kairos; in “Toward a Sophistic Definition of 
Rhetoric” John Poulakos defines the kairotic rhetorical moment as “the opportune 
moment,” a temporal choice that considers not whether to speak but whether to speak 
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now (56, 60).  In his essay “The Ancient Conception of and Art,” James Allen notes that 
kairos and techne are directly connected and that, “stochastic artists needed to do more 
than acquire a mastery of the formal precepts of their art; they also needed to develop a 
sensitivity to the peculiar features of a particular situations, sense of the opportune 
moment” (88).  Intentional error, thus, magnifies the influence of kairos on techne 
because the expert must not only know how to deploy his skills, but he should also know 
the precise opportune moment to eschew them.  By “knowing-how” to execute error, the 
expert is once again overcoming tyche by mastering the situation.  Take, for example, the 
field of medicine, one of the most frequent examples cited to explain the role of error in 
techne.  Because it is prone to failure, medicine can only ever be a T2—it “cannot 
achieve the high level of precision or rate of success expected of a T1” (Roochnik 61).  
To explain, sometimes an ill person heals herself without the help of a doctor; by resting 
or self-medicating, she could be back on her feet in a few days.  It is likely, however, that 
the patient changed her routine—it was not simply random good luck that healed her, but 
the amateur happened to stumble upon the correct treatment that worked for her 
individual case (Roochnik 46).  Just because a doctor had no role in her returned health, it 
does not diminish the fact that the medical field is effective.  Similarly, sometimes a 
doctor cannot cure one of her patients regardless of the tests and treatments she 
prescribes.  Although such a failure might lead to death, it does not discredit her standing 
as a doctor.  Failure, here, is a result of trial-and-error; even though the doctor used all of 
her expertise and skills with the intention of healing, the end result (good health) did not 
materialize.   
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At issue here is how a technites is able to retain her status while at the same time 
being prone to failure.  In her reading of Aristotle, Frances Ranney argues that voluntary 
error is commendable in techne but is faulty in phronesis (practical wisdom), episteme 
(scientific knowledge) and praxis (action).  Ranney suggests that techne, unlike the other 
three, can intentionally fail without losing its ‘cred’ (51).  In this sense, even after the 
patient failed to respond to the doctor’s treatment, the doctor did not lose any respect 
among the medical community, or with current and future patients.  Failure, here, lies in 
the patient’s inability to respond to the treatments and not in the doctor’s inability to treat 
her—the doctor still used her knowledge with the hope of curing the ailing even though 
the skills were unsuccessful in this instance.   
To say it another way, T2 is still considered techne because the expert can provide 
an account of his foreseeable action while at the same time responding to tyche and 
kairos.  A technites is not incompetent simply because he did not arrive at the ending the 
same way as before (think again of the jazz musician).  In fact, Aristotle claims that the 
reason techne can have ‘excellence’ is because it is prone to failure (Ranney 51).  There 
is an exception, though, where failure is unacceptable.  Let’s say someone “hangs a 
shingle” advertising his skills as roofer.  Based on the shingle, we can assume the 
following: the roofer has previous experience roofing houses, he is skilled at such a trade, 
and he will be able to perform that trade again in the future (i.e., the roofer is seeking new 
or repeated customers and is not just advertising a task he completed in the past).  If the 
roofer does not live up to these assumptions and fails to construct a functioning roof, then 
he is stripped of his title because he does not perform what he set out to accomplish.  His 
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lack of expert knowledge is manifested in his inability to perform his advertised duties.  
The roofer’s failure lies in his lackluster skills.   
The doctor, on the other hand, has the skills to perform but still failed at healing 
her patient; but according to T2, she did not fail as a doctor.  But what is the difference 
between the types of failure seen in these two examples?  The contrast can be seen in 
how well the technites executed his/her task; because the roofer does not have the skills 
to begin with, he was unable to construct a proper roof.  The roofer, moreover, is dealing 
with materials (e.g., wood, roofing tiles, nails) that are consistent and are “easy to shape 
aright” (qtd. in Roochnik 51).  The doctor, conversely, is constantly battling variety—no 
two human bodies will be quite alike, especially their healing properties.  Even though 
the field of medicine strives to compartmentalize ailments by providing certain 
medications for all cases of certain diseases, the human body does not always react in the 
same ways.  The theme of TV show House, for instance, is a prime example.  The title 
character, Dr. House, leads a team at a university hospital that specializes in “diagnosing 
the undiagnosable” (“House – TV Series”).  The twist of each episode revolves around 
the team’s attempt to diagnose patients’ strange and uncommon symptoms and their 
reactions to strange and unconventional treatments.  In each episode, the patients are 
often non-responsive to traditional medicine and tests, forcing the doctors to respond 
creatively to each case.  The team, however, often fails to discover a cure and several 
episodes end with a patient’s death or diminished quality of life.   
Like roofing, the materials used in medicine are the same: the pills, tests, and 
surgeries do not vary from one case to the next.  The variable, here, is the patient.  
Because “diseases run various and sometimes unpredictable courses” (like the patients in 
  
63 
 
 
 
House), doctors “must exhibit ‘a sensitivity to the peculiar features of particular 
situations’” (Roochnik 51).  The roofer failed because he could not use his materials 
correctly; the doctor succeeded because she did.  The doctor is equipped to react 
effectively even if that reaction does not materialize in good health for the patient.  
Because the doctor has the ability to act properly but the end result is still negative, the 
doctor ultimately comes out on top because she is best equipped to perform.   
The distinction between voluntary and involuntary use of knowledge is, for 
Socrates, a critical juncture for the technites.  As David Roochnik explains, “In running, 
speed is good, slowness bad.  But if someone is fast, he can run slowly, whereas the slow 
runner cannot run fast.  The good runner who voluntarily runs badly (slowly) is thus 
superior to the bad/slow runner who does so involuntarily” (137).  With his current skills, 
the ill-equipped roofer could not build a good roof even if he desired.  On the contrary, 
the proficient doctor could voluntarily choose to not administer certain drugs (Dr. House, 
again, is a prime example here since many cases are ‘cracked’ because he knows when to 
administer and withhold drugs from certain patients).  Because it is backed by expert 
knowledge, voluntary “failure” is supremely better to that which is involuntary. 
As I argue in the next section, how one uses tools and knowledge is another 
crucial aspect in the definition of techne.  The relationship between techne, physis, tyche, 
and kairos have all played significant roles in the explication of “expert knowledge,” but 
the following section will question how we actually “use” techne.  What happens, in 
other words, when making and expert knowledge collide?   
Use  
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 In this section, I show how “making” and “expert knowledge” are woven together 
by looking at “use.”  “Use” signifies the instrumentality of techne: use suggests both 
human action (i.e. to use a tool) and human know-how (i.e. to make use of a skill I know 
well).  It is important to reiterate that techne does not simply exist on its own, but that 
techne must be enacted to be effective—someone cannot just say she has a techne 
without actually using and proving her talents.  Because techne relies on application, such 
talents must be constantly practiced and utilized.  Put simply, if you don’t use it, you lose 
it.  By using one’s techne, one avoids the unfortunate possibility of forgetting the skill.  
For instance, even though I waited tables as an undergrad and in the years before 
graduate school, that experience does not automatically qualify me to jump back into a 
full rotation on a busy Saturday evening dinner rush; but instead I would need several 
days (weeks, maybe) of training and practice to regain the competency I once had.  
Techne, in other words, must be used in order to be validated.  In Truth and Method, 
Hans-Georg Gadamer states that the difference between techne and moral knowledge is 
how we acquire our skills and in what ways we apply them: “We learn a techne and can 
also forget it.  But we do not learn moral knowledge, nor can we forget it” (317).  For 
Gadamer, then, techne is the application of the skills we have acquired—techne means 
that we are using our expert knowledge and also that someone is using our product.  
Moral knowledge, on the other hand, is not acquisitive, and therefore cannot be lost 
either.  Having moral knowledge is enough, but having techne and not applying it is not 
sufficient.   
When we think of “use” and techne, I find it helpful to consider a few questions: 
How do we use the tools we make to extend our human abilities?  What happens if we 
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use those tools “incorrectly”?  How can these tools be used repeatedly to produce a 
certain outcome with some sense of reliability?  While there have been several scholars 
before me who have asked similar questions (Johnson; Mitcham; Ellul; Winner), it is 
important to recognize that their contributions have steered the path for these inquiries 
while also helping to clarify the impact of the use/techne combo.  
First, it is helpful to consider what “use” actually means.  In Thinking Through 
Technology, Carl Mitcham defines use in the following way:  
The verb ‘to use’ commonly denotes ‘to bring or to put into service’ and ‘to 
employ for some purpose’ – hence the ‘useful’ arts and crafts, in the sense of 
making things to be employed. […] Furthermore, because of its connotations of 
regularity or commonness ‘use’ seems associated more appropriately with 
repetitive, not to say mechanical, processes than with creative or original ones, 
that is, putting into practice as opposed to bringing into existence (230-1).   
 
This comprehensive definition takes aim at what I hope to accomplish in this section—to 
show how use is an action demonstrated by an expert as well as an action that is exerted 
on a made product.  Mitcham’s definition along with the questions I raised above will 
inform my definition “use” by referring to a few larger concepts: tools and tool-making; 
object-orientation; and repeatability and reproduction.  These concepts help elucidate the 
importance and depth of “use” and techne.   
 To begin thinking about use more practically, I begin with several anecdotes 
describing some experiences as a user.  The first one highlights the troubles and the 
disconnect between a maker, his/her product, and the end user.  The second illustrates the 
knowledge we assume we (supposedly) have as an “expert user,” but how quickly that 
knowledge can be dismissed or comes into question when we try to apply it to new 
technology.  The final is a humorous tale about using a tool in a different way than 
intended. 
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Use Example #1: The Label Maker 
This past year, I received a label maker as a gift.  Its design seems straightforward 
enough—a full QWERTY keyboard along with standard punctuation and some random 
label embellishing designs and emoticons.  Unfortunately, in order access any of these 
“extras,” the user has to press an arrow key and scroll (with another arrow key) through 
the entire list of punctuation.  While it sounds rather simple on paper, I am (admittedly) 
not that coordinated and have printed several misspelled and incorrectly spaced and 
punctuated labels.  I always think to myself, “why couldn’t the designers just program a 
‘function’ key?”  My frustrations with my label maker illuminate the distance between 
the makers and the users.  Sure, once I got the hang of the machine (honestly, and 
embarrassingly, it took several tries), my dissatisfaction was a thing of the past; but, it 
still makes me wonder if the designers ever thought about how the product they were 
creating was going to be used.  In much the same way that my technical writing students 
ignored their readers when writing instructions to recreate their Play-dough designs, I feel 
the label maker designers also neglected the end users.   
Use Example #2: New Technology 
 Now a days, how often do we replace our existing tools with similar, but newer, 
models?  My current cell phone contract states that I am eligible for a new phone every 
two years, and so I take advantage of the situation and select one of the upgrades offered 
by my phone company.  Usually, I have no problem becoming accustomed to the new 
phone’s features—sure it might take a minute to learn how to flip through my texting 
options, but I get the hang of it pretty quickly.  Now, alongside the label maker story, I 
am fully aware that it sounds like I am completely inept with new tools, but these two 
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situations (albeit embarrassing) highlight the problems with “use” quite clearly.  I was 
attracted to my newest phone because its sliding interface—the keyboard is hidden and 
you must slide the screen of the phone up to access the number pad underneath.  In my 
mind, this phone is very sleek and James Bond-esque…although he would know how to 
answer the phone when it rings.  That’s where the problems kicked in: something as 
simple as answering the phone and hanging up after completing a call caused me 
significant problems as a user.  (I am not alone in this, as I frantically Googled for others 
with this same phone and similar problems.)  The problem, I eventually discovered, 
rested in the slide feature, the exact feature that attracted me to this phone in the first 
place.  In order to answer the phone, the user must program the settings to answer an 
incoming call without sliding the interface and revealing the keys.  Presumably, the user 
could click a button on the interface and answer the phone. So far, so good.  I changed 
my settings, enabling me to answer calls without sliding up the screen.  However, there is 
no way to turn off the “auto-lock” feature when the interface is covering the number 
pad—even if I wished to answer the phone without sliding the interface up, I have to 
“unlock” the phone first by pressing three different buttons.  Eventually, constantly 
unlocking the interface became too much of a hassle, and I turned off the feature that 
allowed me to answer incoming calls without sliding the interface up, and now only slide 
the phone open when it is ringing.   
Use Example #3: Basket hat 
 Many Christmases ago, one of my aunts made what my family jokingly 
nicknamed “basket hats.”  These were not initially designed to be head coverings; 
instead, they were supposed to be liners for baskets or serving bowls made in a festive 
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(ugly, actually) holiday print and elastic around the sides to hold them it place.  When my 
grandma opened hers, she innocently thought it was a hat and proceeded to wear it.  The 
rest of my aunts then followed suit, not wanting to offend their sister-in-law.  However, 
even though the basket liners functioned just fine as (really unattractive) hats, its actual 
purpose was sidestepped for this new family fashion statement.   
What these stories represent is the confusion between the tool and its user, and in 
what follows, I investigate that middle ground: the object, or tool, that is being used by 
different people for different ends.  I will borrow the term “object-oriented” to indicate 
this middle-ground, and show that another characteristic of techne is its inherent 
neutrality and that the tool itself can be utilized in ways that differ from its original 
intention.  Later, I look at the complications of use in terms of repeatability, replication, 
and reproduction and how information technologies, specifically digital external memory, 
spring techne into the limelight in this current digital moment.   
Tools and Object-Orientation 
With techne, there are two distinct agents: the maker and the user.  The maker 
initiates the process of creation, makes an object, and the user then puts that object to 
work.  The relationship can be illustrated simply: maker  object  user.  In other 
words, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the maker creates a tool or some product that 
is separate from and outside of himself—this made product is not, in other words, mental 
growth or moral righteousness.  The shared tool, then, stands between these two 
independent agents.  As a result the shared tool, or the made product, becomes the 
“middle-man”—it is the object that links the maker to the user.  Now, even though the 
maker is deemed an expert because of his proven capabilities in a specific area of work, 
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he never verifies his own work.  Thinking back, remember that the roofer failed because 
his product did not withstand the normal expectations of the user.  In order for techne to 
be viable, it must be up to the standards of the user herself.  The relationship between the 
maker, object, and user is interrelated and unbreakable because the user must verify the 
quality of the object itself, while simultaneously verifying the quality of the maker.  
Thus, the object is the tie-that-binds the maker to the user—their relationship must be 
harmonious for techne to be achieved.  
Let’s think of the object, now.  The symbiosis between maker and user relies 
entirely on the effectiveness of the object in question.  But here, the object is enacting its 
essence on the two separate forces equally: maker  object  user.   The object is a 
direct reflection of the viability of the maker only when the user has validated its quality.  
The arrows show that the object (the “middle-man”) is actually the primary source of this 
validation, informing the quality of the maker and ensuring the satisfaction of the user.  
In the end, the level of effectiveness of the object returns back from the user to the maker 
himself.  If the quality of the object is legitimately endorsed a number of times, the maker 
then can honestly “hang a shingle.” (This cycle might be represented by a return arrow 
reaching all the way from the user, arching over the object, and pointing back to the 
maker.)   
There has been a lot of interest in recent years about the influence of the object on 
individual agency.  Philosophers of speculative realism, such as Ian Bogost and Graham 
Harman, have been using the term “object-oriented ontology” to indicate the equally 
important role of the object in an agent-object relationship.  Simply put, object-oriented 
ontology (OOO) is another way of saying that agency is invoked not only by the acting 
  
70 
 
 
 
agent, but also, or primarily, by the object itself.  Typically, the agency comes from 
someone enacting a particular action: one friend influencing another to see a specific 
film, a group of people resisting governmental mandates.  With OOO, ‘things’ 
themselves have agency: just as I am deploying my agency on this laptop, the laptop is 
simultaneously acting on me, too.  Leading theorists of OOO, like Bogost and Harman, 
have interpreted Heidegger’s claims about the use and essence of tools, emphasizing, or 
even transferring, the power from the user to the tool instead.  In other words, the tool 
itself acts upon its user just as much as the user acts upon the tool.  In the following, 
Bogost defines OOO simply:  
Ontology is the philosophical study of existence. Object-oriented ontology 
(“OOO” for short) puts things at the center of this study. Its proponents contend 
that nothing has special status, but that everything exists equally—plumbers, 
cotton, bonobos, DVD players, and sandstone, for example. In contemporary 
thought, things are usually taken either as the aggregation of ever smaller bits 
(scientific naturalism) or as constructions of human behavior and society (social 
relativism). OOO steers a path between the two, drawing attention to things at all 
scales (from atoms to alpacas, bits to blinis), and pondering their nature and 
relations with one another as much with ourselves (Bogost). 
 
What Bogost suggests is that we attend to the object as much as we do to their relations 
with outside agents (i.e., the ones who use these objects).  With OOO, the hierarchy is 
reversed—the object becomes slightly more prominent in its relation with the user or the 
maker.  At very least, the object rests on the same plane as these two entities.   
Such a suggestion might sound familiar to those who study techne, and thus OOO 
is an interesting way of looking at techne for a few reasons.  First, techne is object-
oriented, it is not a value-laden or self-reflexive process, but the value lies in the use of 
the object that is created (Roochnik 111).  Roochnik argues that object-orientation 
“implies [techne] is neutral on the question of use or value, for to understand use requires 
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reflection, not on the object conceived as distinct from the subject, but on the object as 
part of an expanded context including the object and the subject” (111).  Roochnik and 
the proponents of OOO agree that the object should be given more attention, particularly 
since it is the point of validation for the user and the maker.   
Next, it is essential to keep in mind that even though the object itself is value-
neutral, such neutrality does not diminish the importance of the object.  When Roochnik 
claims that the object is value-neutral, he is not saying that the object is not important to 
the creation of techne, but quite the opposite.  Roochnik argues that, “‘Use’ is the critical 
term because it refers to the process of bringing possessions into the human sphere of 
action, that is, of applying them in a value-laden manner” (164).  Here’s where the line 
that separates OOO from Roochnik becomes a little clearer.  For OOO, the object has its 
own value—that value is the object relating to or reacting against the agent.  The object 
changes the relationship between itself and its user.  On the contrary, Roochnik suggests 
that the user can only determine the object’s value.  Because the maker cannot determine 
the value of the object he created, the user must determine its efficacy instead.  
Essentially, the object acts as two different products—one for its creator (as an indicator 
that he can live up to his “shingle”) and another for the end-user (who serves as the 
check-and-balance to verify that shingle).  
Consequently, the maker and the user offer two different interpretations of the 
object that are not always compatible: the maker understands the craft of creating a 
product for its ultimate use, but the user is the judge of the product’s viability.  Just like 
the label maker, the engineers who created the product likely ignored the end-user, 
indicated by my lackluster experience with the product.  How often have we used a 
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product and wondered if the designer actually used it himself?  How often have we 
switched phones or computers and wished for days that the new product had certain 
features or shortcuts of the previous model (or, at least a convenient way to answer 
incoming calls)?  In his book User-Centered Technology, Robert R. Johnson emphasizes 
the differences between making and doing, emphasizing their interrelationship in a way 
that is quite similar to my frustrations with the label-maker and my new cell phone.  For 
Johnson, the user’s satisfaction should always be the primary goal of the makers, 
although this is not always the case.  To bring it back to the Greeks, Johnson reminds 
readers that the ancients “saw the practice and production characteristics of users as 
being important” (57).  The production of the object, therefore, is bound to its practice—
the producer cannot be validated outside of his object’s practical viability.  While OOO is 
an interesting balance for techne studies, in the end OOO does not emphasize the user’s 
role in determining the fitness of the object in question.  
So far, I have suggested that by looking at the object directly, we can reconstruct 
the techne hierarchy (maker  object  user) so that the object becomes the central 
force instead, acting on both outer agents equally (maker  object  user).  However, 
this relationship sidesteps the instrumentality of the object itself.  With the current 
relationship, the object serves as the middle-man informing the characteristics of the 
maker and the user.  As a result, some techne scholars such as J.E. Tiles emphasize 
“instrumentality”; by instrumentality, Tiles is referring to the intended use of a product in 
the future (55).  Similar to Johnson, Tiles argues that the instrumentality of the object is 
so critical, that the maker must always keep in mind the end user: “techne thus affords a 
model of a person exercising critical judgment” (Tiles 55).  Such critical judgment is a 
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reflection on the instrumentality of the object itself—both the maker and the user are 
implicitly reflecting on the quality of the object while at the same time explicitly 
analyzing each other.  In other words, when I found it tricky to answer my phone, I 
misdirected my frustrations toward the phone itself when I should have been more 
aggravated with the designers (I could have equally been disgruntled with myself, but 
who wants to blame herself for being unable to answer her own phone!?). I was implicitly 
analyzing the inability of the makers to design a phone with easily usable features. 
For Tiles, instrumentality is key in the larger discussion of techne because it 
implies a certain teleological characteristic in the object itself.  While the creator 
supposes that his creation might succeed, he is not the appraiser of its efficacy.  To 
illustrate, Tiles uses an armor maker to explain this idea—even though an armor maker 
fully grasps which materials seem to provide the most protection in battle, it will the one 
wearing the armor ‘under fire’ who will be the best judge of how well it actually 
performs.  In the following quote, Tiles explores the maker-user relationship:  
This consumer’s guide to body armour [sic] illustrates aptly the kind of practical 
thought which a man with a techne had to exercise.  He had to keep a clear and 
precise idea before him of the requirements of the user (maximum protection with 
minimum hindrance and restriction of movement, for a man proportioned thus and 
so) and relate his procedure to that goal.  He had constantly to consider whether 
this or that modification would make his product better or worse and not pay 
attention to the trappings and ornaments which would appeal to those who had not 
given much thought to the user of the product.  In sum, a man with a techne 
grasps the principles which govern the goal of his activity and relates his 
procedure to those principles (Tiles 55).  
 
Any consideration of techne is always a reevaluation of the relationship between the user 
and the necessary tools involved in that process.  These tools – be they roofing nails and 
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shingles or external memory  – will consistently involve a reciprocal association with the 
one setting it into action.   
The relationship between the user and the tool is an important one for techne.  
Alone, the tool means nothing—it must be activated by the user for it to be effective in 
any way.  In his seminal text on Aristotelian techne, Back to the Rough Ground, Joseph 
Dunne explains the significance of techne as a tool that aids the body:  
And since the soul […] cannot exist at all except through the body, is it not 
likewise the case, therefore, that a techne cannot exist except through its tools? 
We would not be able to even conceive, we might say, of technai such as surgery, 
sailing, or snaring if we did not know what scalpels, sails, and nets are; these 
technai have no other way of being exercised except through these tools, and so 
what constitutes a person as a technites in these areas is precisely a proficiency 
with these tools (349). 
 
Just as the maker must produce something to validate his skills, the tool must be used to 
verify the skills of the craftsperson.  What happens, however, in this technological age 
when we create tools that “do the work for us”?  This question is pivotal when relating 
techne and memory, especially since, as seen in chapter one, there are many people from 
Socrates to the present day who discredit the benefits of externalized memory, fearing 
that externalization diminishes, or relinquishes control over, “real” memory in favor of 
the “fake” digital kind.  
Losing control is an important distinction for techne, since users must always be 
in charge but can lose that control, however momentarily, via tyche (as explored earlier in 
this chapter).  Complications arise when we make an object and it is utilized for 
alternative purposes.  These alternative purposes could be silly (the basket hat) or more 
complicated (externalized memory).  The distinction for techne arises in the notion of 
reproduction—a product of techne must be able to be repeatable and reproducible.  An 
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individual who “hangs a shingle” does not deserve that honor if he only roofs one house.  
This skill must be repeatedly used.  Repeatability and reproducibility, consequently, shift 
the emphasis of techne away from the object and back onto the maker.   
Repeatability and Reproducibility 
In order for a techne to be considered repeatable, it should be replicable without 
fail, although that is not always the case.  As examined earlier, the differences between 
T1 (exact techne) and T2 (stochastic techne) can be recognized by how reliably they are 
performed.  T2 is the only form of techne that is susceptible to and thrives on chance 
(tyche) and failure.  T2’s encounters with tyche do not diminish the quality of the maker, 
the skill, or the product; instead, tyche shows that T2 can stumble on the road to 
achieving an end goal, yet still succeed because it arrives at that end by a different route.  
T1, on the other hand, is so precise that any veering off the path immediately discredits 
the techne.  In order to succeed with a T1, the technites must be able to provide a logos of 
techne—that is, provide a logical explanation as to why a certain process works and can 
be repeated.  T1, unlike T2, always culminates with the same result (i.e., a math problem 
will yield the same outcome each time it is performed).  Think back to those lab reports 
we were required to write-up in Biology and Chemistry 101 courses—we had to prove 
that our experiments could be verified through replication.  If the experiment could not be 
repeated, its credibility could not be confirmed.  For T1, like the math problem or the lab 
reports, there must be some tried-and-true verification process.  This verification process 
is the logos—T1 must be so repeatable, that the technites and those who attempt to repeat 
or follow the process are able to do so because there is accountability. T1 must have a 
logos in order to “qualify” as a techne.  Thus T1 is often used to describe both a situation 
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with specific teleological purpose determined in advance as well as the steps 
accompanying that process.   
In the essay “Techne and Teleology in Plato’s Gorgias,” Lee Franklin reminds 
readers that in the Gorigias, Socrates does not “call anything a craft which is lacking an 
account” (230).  Instead, Socrates rallies against any activity lacking an account calling 
them mere guesswork, proceeding by knack instead of true skills (Gorgias 462b1-c4). 
Here, Socrates will not grant anything the status of techne (T1) that cannot provide a 
“know-how.”  Now, this version of “know-how” is slightly different than when it was 
mentioned earlier.  Here, “know-how” is the exact account of what is occurring, and it is 
different from “knowing-how” to arrive at an end through different means.  There are no 
alternate paths with T1—there is one route (logos), and one route only.   
In his essay “Plato’s Theory of Texnh a Phenomenological Interpretation,” John 
Wild highlights the significance of viewing techne teleologically while at the same time 
acknowledging the influence of both T1 and T2.  Wild defines techne as “a pure 
knowledge of form or standard,” or what he names “structural knowledge,” a complete 
understanding of an action (257).  Structural knowledge sutures the means and the ends 
of a process, providing a full view of an activity from inception to completion.  
Furthermore, Wild states that, “each art gives something (form) to something (matter)”; 
thus in order to produce something useful, one must have a detailed working knowledge 
of how to arrive at the end product.  This working knowledge is what Wild calls 
“forness”: the notion that actions are completed “for the sake of one another” (259).  
Even though each action is completed with “forness” in mind, Wild reminds us that no 
matter how we originally intend to apply a specific action, there are moments that we 
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cannot control:  “Where events are within our power, nothing must be left to chance; 
where they are not, we must work out the various possibilities, and take account of them” 
(263).  Without control, some argue that techne cannot be repeatable, hence the on going 
debates on whether rhetoric itself can be considered a techne.  
Even though I will not discuss it in too much detail here, it is important to note 
that the lack of accountability is the problem most ancients and scholars have in 
attempting to label rhetoric a techne. For instance, Socrates insists that rhetoric is not a 
techne because “the activity, its procedures, must have or be amenable to, the 
underpinning of an explanatory framework to count as a genuine skill” (Woolf 120). Lee 
Franklin also emphasizes that for Socrates, the success of rhetoric occurs because the 
“orators proceed by routine and the ‘memory of what usually happens’” (Franklin 231). 
Because the end result of rhetoric lies in the audience’s reception, and because there is no 
comprehensive method for understanding or judging an audience in advance, rhetoric’s 
effectiveness is thus entirely unpredictable.  The lack of accountability is what 
differentiates T1 from T2, and so rhetoric is most often categorized as a T2 (if it is 
characterized as a techne at all).   
To return back to the discussion of T1, “use” indicates its inherent stability in a 
process or a made object.  In other words, I can use my skills to repeat a process of 
creation (the process that has granted me the title of an expert in the first place), and also 
someone can purchase and use that created product without hesitation because he or she 
knows its worthiness is reliable.  The creator, though, is not responsible for the incorrect 
use of their product.  The basket hat, for instance, worked well as a hat even if the hat 
was outside of its intended purposes.  The ethical responsibility of maker stops if the tool 
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is used incorrectly—even if that unintended use is successful.  For instance, we have 
probably all shooed a fly or squashed a bug with a rolled up newspaper.  Even though the 
original intention of the newspaper is not a fly-swatter, it does work well as one.  If I aim 
to squash a bug on the wall and fail because the quality of the paper is too thin, the 
newspaper printers are not responsible for the poor quality of the paper or the inability to 
squash the insect.  The printers are, however, responsible for the quality of the printed 
page: the superiority of images’ color ratio, ensuring that the text is not blurry, 
guaranteeing that all pages are intact and in the correct order.  If these aspects of the 
newspaper fail consistently, the company will likely lose subscribers, but not because 
their paper fails at bug-squashing.   
Repeatability and reliability are very important terms for linking techne with 
digital studies because information technologies provide users with a myriad of options to 
repeat and reproduce objects, texts, and images quickly and reliably.  Repeatability 
signifies the likelihood of replicating an action or process that is nearly identical to the 
original, eliminating modifications in the final product.  Repeatability, thus, implies the 
action of reproduction—for instance, by making a duplicate of a photograph of the 
Washington Monument that I snapped on a recent trip to Washington D.C., I am 
repeating the original action by making another photograph.  I can produce that photo as 
many times as I wish, whether I e-mail it to different people, upload it to Flickr or 
Facebook, or print off a copy or two for framing.  The end result, the photo, will retain its 
original features; on the contrary, the photo will never be the actual Washington 
Monument since it is only a representation of structure.  Because the reproduced photos 
are not the originals, philosophers such as Jean Baudrillard would argue against the 
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constancy of the copies arguing that, “it is not a question of imitation, nor duplication, 
nor even parody.  It is a question of substituting the signs of the real for the real” 
(Simulacra 2).  For Baudrillard, the real is dismissed the instant I snapped the photo of 
the Washington Monument—the photographs mediate future experiences.  Walter 
Benjamin, too, would suggest that technological reproducibility destroys the aura of the 
original and the reproductions allow individuals to create their own perceptions in their 
own space (Reproduction 256).  For Benjamin, the photograph destroys the aesthetic 
value of the original, reducing the photo of the Washington Monument to utilitarian use 
or mere instrumentality.   
However, compared with the easily degradable quality of analog reproductions, 
digital reproductions ensure perfect replications of the original.  The digital file of my 
dissertation can be replicated as many times as I choose without losing any quality of the 
document itself.  The difference is easily demonstrated with a throwback example: before 
iTunes or CDs, it was not uncommon to create mix-tapes for friends or flings by taping 
songs directly from the radio or recording a song from one tape onto another with a dual-
tape deck system.  The quality of the end product never sounded as good as the original, 
especially after multiple copies of the same song: “copying the copy of a copy of a really 
nice music tape yielded not another tape with great sound, but a mediocre one,” a 
phenomenon that Viktor Mayer-Schonberger calls the “noise” of analog reproduction 
(53).  With digital reproductions, the “noise” is fortunately eliminated since the copies 
are identical, resulting in the ability to repeat and reproduce quality and content.  
Contemporary memory works in the same way by allowing users to make and 
create memories by storing them in various locations, or also by copying the memories 
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limitlessly.  Just as someone who has the skill to build a table can reproduce that same 
table based his expert knowledge, or like my students who should have been able to re-
create a Play-dough design by following another group’s directions, information 
technology supports the ability to make any digitally stored product reproducible, and 
almost flawlessly so.  Here, I emphasize that “repeatability” signifies the process of 
ensuring identical replication.  Moreover, repeatability provides techne, or specifically 
T1, with a stable structure that attempts to eliminate random outcomes and overcome 
nature.  
With repeatability, the connection between techne and technology becomes a bit 
more apparent, as suggested by digital philosopher R. L. Rutsky.  In the book High 
Techne, Rutsky argues (like others before him) that reproduction takes the aesthetic 
quality out of an object, reducing the object to a mere instrument.  Unlike others, 
however, Rutsky suggests that techne is the force behind this instrumentality noting that,  
“If the machine aesthetic’s reproduction of technological style splits style from function, 
with the rise of technological reproducibility, the function of technology itself begins to 
become a matter of reproduction, of simulation” (Rutsky 12).  In what Rutsky names the 
“technological turn,” digital technologies combined with the (re)productive forces of 
techne represents “modernity’s tendency to technologize or instrumentalize the world, to 
abstract and reduce it into ever more minimal, more controllable forms” (13).  Thus, the 
technological turn points to the power of techne to take control of non-technological 
processes (here, digital memory’s preeminence over biological memory).  To provide just 
one more example, Rutsky maintains:  
Although computers offer various kinds of hardware for the storage of data, from 
chips to hard drives to CD-ROMs and DVDs, this storage space cannot be 
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accurately described as a hardware space. It might, in fact, better be called a 
media-space, as suggested by the fact that these forms of storage are known as 
‘storage media.’ The space of this data is, then, a multi-media space, constituted 
through simulation, though technological reproduction and reproducibility. The 
name generally given to this simulacra virtual space is, of course, memory 
(Rutsky 15). 
 
These smaller multi-media spaces provide users greater control over their end functions.  
It is much easier, for instance, to open my Google Reader to access my favorite websites.  
Google Reader allows users to bookmark (“subscribe to”) frequently visited websites and 
will alert the user when there is an update on that particular page.  Rather than opening 
several dozen pages in my browser, Google Reader is a “one-stop-shop” for my 
information needs. If I had bookmarked each page separately, I would have to flip 
through each site to see if a new post had been added. With Google Reader, I have much 
more control over a smaller platform.  Google Reader “remembers” all my favorite sites 
for me, and notifies me (reminds me, even) when new material is available for viewing.  
It is much easier to view one site instead of sifting through several dozen individual ones.  
By subscribing to all of my favorite sites in one location, I have much more control over 
my time as an information-consumer than I would if I merely flipped through each one 
hoping for new content.  We can see here that techne is resurfacing under the purview of 
digital technologies and digital reproducible memory has become one opening through 
which techne and memory can both gain ground in this contemporary moment.  
Conclusion: Beginning to Link Techne and Memory 
One of the more interesting, and perhaps even the most significant, correlations 
between memory and techne is the suggestion that memory is no longer afflicted by time 
orientation.  When we think of memory, we are most certainly conjuring up thoughts of 
the past—we “remember” what happened to us on various occasions, we “memorize” 
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facts in order to “recall” them to prove something in an argument or pass an exam.  
Memory is conceived as the storage of an event in the past—not the present and certainly 
not the future. The mere suggestion of memory invokes the idea that one is ‘looking back 
at’ an event, conjuring up an emotion which has passed, and even becoming nostalgic for 
a place or a time in one’s life when all was different, better, or even worse.  Thus, 
memory is rarely conceived as a structure that is outside of time; instead, memory is the 
representation of all that encompasses the past.  However, as suggested in the previous 
chapter, new technological forms of storage are shifting memory outside of its time 
constraints and into a time-less cycle.  In other words, the memories that are stored on 
externalized devices or placed for use on various web collectives (e.g., Wikipedia) now 
function outside the constraints of time and are actually being transformed into structures 
for use in the future.  
As a result, the connection I am drawing between techne and memory must focus 
a significant amount of attention to the re-districting of time, specifically how the past is 
becoming, well, a thing of the past itself.  Contemporary memory is not limited to or 
created for nostalgic remembrance or mere recall, but rather it is constructed specifically 
for use in the future.  Furthermore, whereas biological memory can be severely limited by 
personal lapses (e.g., a few too many beers can impair one’s memory of an entire 
evening’s conversation), contemporary digital memory is focused on use in both personal 
situations and in collectives.   
And while critics like Jaron Lanier whose recent manifesto, You Are Not A 
Gadget, is highly skeptical of “hive mind thinking” and the noosphere in general, the 
combination techne and memory speak to the benefits of such collectivities.  Recent 
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upsurges in “cloud computing” indicate that individuals and corporations alike are 
shifting the control of their personal “memory” (or server space) into the larger cloud.  
During a presentation at the 2010 Digital Conference of Humanities, Arts, Science and 
Technology Advanced Collaboratory (HASTAC), four presenters representing the blog 
HTC In the Cloud explored new possibilities for cloud computing.  As described by Steve 
Campbell, a simple way to think of cloud computing is a “pay-per-drink” system: you 
only pay for as much storage as you need.  If you want to drink a pint, you only pay for a 
pint.  Just like personal energy use, you only pay for what you need and use.  If we are on 
vacation, our electric bill shrinks because we are not flipping on the lights or running our 
laptops well into the night.  Cloud computing works the same way, but instead deals with 
storage and server power. Rather than companies constructing large servers for their 
personal use, cloud computing allows business to offload their server needs to “the 
cloud.” 
But what is “the cloud”?  According to the presenters, clouds are a huge data 
storage centers that serve as the offsite computing power for corporations.  For individual 
purposes, think of Google Docs.  For instance, even though I have several copies of my 
dissertation stored on different flash drives, I have uploaded each revision to Google 
Docs just in case something damages the drives.  I have stored my dissertation in the 
cloud—I have used Google’s storage capacity for my personal use and reduced the 
possibility of losing access to my files.  Similarly, companies can create mirror images of 
their servers or locate their entire network elsewhere by purchasing cloud space (think of 
the recent upsurge of “mirror sites” for the Wikileaks’ cables); therefore, in the event of a 
  
84 
 
 
 
flood or other catastrophe, their server space will not be damaged (as it often was in the 
pre-cloud days).  
Further still if, as Roochnik and others have suggested, techne overcomes the 
chance floods that could destroy all the server space, then perhaps we can read this as 
another representation of memory, too.  On the one hand, the chance of “forgetting” any 
random fact stored in our biological memory is high.  Very few of us have perfect 
autobiographical memories like “S,” whose written account appears in A.R. Luria’s Mind 
of a Mnemonist, or more recently Jill Price, the woman whose perfect memory, or 
hyperthymestic syndrome, has been both chronicled (Woman Who Can’t Forget) and 
criticized (“Total Recall”) for its rareness.  On the other, displacing memory outside of 
the biological constructs reduces the chance of one forgetting anything, and thus we can 
regain control of our personal memory.  
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Chapter 3 
Techne-monics and Digital Archives 
One of the most important aspects of archives and memory is organization.  
Archivists will note that an archive without a clear-cut system in place is not worth 
calling anything (well, except a mess).  Even as I began this chapter, I struggled with 
ways to organize my archival work—how do I archive the archives?  What qualities am I 
looking for?  Is it awkward to begin looking at archives, or to do any quantitative work, 
with a theory and boundaries already established?  Many will say it is best to let the 
material speak for itself.  Others insist you need a focus or the data collection will 
become too unwieldy.  Regardless of the collection process, archives have taken many 
shapes over the years, ranging from specific library and museum collections to memorials 
and places of storage for shared cultural events.  Not only is it paramount to note what is 
included in an archive, but it is equally important to recognize what is omitted and how 
someone (usually a curator) decides what does “not get remembered” by denying 
inclusion in the archive.  In this chapter, I look at three specific digital archives: The 
Wayback Machine, The September 11 Digital Archive, and The Soweto ’76 Archive.  
These archives are different from “traditional” brick-and-mortar museums or memorials 
because they encourage, in fact thrive on, user input.  Rather than a static space, these 
digital memorials are constantly in flux—one visit will never be like the previous one.  
Furthermore, these three archives all have different end goals.  The Wayback Machine is 
the only one of its kind and is attempting to collect the entire history of the Internet.  In 
addition to the team of researchers who are responsible for the archive’s content, The 
Wayback Machine “takes requests” from its users to determine which sites have not been 
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crawled yet, searches for them, and then reactivates and stores the Web sites.  Both The 
September 11 Digital Archive and The Soweto ’76 Archive seek to collect the stories and 
memories of events of national importance.  The difference between the two, however, is 
that The Soweto ’76 Archive is formulated like a real museum, allowing visitors to 
“walk” between buildings and visit spaces right on their screens.  (I should note, too, that 
The Soweto ’76 Archive is still in Beta testing and is yet to be completed.  The project, 
which began in 2007, will take about five years to complete; however, the Beta site is an 
impressive example of the usability of the final site.)  The September 11 Digital Archive 
is different because there is no place to return to, only the space of what used to be the 
World Trade Center Towers, the empty field in Pennsylvania, and the side of the FBI 
Headquarters, the J. Edgar Hoover Building (which was largely inaccessible before 
September 11).  The aim of both event-based archives, however, is to collect stories, e-
mails, sound files, and images from anyone, expanding the notion of inclusivity and 
encouraging contributions from people who would not normally have the opportunity to 
participate in and contribute to national memory.  In this chapter, I look at these three 
digital archives in order to question what it means to have a memory in the digital age, 
and what these three spaces of memory say about the limits (or limit-less) means of 
memory space.  
By encouraging participation from users, digital archives utilize the creative and 
productive aspects of techne as a mode of successful memory making.  In relation to 
techne, it becomes important to reconceptualize how we perceive memory and how the 
boundaries of natural memory shift when we invite everyone to write memory together.  
If techne is about making and use, then these three archives encourage visitors to make 
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and use their memories quite differently by asking for deliberate participation and 
production rather than mere observation and consumption.  The creative aspect of these 
archives is where I suggest memory and techne meet once again.  By exploring these 
archives individually, I argue that their participatory nature exhibits how memory and 
techne are collective forces.  To capture the combination of memory and techne, I 
introduce a new term: technemonic.  This term is different than “mnemotechnics” which 
has been used elsewhere to designate memory loci and the process of recollecting those 
memories during a speech.  In The Art of Memory, Frances Yates denounces the term 
“mnemotechnics” in favor of “art of memory”; for Yates, “mnemotechnics” reduces the 
high-sensory process of artificial memory and “makes this very mysterious subject seem 
simpler than it is” (4).  Mnemotechnics is a term that also emphasizes the process of 
recollecting, not the actual creation of memory on which I am focused in this chapter.  By 
recognizing the complexity of techne and memory devices, technemonic foregrounds 
techne in order to emphasize the creative nature of contemporary memory.  Thus, the 
combination of “techne” and “mnemonic” suggests the devices, spaces, or tokens (digital 
or otherwise) that we make or collect to remember a particular event.  Since the digital 
archives consist of individually crafted memories, technemonic will be used to signify 
memories that are available for use in each archive. 
By also viewing archives as a point of productive memory, I reconsider what it 
means to consume and produce memory.  As consumers of memory, we need to evaluate 
the product that is being consumed.  When the event has passed, what qualifies as a 
consumable remnant of memory?  What happens when the tide shifts away from 
consuming memory and “we” become the point of producing memory?  Throughout this 
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chapter, I also consider whether these digital archives undo the ideological consumerist 
trends and capitalistic mechanisms of memory culture.  When the consumer chooses how 
to use the product, what does this mean for the productive ends of technemonics?  Or 
more specifically, is there an intended use for digital archives? 
Clay Shirky has recently introduced a new term to recognize the shift towards 
online productivity: cognitive surplus.  Rather than using our free time watching 
television, Shirky argues that we are now spending at least one percent of that time 
contributing to social networks such as Wikipedia.  He states: “One thing that makes the 
current age remarkable is that we can now treat free time as a general social asset that can 
be harnessed for large, communally created projects, rather than a set of individual 
minutes whiled away one person at a time” (Shirky 10). “That doesn’t mean we’ll stop 
mindlessly watching TV” Shirky argues, “it just means that consumption will no longer 
be the only way we use media.  And any shift, however minor, in the way we use a 
trillion hours of free time a year is likely to be a big deal” (23).  If there was a question 
about the value or meaning of contributing to the digital archives, then cognitive surplus 
might just be the answer.  Such a small percentage of our free time truly adds up to large 
social movements, whether this time is used towards contributions to The September 11 
Digital Archive or making small edits to Wikipedia pages.  The shift from consumer to 
producer might have always been in our nature, but the platforms were never as readily 
available as they are today.  Shirky then questions, “What if we’ve always wanted to 
produce as well as consume, but no one offered us that opportunity? The pleasure in You 
can play this game too isn’t just in the making, it’s also in the sharing” (19).  The shift 
from what Jay Rosen names “The People Formerly Known as the Audience” into the 
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producing agents of technemonics symbolizes the growing desire that individuals have to 
become active citizens in the writing of memory and history (Shirky 36).  Because the 
spaces in which we can contribute and craft the memories of events are expanding, I 
reconsider “why” individuals are compelled to participate rather than merely observe.  
The shift away from mere consumer or spectator and into the realm of producers 
of memory lies in the available means themselves, a move I suggest is a critical one for 
rhetoric to notice.  Because individuals have new outlets for sharing and creating self-
value, Shirky argues such social spaces create more intrinsic value than ever before: 
“Personal value is the kind of value we receive from being active instead of passive, 
creative instead of consumptive. […] Social motivations can drive far more participation 
than can personal motivations alone” (172-3).  Shirky also points out that digital 
production is symmetrical: “When someone buys a TV, the number of consumers goes up 
by one, but the number of producers stays the same. On the other hand, when someone 
buys a computer or a mobile phone, the number of consumers and producers both 
increase by one” (55).  An increase in the number of available means should prompt 
rhetoric to return to one of its own canons and reclaim this digital moment as its own.  
Information technologies not only offer limitless means to store digital memories, 
but these same technologies must also be viewed as a route towards increased 
participation in rhetorical practices.  Because information technologies, or as I prefer to 
call them “interactive” technologies, increase the possibilities for users to “write 
memory,” participating in accessible memory forums, like digital archives, permits 
individuals to contribute to collective memory as never before.  In terms of access, these 
archives enable the possibility for individuals to contribute to national memory in such a 
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way that is unlike many other sites of remembrance.  Even though people leave tokens at 
permanent memorials like the Vietnam War Memorial in Washington D.C., and although 
those tokens are collected and stored, the actual space and shape of the monument never 
changes.  The content of the digital archives I explore in this chapter relies on user 
input—they would be significantly bland without it.  As a result, the type of memory that 
is applied in the digital archives must be differentiated.  I will refer to memory of these 
digital archives as “open memory” while typical museums or other selective archives will 
be noted as “closed memory.”  To explain, any archive that allows, encourages, and 
thrives on user input via stories, audio or video files, or Web links will be noted as “open 
memory.”  The three archives I look at here are all “open” because users have the 
capability to add their own content as well as comment on existing elements.  On the 
other hand, “closed memory” archives do not allow users to contribute to the batch of 
material that has been pre-selected for display.  For example, displays at the 
Smithsonian’s National Museum of American History do not ask visitors to leave 
mementos during their visit—the exhibits only invite spectatorship and reflection.   
On the outset of such a quest, it is vital to establish how the digital archives 
construct “memory” versus “history.”  To help distinguish “memory” from its close 
relative “history,” I will lean very briefly on Pierre Nora.  Although such a slight nod to 
Nora might be an injustice to his voluminous study of French history, his distinction 
between “history” and “memory” is helpful at this juncture to re-characterize the ways 
we collect, and ultimately write, experiences.  On the one hand, history for Nora is a 
representation of the past, calling for “analysis and critical discourse”; memory, on the 
other, “thrives on vague, telescoping reminiscences, on hazy generalizations” and is 
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vulnerable to all kinds of “projections” and “censoring” (3).  Memory, as we know it, is 
always subjected to “forgetting”—our personal affective responses will limit, or censor, 
what we can recall.  However, digital archiving does not speak to the limits of time—
whether censored by time or fresh in our thoughts, a visitor to the archives can add 
memories to these sites at any point in the future.  Because the archives are not limited to 
immediate responses, they also represent the possibility of shifting spaces of 
remembrance rather than being mere solidified historiographies of national importance.   
In another example, in the introduction to Save As…:Digital Memories, Joanne 
Garde-Hansen, Andrew Hoskins, and Anna Reading note that “history” is a projection 
from “one to many” whereas “memory,” and specifically “digital memory,” is more 
localized and can be thought of as “peer-to-peer” (8).  By invoking the term “peer-to-
peer” (P2P), I touch on some of the essential aspects of the digital archive—file sharing, 
collectivity, and distribution.  For example, in an open memory digital archive, memories 
are written by individuals to be shared with all visitors.  P2P memory does not preference 
one memory over another—each memory receives equal weight.  On the contrary, a 
closed memory brick-and-mortar museum works differently.  Closed memory systems 
are hierarchical—a group of curators select what is archived, displayed, and remembered.  
P2P digital memory encourages memory-making from below, so that digital archives 
collect stories that may not be historically significant, but instead are personally 
meaningful (Garde-Hansen, et al 12).  One of the aims of all three digital archives is to 
make memories of, or “write,” events in different ways, through different means, and 
from different voices.  The ability of users to upload their stories does not neglect the 
historical importance of the events, but rather personalizes and expands the traditional 
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boundaries of both “history” and “memory.”  By using digital terminology such as “peer-
to-peer,” it becomes easier to show how these three archives share memory among users 
instead of simply displaying memory for spectatorship.  
 Because the digital archives are, by definition, collaborative collectivities rather 
than displays, it is helpful to turn to sociologist Maurice Halbwachs to explore the 
distinction between individual memory and collective memory.  In The Collective 
Memory, Halbwachs defines collective memory by drawing the distinction between the 
collective as a whole and the individual who contributes to the memory: “While the 
collective memory endures and draws strength from its base in a coherent body of people, 
it is individuals as group members who remember” (48).  For the digital archive, 
Halbwachs’ definition of “collective” is crucial.  Because history tends to privilege only 
one account of an event, many important details are side swept in favor of the dominant 
version.  The digital archive is not one individualized perspective persuading many.  
Rather, the collective P2P digital archive is the collaborative effort of individuals sharing 
many memories, who in turn offer a wide spectrum of interpretations, viewpoints, and 
recollections of one event.   
 Halbwachs takes it one step further and differentiates between two types of 
memory: “historical memory” and “autobiographical memory.”  Historical memory is, as 
Alison Landsberg terms it much later (and as I will discuss in detail shortly), a 
“prosthetic” memory, or one that we do not experience first hand but have experienced 
nonetheless.  For instance, even though I was not alive in 1969 for Woodstock, stories 
from relatives who were there, special anniversary edition magazines, DVDs and CDs, 
and The History Channel specials allow me to form my own experience of this event.  
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For Halbwachs, I am essentially “remembering” an historical event even though I did not 
experience it first hand.  My understanding of and reaction to Woodstock characterizes 
“historical memory”—these are memories I have of events that I have experienced from a 
distance.  
Autobiographical memory is the counterpart of historical memory.  With 
autobiographical memory, I recall events that happened to me, that I lived through, and 
that I am able to provide an “eye witness” account of.  Autobiographical memories do not 
have to be of national importance, but they do need to be important to the individual.  In 
my mind, I will always celebrate March 12, the day I was accepted to graduate school.  I 
am able to share my excitement about that event with other graduate students, even if 
they were accepted in February or some other time because the event itself is similar.  In 
the introduction to Halbwachs’ On Collective Memory, Lewis A. Coser compares 
autobiographical memory to attending a college reunion: even though the attendees all 
hold degrees from the same university, the individual college experience will be 
dramatically different from one alumni to the next (24).  In this sense, autobiographical 
memories are personal; they are moments in one’s life that are important to the individual 
for some reason or another.  On the surface, they may not be important to the 
construction of a nation’s history, but digital archives are shifting the tide by favoring 
autobiographical memory over historical fact.  In this chapter, I show how the aims of all 
three archives are angled towards autobiographical memory rather than mere history.   
The productive nature of these archives is what shifts the focus away from 
consumerist memory, documented most notably by Marita Sturken in Tourists of 
Memory.  Sturken contends that national events, like September 11 and the Oklahoma 
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City Bombings, prompted a response via consumerism.  In order to deal with the 
overwhelming grief of these events, people bought kitschy items, such as World Trade 
Center snow globes and teddy bears for comfort.  The new trend toward digital memory 
production points to an interesting shift in the types of memory storage the three digital 
archives represent.  Although The Wayback Machine is not specifically a site to collect 
memories of one specific event, it does have different “channels” devoted to memorials 
of September 11 and other tragedies.  
Others, too, have considered the ramifications of mass culture and memory, 
especially Alison Landsberg.  Her work, Prosthetic Memory, is helpful in thinking 
through how remembrance, in general, is formulated via engines of mass consumption.  
Landsberg wonders how interactions with mass media influence and shape individuals’ 
relationships to historical events, especially ones they did not live through.  She defines 
prosthetic memory as, “the interface between a person and a historical narrative about the 
past, at an experiential site such as a movie theater or museum. […] The resulting 
prosthetic memory has the ability to shape that person’s subjectivity and politics” (2).  In 
the epilogue of her book, Landsberg recognizes that she has not considered the 
consequences of digital archives on memory, and the three sites I look at here benefit 
from and pose many new questions to Landsberg’s theory.  If Landsberg suggests that 
prosthetic memories enable people to have true experiences of events in which they did 
not actually participate, then I am particularly interested in defining what ‘counts’ as real 
experience.  The difference I am interested in here is how new sites of memory ask users 
to write the memories themselves by combining mass media and memory in one location.  
Can we write prosthetic memories, even if we did not experience the actual event?  Since 
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these digital archives are open to all contributions, should there be limitations or 
boundaries on what “counts” as true experience?  More directly, even though I was not in 
New York City when the planes collided into the World Trade Center towers, did I 
“experience” the event on television?  On a more localized scale, as a result of increased 
security measures because of 9/11, my trips to the airport are now more labor-intensive.  
Are these aftershocks of 9/11 actual moments of experience, signifying the only pure 
“experience” I have had of the events?  
Landsberg’s characterization of “prosthetic memory” follows Halbwachs’ interest 
in memory from a distance.  In considering what “counts” as actual experience, 
Halbwachs states that,  
During my life, my national society has been theater for a number of events that I 
say I ‘remember,’ events that I know about only from newspapers or the testimony 
of those directly involved.  These events occupy a place in the memory of the 
nation, but I myself did not witness them.  In recalling them, I must rely entirely 
upon the memory of others, a memory that comes, not as corroborator or completer 
of my own, but as the very source of what I wish to repeat.  I often know such 
events no better nor in any other manner than I know historical events that occurred 
before I was born. I carry a baggage load of historical remembrances that I can 
increase through conversation and reading.  But it remains a borrowed memory, not 
my own (The Collective 51). 
 
The digital archives force us to reconsider the stretches of memory.  Because the digital 
archives themselves mediate the actual experience of the events by allowing users to 
upload videos, pictures, and other forms of media to bring people closer to the actual 
event, the boundaries of “historical memory,” “autobiographical memory,” and 
“prosthetic memory” must be restructured.  When speaking of historical memory, 
Halbwachs states that, “I can imagine them, but I cannot remember them” (52).  
However, the static photographs and historical accounts of his time vary differently from 
the digital archive with which we deal today.  In particular, if prosthetic memory enables 
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us to bring the event “into our living room,” or at least onto our screens, then I argue that 
we are experiencing the event as our own.  Through the technology, we are persuaded to 
write our own memory even though we experienced the event from a distance.  We can 
write both an autobiographical memory and a prosthetic memory within the extended arm 
of the digital archive.  
However utopian I have made these archives sound, media obsolescence also 
becomes a critical idea to consider, especially since the archives are relying on the 
stability of code.  Rather than housing memories and keepsakes in permanent locations 
under ideal conditions and the watchful eyes of museum curators, these digital archives 
rely on the continued interest of unknown archivists.  Worse still, the archives risk being 
forgotten, as they are at the mercy of badly written code as N. Katherine Hayles 
recognizes in her essay “Traumas of Code”: “Nothing is more difficult than to decipher 
code someone else has written and insufficiently documented” (137).  Because the digital 
archives are code by nature, they will always be subjected to the torments of bad code 
sourcing, various Internet protocols, and server stability.  These digital archives, too, are 
relying on backwards compatibility, the process that allows newer media devices to read 
or project older versions of software or other saved material.  For instance, Blu-ray 
players are able to play most standard DVDs; even though the Blu-ray technology is 
more advanced than the average DVD, the device is able to read both types of discs and 
Blu-ray owners are not required to repurchase the movies they already own.  
Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that the storage and server space the archives 
currently occupy will be the type we use even five years in the future.   
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The issue of media obsolesce foregrounds another distinction—the type of content 
that is actually contained within the archives.  The content of these digital archives is a 
bit different than what you would find in a closed memory museum or memorial.  Each 
digital archive houses a great many types of sources, but they all have one common 
element—all of the source materials are digital files.  What becomes tricky is when we 
consider the originality of the items themselves.  For example, how might the content 
“appropriate” or, to use Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin’s term, “remediate” a previous 
medium since it is reinventing, reinterpreting, and technologically updating older media 
for use in fresh contexts?  Remediation, a term that was influenced by Marshall 
McLuhan’s statement “one media’s content is always another media’s,” absorbs previous 
media while at the same time being presented in a new form (Understanding 8, 
Remediation 53).  As a result, digital content walks a fine line between “original” and 
“remediated.” 
To differentiate between the various types of digital content, G. Mahesh and 
Rekha Mittal define three terms that are useful here when exploring texts in the archives: 
born-digital, turned-digital, and gained-digital.  Mahesh and Mittal’s work contributes to 
the debates on copyright issues concerning digital work, and the three classifications of 
the types of texts encountered in digital archives. These terms will be used to analyze 
certain elements of each archive in order to determine if the point of creation affects the 
viability and aims of the individual archives. 
Born-digital refers to “the content is created in digital form with the purpose and 
understanding that the content is primarily meant for storage and use in digital form” 
(Mahesh and Mittal 677).  Born-digital texts originated in digital forms and are not 
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reproduced outside of their space on the Internet.  The three open memory archives I look 
at are mainly composed of born-digital content, but this does not mean that they are 
immune from deterioration like other materials stored in closed memory archives. In fact, 
Walt Crawford contends in his article “Stick Around: Notes on Long-Term Digital 
Content Retention” that the digital archiving process itself is similar to closed memory 
archives, but the long-term storage of born-digital material is where issues arise (64). For 
instance, Crawford argues that copying born-digital material onto microfilms or printing 
out the archives for long-term storage actually negates the classification of born-digital.  
In terms of storage, born-digital material must stay digitized—it must not be printed or 
copied and stored in alternative locations.  The problem then becomes ensuring that the 
material is properly migrated from one technology to the next, and guaranteeing that the 
digitally archived will be accessible in the future.  With printed material, we do not have 
to worry about accessibility in the same ways—we can still read handwritten letters from 
the Civil War without worrying whether our current technology will support the “file” 
(Crawford 65).  Moreover, Crawford recommends migrating digital archives every five 
years to ensure their accessibility and compatibility with current technologies (65). 
Continual migration is not a flawless option though, since it takes money, a full staff and 
continued interest—more resources than digital archives typically have.  
The second type of material found in digital archives is called turned-digital, 
referring to all content that has been converted into a digital format, and retains its 
original shape and form.  The Wayback Machine has a substantial amount of turned-
digital material since they have partnered with digital book projects like Project 
Gutenberg.  E-books are a classic example of turned-digital content because they were 
  
99 
 
 
 
originally printed texts but have been scanned and/or made available for digital 
consumption.  The digital book itself functions and appears nearly identical to its printed 
counterpart.  Other examples of turned-digital texts include academic journals, 
magazines, and newspapers that are available in both print and electronic forms without 
any changes in content. 
The final term, gained-digital, is less a matter of how the content is created, and 
more an issue of how the material is distributed and made available through a lending 
institution, such as a university library.  Mahesh and Mittal describe gained-digital 
content as that which: “might have been born-digital or turned-digital at some source but 
the library is not associated with the creation of content. The library only acts as a 
facilitator to access the already available content” (678).  Here, claiming a text as 
“gained-digital material” are simply the means by which it is accessible and distributed, 
not the process by which it is created.  All three archives provide gained-digital material.  
In fact, I suggest that one of the goals of the digital archives is to make accessible 
material and information that was not possible prior to their existence.  The September 11 
Digital Archive and The Soweto ’76 Archive both strive to present the voices from a 
wide variety of experiences. Before the digital archives, expressing such memories in 
public forums was complicated, and thus the archives can be called gained-digital 
because they provide a space where people can distribute and access one-of-a-kind 
stories.  
In what follows, I describe all three archives and explore their collections by 
viewing specific examples.  By looking closely at the new forms of “making memory” I 
show that digital archiving is shifting memory away from consumerist tendencies and 
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into strong spaces of production.  I also have the following specific questions for each 
archive I address as the chapter progresses.  Because The Wayback Machine is 
essentially “hoarding” all the sites they can collect, how does this massive collection 
affect the meaning of “archive”?  Anyone who has visited The Wayback Machine is 
immediately drawn into its bank of “oldies-but-goodies,” outdated versions of familiar 
Web sites like Yahoo or eBay.  Does this desire to look back align with what Svetlana 
Boym calls “nostalgia”?  For The September 11 Archive, does collective memory alter 
the ways we write memory?  Finally, because The Soweto ’76 Archive will be used as a 
supplement to the actual museum in Soweto, will there be a disconnect between 
availability to the digital archive and memory production?  How might visiting the two 
different memory spaces prompt different responses?  Do the aims of the digital archive 
parallel the actions of the post-Apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commission? 
The Wayback Machine 
The Wayback Machine is the Internet’s own time-traveling device.  The purpose 
of this archive is to collect and make accessible all of the pages that have existed on the 
Internet.  Page updates or system upgrades often surprise us when we open our browsers 
and find our well-traveled pages changed, redesigned, or inaccessible. If we think about 
memory and digital archives as simply as possible, it can be related to the clichéd 
reminder to “back-up” our work.  If our computer crashes, and we have not created a 
duplicate copy, our work is gone.  Even though social bookmarking systems like 
delicious.com and Twitter are places to share sites of interest via links, they are not 
immune from the saved sites being deleted on the other end.  This is the trouble with 
born-digital material: we do not have a guaranteed solution to keeping it around.   
  
101 
 
 
 
Fortunately, ‘keeping it around’ is the main goal of The Wayback Machine.  They 
strive to archive all versions of every item that has ever appeared on the Web.  Each 
version is sorted by date and when you search for a site, you are directed to a screen with 
a table listing all archived versions by date (figure 3.1).1 To illustrate with a bit more 
detail, at archive.org, the layout is nothing fancy (figure 3.2).  The website is categorized 
by type of materials it stores: Web, Moving Images, Live Music Archive, Software, 
Audio, and Texts. Each category indicates how many files it currently hosts (the Web is 
significantly higher than the others at over 150 billion pages) and users can follow the 
site via RSS feed, signified by the button on the upper right side of the screen.  For each 
featured category there is a “Curator’s Choice,” a daily selection of interesting or topical 
archived material.  Also on the homepage, there are places for recent comments and 
questions within the user forums of the site.  Each category allows users to search within 
the specific file type, which is helpful considering the sheer vastness of collected 
material. 
Just above the orange RSS feed button is a link that simply states “upload.”  
When clicked, users are taken to a registration screen that must be completed in order to 
contribute any material to the archives.  After agreeing to the legalese, users receive an 
“Internet Archive Virtual Library Card” which provides access to the archives and also 
allows users to post material and comments.  As an indication of how many subscribers 
there are, when I signed up in June 2010, I received the 928,936th “library card.” 
Digital archiving takes into consideration two questions: what do we choose to 
store and what do we choose to leave out?  With digital archives, we have a choice to 
                                                
1 All figures can be found in the appendix at the end of this dissertation 
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remember (by requesting our favorite sites be crawled) or to forget (some sites aren’t 
worth the time to return to). There is one significant drawback, however.  The restoration 
and “reactivation” of, say, my old blog does not guarantee that all the old posts will be 
available nor does it grant me my administrative duties to change its appearance, 
moderate comments, or add new posts.  Each version of the website must be crawled and 
archived separately (thus, the table of dates and links).  Our biological memory functions 
a bit differently—sometimes we repress ideas because we want to, and other times we 
cannot control the forgetting that is brought on by disease, injury, or age.  If a memory is 
locked in our biological memory, it is significantly more difficult to recall an event or 
someone’s name.  Frequently, biological recollection occurs merely by chance. As we 
begin to think more critically about how memory will be transformed in the digital age, 
we must also remember to think about how quickly ideas can be “forgotten” and deleted.  
If The Wayback Machine promises users “universal access to human knowledge,” what 
is included in this universality must be questioned, too. 
 Compared with traditional archeology, I can see how data retrieval from five 
years ago does not seem as delicate – or even as relevant – as, say, uncovering our 
evolutionary history via archeological digs.  But this is the exciting aspect of The 
Wayback Machine—we are archiving events as they occur, not in retrospect.  Even more 
interesting is that The Wayback Machine is a way to protect the past as it is happening.  
Since we do not know what will be important data to hold onto, and because The 
Wayback Machine is actively creating massive archives of all Web sites as they appear, 
this archive is expanding the possibility for future research in a way we might not even 
know yet. 
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 Because The Wayback Machine desires to hold onto everything, this might be the 
first digitally diagnosed case of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder.  While “hoarding” has 
recently become grossly intriguing because of reality television shows, digital hoarding is 
popular for a different reason.  It is exciting to think that everything we have seen on the 
Internet can be viewed again, that we have a place to return to, and that our memory will 
be saved for us.  There are, however, many skeptics of digital preservation.  Digital 
doomsayers like Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger cringe at the idea of saving everything and 
suggest that we purge our hard drives on a regular basis.  However, it is critical to rethink 
digital archives from the present moment precisely because we are producing at the same 
time that we are consuming its content.  The Wayback Machine places researchers and 
archivists at a privileged standpoint because we are all able to contribute to, sort out, and 
organize the newly added material while simultaneously identifying and saving older 
sites.  This collaborative form of open memory suggests new forms of researching and 
remembering because the archive will always be a new space for new voices.    
The downside of such massive collections is organization and ease of locating the 
desire information.  If we cannot locate material quickly and regularly, then it might as 
well be forgotten.  One of the issues with open memory digital archives is not how much 
we can store, but the structures we must develop in order to process and use the 
information efficiently.  In the first issue of the journal Memory Studies, Paul Connerton 
suggested “Seven Types of Forgetting” in his article of the same name. The seven types 
all describe forgetting as a purposeful action occurring as a result of the individual, as 
opposed to involuntary forgetting as a result of a disorder or brain injury.  Connerton 
contends that while we usually view memory as a triumph, forgetting is most often a type 
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of failure: forgetting where we placed our keys, forgetting we have a committee meeting, 
forgetting to grab milk on multiple trips to the grocery store.  He argues that no matter 
what kind of forgetting occurs, they all have one similar feature: “they imply an 
obligation on my part to remember something and my failure to discharge that 
obligation” (59).  Subsequently, digital memory shifts the obligation away from the user 
into the system itself—the failure of forgetting is no longer mine, but is instead a lapse of 
technological memory.  But aren’t we the ones who actually place our memories in 
digital systems like The Wayback Machine?  Who’s to blame then?  Characterized by its 
functionality, external memory’s most striking property is not merely its ability to 
supplement biological memory, but that it “remembers” events exactly as they occurred 
and retains knowledge without the fear of our brain failing us, or forgetting.  
But how do we characterize all those Web sites that are “oldies-but-goodies,” like 
the first Yahoo page or early versions of Amazon?  Viewing these sites reminds visitors 
of a time when they, too, were as new to the Internet as the Web sites themselves.  When 
viewing early versions of popular Web sites, we are transported to a different time, a 
different place.  Looking at Yahoo’s homepage from 1996 and comparing it with recent 
versions, not only is the layout different, but so too are the advertisements, the images, 
and the option to personalize content (figures 3.3-3.8).  When viewing the 1996 Yahoo, I 
think: “remember when this was fantastic?”  Might The Wayback Machine be 
reinventing nostalgia alongside digital memory?  In The Future of Nostalgia, Svetlana 
Boym states:  
At first glance, nostalgia is a longing for a place, but actually it is a yearning for a 
different time—the time of our childhood, the slower rhythms of our dreams.  In a 
broader sense, nostalgia is rebellion against the modern idea of time, the time of 
history and progress.  The nostalgic desires to obliterate history and turn it into 
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private or collective mythology, to revisit time like space, refusing to surrender to the 
irreversibility of time that plagues the human condition (xv).  
 
The allure of The Wayback Machine is to see the progress of technological 
development—that is why visitors are drawn to the 1996 Yahoo homepage.  We 
understand that technology has progressed well beyond 1996, but we yearn to remember 
and see ‘what it was like then.’ We can visit 2010 Yahoo anytime, but we rebel against 
modern time by reminiscing within the constructs of the digital archive.  The Wayback 
Machine also creates nostalgic desire by encouraging visitors to contribute to its 
collection.  Your favorite site from 1998 is missing? Request it!  Nostalgia, here, 
becomes individualized within the collective.   
 More specifically, Boym argues that nostalgic recollections do not reveal any 
signs of decay, and “it has to be freshly painted in its ‘original image’ and remain 
eternally young” (49).  A visit to Yahoo today only provides access to the current site; 
The Wayback Machine invites visitors reminisce about the ‘original image’ of the older 
version.  When Boym states, “the past for the restorative nostalgic is a value for the 
present; the past is not a duration but a perfect snapshot,” she is saying that nostalgia 
captures the past perfectly as it was (49).  We can view Yahoo anytime, but we must visit 
The Wayback Machine to see earlier snapshots of a time past. 
 While The Wayback Machine seeks to capture moments as they occur, in the next 
two sections, I examine the archives inspired by events of national importance.  One the 
surface, these sites may seem “historical” by nature, but I argue that they are favoring 
autobiographical and prosthetic memory over any single version of history.   
The September 11 Digital Archive 
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 Like the other archives I look at in this chapter, The September 11 Digital 
Archive is designed to generate user content with the intent of “saving the histories of 
September 11, 2001” (The September).  At the top of the home page there are six tabs 
from which visitors can choose: browse, research, contribute, special collections, 9/11 
faqs, and 9/11 links (figure 3.9).  Under the tabs a description of the site notes its purpose 
as “using electronic media to collect, preserve, and present the history of September 11, 
2001 and its aftermath” (The September).  The archive was established as a means to help 
historians collect information via contemporary technologies, allowing them to 
investigate events from new perspectives and from people who typically would not have 
an opportunity to contribute to shaping historical narratives.  Although the archive 
“officially” stopped its collection efforts in 2004, visitors to the archive are still 
encouraged to add their memories to the database.  Moreover, The September 11 Digital 
Archive “has partnered with the Library of Congress, which in September 2003 accepted 
the Archive into its permanent collections – an event that both ensured the Archive’s 
long-term preservation and marked the Library’s first major digital acquisition” (The 
September).    
By clicking on the “browse” tab, users are taken to another screen that 
differentiates between the type of files, ranging from stories to e-mails, digital animations 
and audio.  There is even a “forum” dedicated to Mark D. Phillips’ famous “Satan in the 
Smoke” image, a photograph in which some claim an image of Satan can be seen in the 
dark plumes of smoke rising from the burning towers (figure 3.10).  A quick look through 
the different files exposes a broad reaction to the events; some note their hatred towards 
the attackers, others replay what they were doing when the attacks occurred, while others 
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are still skeptical of the media’s reporting of the events in general.  Overall, the archives 
represent the gamut of feelings, reactions, and confusion inflicted on Americans after the 
attacks.  
Many of the stories follow similar patterns: there are several poems describing 
what amateur poets called “Tuesday Mourning”; there are many high school and college 
students detailing how their daily routines on September 11 were altered and the bonds 
they formed with random passer-bys watching the news reports together; there are several 
parents noting the birth of their children, doomed with the national tragedy as their 
birthday; and hundreds of native New Yorkers describing their narrow escapes while 
their friends, family, and co-workers were not as fortunate.  The images in the archive 
can also be categorized: many capture the World Trade Center Towers in the years before 
the attacks; there are dozens of pictures of the towers in smoke and the rescue efforts 
(figures 3.11-3.14); several photos showcase visitors to NYC playfully manipulating the 
vanishing point to show how much “taller” they are than the towers (figures 3.15-3.16); 
and others are tributes to loved ones who died in the attacks.  There is, however, a 
noticeable lack of stories and images from either Pennsylvania or the Pentagon, 
suggesting there were many more people directly affected in New York City (figures 
3.17-3.18).  Reading through the stories in the archive, there is an overall feeling of 
distress—almost a decade later, and I, too, still feel the confusion and the unrest I felt just 
watching the destruction on television.  Because events like September 11 were televised, 
the broadcast itself expands the notion of first-hand experience; even though the majority 
of the country was not directly affected by the plane crashes, as a nation we are still 
struggling through the aftermath of the event.  The 24/7 media coverage of 9/11 along 
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with sites such as The September 11 Digital Archive bring the event much closer to 
everyone.  In what follows, I use a couple examples of stories and images from the 
archive to illustrate that prosthetic memory and autobiographical memory are valid 
means of experience.   
September 11 brought out patriotism, almost excessively so, in the months that 
followed the attacks, as this segment of one story illustrates:  
Our family business is wholesale novelty, carnival and party supplies. We could 
not believe the amount of phone calls we received for patriotic merchandise since 
September 11. We have always carried American Flags and other items, but the 
response to show patriotism was overwhelming, here in St. Louis. We supplied 
the Baseball Cardinals with 50,000 American Flags that were given out at an 
evening game. Subsequently, other teams called our store asking for flags as well. 
Unfortunately we were out of stock and frantically looking for vendors who had 
them in stock! (Dawson).  
 
Even in St. Louis, quite a distance from the sites of any of the plane crashes, the demand 
for American flags increased drastically following 9/11.  That people rallied in cities 
across the nation clearly suggests the experience of writing memory is not limited to the 
specific sites of impact.  By extending the reach of “experience,” the possibility to write 
memory also expands.  The story above illustrates one specific memory of Sharyl 
Dawson; although she was not physically present at any of the sites, she transferred the 
prosthetic memory of the attacks from the media’s portrayal into the autobiographical 
memory of distributing flags locally and around the country.  As a result of 
“experiencing” 9/11 on television or through other media, Dawson utilized the prosthetic 
memory in order to write her own autobiographical memory.  The event was no longer 
someone else’s version of history—Dawson rewrote the event for herself, reacted by 
distributing American flags, and shared her memory of 9/11 in the archive.  Dawson’s 
memory should not be disregarded because she was in St. Louis.  On the contrary, her 
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autobiographical memory of the flag distribution demonstrates that the experience of 
writing memory and technemonics extends beyond the spatial limitations of the attack 
sites. 
 Similar to Dawson’s memory is an image of an installation in Texas, the 
photograph capturing only a fraction of a field on which hundreds of small flags are 
pointing out of the grass (figure 3.19).  Jesus Velasquez describes the photograph as “A 
park in Lubbock, Texas on September 11 2004 to honor the Men and Women who gave 
their lives on September 11 2001.”  Velasquez does not detail what he means by “gave 
their lives”—we do not know if the flags represent people on the planes, the rescue 
efforts, and/or people inside the World Trade Center or Pentagon or if each flag 
represents a specific number of deaths (e.g., one flag equals ten deaths).  Lubbock, Texas, 
like St. Louis, is quite a distance from the actual location of the attacks, but the physical 
space does not disqualify Velasquez from writing his own memory.  In the image, the 
rows of American flags symbolize the transferring of the prosthetic memory into a 
tangible autobiographical one.  I am assuming that Velasquez was not an eyewitness to 
the plane crashes, but he was present at this specific memorial dedicated to September 11 
on the three-year anniversary.  Velasquez’s photograph represents his autobiographical 
memory of 9/11 drawn from the nationally publicized prosthetic memory.   
 The two previous examples exemplify the desire to contribute to a national 
moment by transforming distanced experience into personalized memory.  In Tourists of 
Memory, Marita Sturken argues that by reconstructing the context of events, America’s 
response to national tragedy is often a rhetorical act.  By persuading outsiders of our 
strength even in moments of weakness, “the figure of the innocent victim is contradictory 
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in American culture because of its implication of weakness, and this often necessitates 
the rewriting of victims in contexts like 9/11 into narratives of heroism” (Sturken 8).  
Further, Sturken suggests that Americans have the desire to be “tourists of history: a form 
of tourism that has as its goal a cathartic ‘experience’ of history” (9).  Neither Dawson 
nor Velasquez were present at the sites of the attacks, but they were present at their 
localized memorial celebrations.  Dawson’s story and Velasquez’s photograph illustrate 
what Sturken calls authentic and inauthentic memories.  She states that by visiting sites of 
trauma, visitors gain a “trace of authenticity by extension” (11).  These “sites of trauma” 
for Dawson and Velasquez are extensions of the actual sites of trauma, but according to 
Sturken they are inauthentic because of the distance.  “The complexity of contemporary 
media events calls into question the simple equation of physical proximity to a trauma 
precisely because the media disperses and circulates highly charged images” (Sturken 
30).  With the digital archives, one’s physical proximity to an event no longer takes 
precedence over the ability to produce a valid memory.  Instead, the production of 
memory becomes a matter of cultural proximity, or how individuals reclaim events for 
themselves among and within the louder voices of the media.  
By writing memory and contributing to The September 11 Digital Archive, 
Dawson and Velasquez have “authenticated” their experiences by bringing the site of 
trauma out of the media and transplanting it much closer to their own homes.  Whether 
their experiences are deemed authentic or not, what qualifies Dawson and Velasquez as 
tourists is, in fact, their distance.  “Tourism is about travel that wants to imagine itself as 
innocent,” Sturken notes (13).  Tourists stand at a distance; they stand outside culture 
(Sturken 13).  Dawson and Velasquez were certainly distanced from the actual events of 
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9/11 and were far from the clean-up, the dirt, and the congestion that followed.  However, 
I contest Sturken’s claim that viewing the trauma from a distance is a viewpoint “that 
demands no responsibility” (13).  On the contrary, Dawson and Velasquez took 
responsibility for their own memory of the event by rewriting grief in their own localized 
way.  Even though the grief of losing a family member in the attacks certainly outweighs 
the pride of distributing flags at a baseball game, they are both separate experiences of 
the same event.  By contributing to the archives, both Dawson and Velasquez have 
produced memories responding to the call to understand events of national importance.  
Their contributions, among the thousands of others, are an attempt to “make sense of 
one’s response” to 9/11 regardless of their actual distance (Sturken 30).   
The Soweto ’76 Archive 
The final archive I examine is The Soweto ’76 Archive created to supplement the 
“closed memory” Hector Pieterson Memorial and Museum in Soweto, South Africa 
(figure 3.20).  The Maryland Institute for Technology in the Humanities (MITH) and the 
Hector Pieterson Memorial and Museum (HPMM) have created The Soweto ’76 3D 
Immersive Archive, allowing visitors to experience what they have named a “digital 
cultural heritage trail.”  This Archive is a virtual re-creation of several significant 
locations during the student uprising in June 1976.  Although the digital archive is still 
being developed, the live demo enables users to read and share their own memories or 
simply gain a better understanding of the South African Apartheid by “visiting” the sites.  
Better still, The Soweto ’76 Archive gives people access to history in a new way—rather 
than reading about the important locations and events of the Apartheid, The Soweto ’76 
Archive brings the experience to the screen by linking related video, text, and memories 
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in one interactive interface.  The interactive features make The Soweto ’76 Archive 
unique—visitors can add their own personal Apartheid experiences to this site, creating a 
truly multimodal museum.  This archive is unlike the other two I have examined.  
Visitors actually “see” and “walk through” important locations, like Robben Island, while 
at the same time contributing to its very structure.  The combination of spectatorship and 
contribution makes The Soweto ’76 Archive a new way of learning about history while 
simultaneously writing national memory.  
A visit to The Soweto ’76 Archive is similar to visiting an expansive closed 
museum.  Visitors can walk through and between buildings while reading descriptions of 
events related to each location.  This archive has been designed in collaboration with the 
HPMM to collect a better understanding of the events of the Soweto student uprising.  To 
briefly recap the uprising, the National Party government mandated that all classes be 
conducted in a mix of Afrikaans and English (Pohlandt-McCormick, Ch. 2).  Since the 
schools were segregated at the time, Black students rejected the idea of being educated in 
the language of their oppressors (Pohlandt-McCormick, Ch. 2).  The rejection of this 
language requirement grew and on June 16, 1976, the resistance culminated in a large 
student protest (Pohlandt-McCormick, Ch. 2).  Even though the protest was designed to 
be peaceful, police opened fire on unarmed students.  The death toll is still undetermined, 
although reports claim that any where from twenty-three to over 200 people were fatally 
wounded as a result of police violence (Hunter-Gault).  The HPMM is dedicated to the 
students who resisted the government, and even the name of the museum itself signifies 
the horrific iconic image of the uprising—the dying teenager, Hector Pieterson, being 
carried in the arms of another student while Pieterson’s crying sister follows closely.   
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Although the events in Soweto note only one event during Apartheid, its 
developing digital archive suggests that any current representation of the uprising has not 
been presented completely.  The combination of the brick-and-mortar museum with the 
digital archive provides people, particularly students who participated in the uprising, a 
space in which to share their recollections.  These new perspectives expand the written 
experience of the Apartheid in a way that was not possible outside of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission.  
The South African Apartheid separated groups of individuals based upon their 
race, an act that both related and separated the country’s citizens.  Although that 
segregation insinuates a ‘shared meaning,’ individuals were solely identified through 
their lack—my race is connecting me to a specific group, while at the same time 
separating me from another because I lack that color.  If identity during Apartheid 
suggested lack, then a post-Apartheid South African identity encouraged citizens to 
identify through sameness rather than difference.  Post-Apartheid, The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established to collect the wide range of 
experiences of the newly “healed” nation.  The TRC hoped that the space would foster 
recognition and forgiveness; it was a space that was open to any South African wishing to 
speak about his or her Apartheid experience, however painful.  If the TRC provided a 
space to express one’s experience during Apartheid, then The Soweto ’76 Archive 
functions similarly, although on a much smaller scale.  However, issues of accessibility 
complicate the aims of the TRC and The Soweto ‘76 Archive.  While the TRC was a 
massive undertaking with transcripts filling thousands of pages, there are people who did 
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not speak out because of pain or fear.  Moreover, as large as the TRC was, its enormity 
also represents the eerie silence of the thousands who died during Apartheid.    
Both the TRC and The Soweto ’76 Archive are founded on the basis that people 
have the desire to share their stories of suffering.  The TRC was attempting to unify a 
nation through pain, although forcing all to verbalize such pain may not have provided 
much healing after the Apartheid.  Consequently, when the pain of the Apartheid was 
reified through written or spoken language, it became the object for someone else’s 
perception.  As a result, an individual’s subjective experience of the Apartheid was then 
joined with other Apartheid experiences.  With this ‘nationwide’ collection of Apartheid 
experiences, the TRC attempted to reconcile a nation by moving from the simple telling 
of stories into an active forgiveness.  However, the trouble with the TRC is not that it 
actually existed, but that it was relating everyone through the sameness of pain.  By 
allowing individuals to tell their eyewitness Apartheid experiences, the TRC transformed 
these narratives into an act of public (and same) forgiveness.  All those who participated 
in the TRC related to one another because they experienced some sort of similar pain, but 
in the end, this communal pain conquered individuality by recognizing everyone only 
through the sameness of pain.  The TRC illustrates gathering the personal accounts of 
Apartheid experiences, all the while fusing them together as a collective South African 
experience. 
 That The Soweto ’76 Archive is being developed three decades after the events 
prompts a few questions.  First, the time between the event itself and the official launch 
of the archive has been significant; the developers of the site cannot be certain that time 
has not hindered individual perception of the event.  Secondly, like the TRC, if The 
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Soweto ’76 Archive is bringing people together under the auspices of pain, then does the 
archive become a space of “sameness” through segregation just like the uprising itself?  
Finally, it is not clear how MITH will make the archive easily accessible or how they will 
“advertise” the site to Soweto “survivors,” possibly compromising the project before it 
officially begins. 
To help answer some of these questions, I turn to Margaret Anne Clarke’s essay 
“The Online Brazilian Museu da Pessoa” in which she examines the historical and 
memorial impact of Brazil’s national archive of personal stories.  Even though Clarke’s 
example is different from The Soweto ’76 Archive and certainly its goals are much more 
social than the TRC, the Museu da Pessoa (which translates as Museum of the Person) 
has tackled some similar problems like those I raised above.  According to Karen 
Worchman, the founder and director of Museu da Pessoa, the purpose of the archive is 
“to record, collect, organize and archive the life stories and personal histories of the 
nation’s citizens into a public databank and resource” (Clarke 151).  The desire to make 
life stories and personal histories searchable marks a new level of Brazilian history, what 
Clarke calls a “history from below” (152).  This bottoms-up approach to archiving 
endorses “peer-to-peer” memory sharing by handing over the reigns to everyone rather 
than a select few.  By considering peer-to-peer memory, my reservation about the purity 
of memory might not be as detrimental, especially since there is no memory or history 
that is privileged over another.  With digital archives, memory actually takes precedence 
over history.  Events of personal significance are more valuable than one, factual account 
of historical importance.  MITH and The Soweto ’76 Archive are attempting to trump 
history (as it is currently written) by favoring personal memory, even three decades out.  
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Like Brazil whose citizens were “once marginalized and fragmented by the teleological 
one-way narrative of ‘modernity’ and progress,” new digital archives allow the voice-less 
to “open up through the interrelation of multiple memories, narrations and trajectories 
within space” (Clarke 164).  Regardless of the time that has passed between the uprising, 
the end of Apartheid, and the creation of this digital archive, this new and important form 
of “cultural democratic practice” has been designed to capture the stories from those 
“who have been excluded from the channels of economic and political access” (Clarke 
153).   
Conclusion: Technemonic Networks 
While it might be a gross oversimplification, if The Soweto ’76 Archive follows 
the popular trend of the Museu da Pessoa and other Web based memes, then contribution 
to the archive will thrive.  Clarke recognizes this trend when she notes: “The creation of 
networks of memory within social contexts of the present is ultimately to enable 
individuals and communities to pursue goals in the spheres of democratic participation, 
cultural affairs, civic activism, and community-based initiatives” (160).  Elsewhere, too, 
the transformation into active citizenry has been noted.  In No Caption Needed, Robert 
Hariman and John Louis Lucaites maintain that, “If citizenship is to be an actual mode of 
participation rather than a merely legal construct, then it has to be articulated in a manner 
that encourages emotional identification with other civic actors” (17).  The emotional 
identification is the intrinsic desire to become part of a collective by producing and 
collaborating in memory making.  By enabling new access routes to the way an event is 
remembered, especially to groups whose accounts have been neglected, the digital 
archive represents an important step towards altruistic computing and collectivities.  The 
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practice of writing and sharing technemonics is a moment of transformation, one that is 
moving away from privileged accounts of history and towards experiential moments of 
memory. 
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Chapter 4 
Memory Manipulation 
 On Monday, April 27, 2009, the President’s plane, Air Force One, made a 
surprise visit to the airspace above downtown Manhattan.  To many, this fly-by was 
startlingly similar to the images of 9/11.  Even the President’s plane (which President 
Obama was not on at the time) was a little too close for comfort.  In an attempt to “get 
some fresh glamour shots of the plane,” The White House secretly ordered Air Force One 
to fly near the Statue of Liberty (Sataline et al).  What the White House did not consider 
were the ramifications of “reenacting” the plane crashes that preceded this photo-op by 
nearly eight years.  There are several reports of New Yorkers running out of nearby 
buildings, believing that the fly-over was another terrorist attack—and this time they 
were going to be ready for whatever chaos lie ahead.  Instead, it was a misjudged and 
poorly conceived plan to spruce up the current images of Air Force One.  The most 
interesting part of this story, however, is not the fact that the plane’s flight so closely 
resembled the 9/11 attacks, but rather the reactions from the public.  Glancing through 
any of the reporting of the botched photo-op indicates outrage from the American public, 
but there is one constantly repeated comment in the online forums that sticks out among 
the others: “Haven’t they heard of Photoshop?” 
 The demand for faked photography is intriguing—while photojournalists are 
responsible for supplying visual truth to the accompanying text, the public’s desire for a 
manipulated photo points to an interesting shift in our acceptance of what’s “real” and 
what’s not.  Rather than invoking a painful memory, the public’s demand for a digitally 
composed photo also suggests that the integrity of the formation of memory on all levels 
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– prosthetic, historical, and autobiographical – is at stake.  If the public willingly 
demands forged photographic proof because the pain of the memory is still too raw, then 
the ethics of visual representation might slip a little further into the sidelines.  If 
manipulated photographs are designed to represent accurate, eye-witness accounts of 
events, then the possibility exists for the faked photos to become prosthetic memories for 
anyone who views the images.  In this chapter, I question the moment of manipulation: if 
the photograph was manipulated with the intention to strengthen the evidentiary chain, 
then can the prosthetic memory be “real”?  Is the memory, too, manipulated? 
With the ubiquity of technological tools, I wish to probe even further by asking: 
with all the technology we have to assist our memory, is it even possible to remember 
anything correctly?  Externalized memory devices, utilized for their stability, are 
certainly fantastic resources for storing all sorts of memories—documents, videos, 
pictures, and audio files.  The flip side, however, is whether these devices can actually 
help us remember events in the way that they actually occurred.  In other words, 
externalized memory is not a question of whether technologies are “ruining” our 
memory, but instead it becomes a question of how technologies are making us remember 
differently.  In The Invention of Memory, Israel Rosenfield argues that memory is 
constantly prone to re-making (76); regardless of how stable external devices keep our 
memories, when we return to them we will often re-make the event because of new bias.  
This new bias might result from one of Daniel Schacter’s seven sins of memory, which 
each suggests that memory is constantly fallible because of time and continual 
experiences (139).  Typically, when we hear “manipulated memory,” it brings to mind 
that there is an outside agent influencing the memory making process.  For instance, a 
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manipulated photo created by a photo editor or a photographer might form our memory 
of an event incorrectly because it does not represent what actually happened.  However, 
Schater and Rosenfield’s arguments each prompt me to consider if memory manipulation 
might also be ‘in the eye of the beholder’ since our perception of the event shifts as time 
passes.   
Following this idea, I examine two specific vectors of memory manipulation: 
external photo manipulation and internal cognitive manipulation.  I have selected these 
two paths because they each highlight different tactics and possibilities for making 
memory.  Moreover, techne also resurfaces in some interesting ways here.  While 
photography is used to capture a real event, photo manipulation steps around what 
naturally occurred to present an unnatural depiction.  As a result, photo manipulation and 
techne are an intriguing pair.  Photography is problematic from the start simply because 
of its spatial limitations—no photographer can ever escape the limitations of framing.  
Although photos are snapped to savor the natural environment in which an event took 
place, the photo will always omit something.  I suggest that this unavoidable framing 
harkens back to the physis/techne dichotomy: while trying to keep the scene as natural as 
possible to preserve its actuality (physis), a photo cannot escape the fact that it lies 
outside of the natural by its very existence.  The photographed scene has the potential to 
become something other that what it actually is—the photographer is impeding on the 
natural environment by snapping one specific, albeit artificial, shot (techne).  In relation 
to internal cognitive manipulation, I revisit techne in relation to expert knowledge.  We 
believe we are in control of our own memories—I experienced the event, and so I 
remember it in the way ‘I say it happened.’  Unfortunately, there have been numerous 
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studies in psychology that prove that our memories are prone to manipulation on several 
levels.  These studies, which I detail later in this chapter, are exciting for relating techne 
and memory because they prove that expert knowledge (the ‘it happened the way I say 
so’ attitude) is less reliable than we tend to believe.  Not only do we remake the 
memories throughout time, but certain studies have also proved that others can actually 
implant memories by suggestive methods or by asking leading questions.  Making 
memory, in this case, again reroutes the natural way we think about our personal 
memory—we cannot be as confident in our memories because they are constantly prone 
to recreation. 
In order to explore the idea that external memory makes us remember differently, 
I look at several examples of cognitive research that question if purposely manipulated 
photographs influence the ways individuals remember events incorrectly, and whether 
individuals can manipulate personal memory by unconsciously allowing other events to 
reshape the original memory.  Remembering differently and incorrectly is what 
Christopher Chabris and Daniel Simons name “the illusion of memory”—even though we 
are convinced that our memory has correctly stored an event or we are certain that we 
could correctly identify a perpetrator in a line-up, our memories are often influenced by 
the ways our brains “re-make” and manipulate the memories we believed to be correct 
(45).  Therefore, I trace two paths paved by manipulated memory: external manipulation 
created by a photo editor and also internally distorted memories resulting from one of 
Schater’s “sins” of memory (e.g., transience or misattribution).  These two paths will help 
answer the following questions: What can photos do to memory?  Can photographs 
become prosthetic memories?  What is the tension between photography as a 
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representation of a real event and the symbolic allusion of memory as “photographs” or 
“snapshots” of event in our lives?   
Memory, I argue, is a persuasive construct—it is not a concrete structure, as we 
tend to think it is, but rather it is extremely fluid and easily subjected to re-creation by the 
slightest suggestive details.  Rhetorically, these suggestive details indicate that there are 
several alternative means to create memory, which might result in the ideal persuasive 
perspective (possibly even the ‘wrong’ or ‘false’ perspective) of a given event.  If we 
want something to be remembered differently, several studies imply that manipulating 
and making new memories is easier than we believe.  The double-edged sword lies in the 
technology itself—the technology that stabilizes and saves our memories (increased and 
easy storage) is developing as quickly as the programs that can be used to alter our 
memories (cheap and accessible manipulation software).  At the same time that we store 
our photographs on sites like Flickr, other sites like Microsoft’s Photo Tourist or 
PhotoSynth borrow user content from Flickr to create 3D renderings of places.  The 
uploaded photos have the possibility to become one small part of a larger, collaborative 
perspective.  The convenience of Photoshop and other editing tools make it easier to crop 
exes out of family portraits and even include new spouses in their place.  On the NBC sit-
com The Office, Michael Scott (played by actor Steve Carell) caused chaos and destroyed 
his relationship when he substituted his head in the place of his new girlfriend’s ex-
husband.  Her husband and children had been on a ski trip, but Michael altered that photo 
(which he turned into his Christmas card) so he was on the “family vacation” instead (“A 
Benihana Christmas”).  While this television episode humorously explores the ease with 
which new technologies can create new memories, it illustrates my point precisely.  At 
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the same time that storage capacity increases and keeping thousands of photographs on 
our computers, iPods, and phones is the norm, new memories are quickly created with the 
same advanced technologies that enable personal memory storage.  Put simply, the more 
storage we have, the more possibilities there are to control, alter, rearrange, and create 
memories with new tools.  These new tools expand the role of rhetorical memory because 
most users have various capabilities to shape the persuasive intent of an image merely by 
cropping, adding text, or changing the color schemes.  Small moves like these can 
significantly change the persuasiveness of the image, impacting personal memory along 
with it.  In this first section, I examine visual rhetoric and the expertly crafted iconic 
photograph in order to introduce the idea that imagery is a means of stabilizing memory.  
The iconic photograph is designed to appeal to a large audience by becoming the single 
memory of an event.  Later, I explore how these iconic photographs, and our memories 
along with it, can be altered to remember an historical event quite differently. 
Visually Rhetorical: Persuasive Images and Controlled Remembrance 
For rhetoricians, any visual element accompanying a persuasive argument is 
critical—photographs are often used to verify the statements of historical events and 
stand in as a witness for the many who were not there first-hand.  We view pictures to 
supplement the stories, to prove that something actually occurred.  When we view 
pictures of our parents when they were dating, or old images of our grandfathers dressed 
in military uniforms, these visuals suggest that the stories they have told us over the years 
are real, and we can place a bit more weight on their truth based on this pictorial 
evidence.  In any case, visual representation is intended to persuade us of its reality—that 
something occurred in the way it has been told.  Photographs are able to bolster reports of 
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worldwide events so well because they are inherently persuasive.  The persuasive aspect 
of photographs appeals to the same pathos of spoken rhetoric.  For Robert Hariman and 
John Louis Lucaites, the iconic photograph’s hold on the public psyche is carefully 
designed to produce an orthodox reaction. “A rhetorical moment was indeed emotional 
but only because emotions are rhetorical,” argue Hariman and Lucaites, “and the 
persuasive breakthrough achieved by the photo was an example of a polity being brought 
to its senses by its capacity for feeling” (163).  The stable reception of iconic photographs 
is one thing; the likelihood of that memory becoming manipulated, however, is another 
beast altogether.   
Visual rhetoric scholars Hariman and Lucaites’ book No Caption Needed explores 
the rhetorical nature of iconic photographs, their capacity for widespread persuasiveness, 
and their ability to create stabilized memories and affective responses in mass audiences.  
No Caption Needed is a great place to begin looking at the rhetorical influences of 
photographs from the perspectives of both the photographer and individual memory, 
especially because iconic photographs maintain their place in mainstream consciousness 
by forming a singular, albeit universal, memory of a nationally important event.  Unlike a 
political speech whose message can easily be misconstrued, the images Hariman and 
Lucaties discuss are iconic because they spark fixed, visceral responses in their audience.  
Hariman and Lucaties state that, “the iconic image’s combination of mainstream 
recognition, wide circulation, and emotional impact is a proven formula for reproducing a 
society’s social order” (9).  I suggest that “social order” can alternatively be read as 
“controlled remembrance.”  By creating a single, visual representation to stand in for an 
event, the mass audience is instructed to remember the event in that one particular way.  
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Prosthetic memories created by iconic photographs reinforce a controlled rhetorical 
response.  For Hariman and Lucaties, “Iconic photographs acquire rhetorical potential by 
representing events according to the conventions of those visual arts and persuasive 
practices familiar to a public audience” (30).  Unlike shock artists such as Andres 
Serrano, whose photograph “Piss Christ” caused controversy in the art world and drew 
heavy criticism from government leaders, an iconic photograph does not challenge the 
limits of what we individually consider artistic (Hansen).  On the contrary, “whether 
posing next to a scenic vista in the American West or staging a statue toppling in Iraq, the 
[iconic] image is composed to persuade” its audience to remember the event through the 
single image (Hariman and Lucaties 33).   
Outside of its predominant reception as the stand-alone memory, there is no 
alternative purpose for the iconic photograph.  The iconic photograph is not designed to 
challenge our experience of the event, but rather it is created to become our prosthetic 
experience of the occasion.  For instance, very few witnessed the Challenger explosion 
first hand, but the majority of Americans experienced the event via mediated extensions 
like news photos or on television.  Now, the iconic image of the twisted plumes of smoke 
represent the space shuttle disaster; thus each reproduction of that image is intended to 
reinforce the empathetic feelings perpetuated by the iconic photograph.  These 
perpetuated feelings are what Hariman and Lucaties call “twice-behaved” behavior:  an 
“absolute dependence on mechanical reproduction that provides photography with its 
deepest connection to live performance” (31-2).   
Interestingly, however, the repetition of iconic photographs does not make them 
immune from memory distortion.  We often think we create immovable “flash-bulb 
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memories” of significant events, but even these seemingly stable memories can be 
influenced by the “sins” of memory.  As a term first used by psychologists Roger Brown 
and James Kulik in 1977, flash-bulb memories are “extremely vivid, long-lasting 
memories for unexpected, emotionally laden, and consequential events” (Talarico and 
Rubin 455).  Moreover, cognitive psychologists John Neil Bohannon, Sami Gratz, and 
Victoria Symons Cross have found that these seemingly ‘untouchable’ mental images are 
just as prone to manipulation over time because we often discuss and seek out 
information about consequential events more actively, thus inadvertently re-shaping the 
original memory (1028).  This type of individualized manipulation is very interesting, 
especially because it suggests that although an iconic image is created to become the 
memory of an event, our own brains create new memories of the event that we didn’t 
even experience first hand.  As a result, the prosthetic memory that we internalized from 
the original photograph – a memory that we only experienced from that photo – is not the 
only memory of the event we might have.  Rather, our own biases and personal 
experiences will later cloud our perception of the photo, thus making new memories—a 
cognitive blend of prosthetic and autobiographical influences.   
In what follows, I look at several examples of photo manipulation in order to 
explore digital technologies and memory.  By examining the blend of photography and 
digital technologies, I argue that memory becomes much more fragile and prone to 
inaccuracies and misinformation.  I look at several studies that explore the impact of 
photo manipulation on creating distorted memories (autobiographical and otherwise).  I 
also argue that my interpretation of techne as a form of control, as a creative force, and as 
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expert knowledge all become more relevant and intricate with the introduction of 
digitally manipulated photographs and internally altered memories.   
Photo Manipulation: Photojournalism 
Techne and photo manipulation are in an interesting couple: while both use 
artistic means to overcome nature, there are limitations to both.  Altering images presents 
an unnatural viewpoint—an event did not happen in the way it is presented in the 
photograph.  A manipulated photo resists the natural presentation of an event, and favors 
an unnatural representation of what occurred.  Since manipulation alters the natural 
qualities of an image, then the line between actuality and potentiality also becomes a bit 
finer and more difficult to straddle.  In what follows, I explore memory and photo 
manipulation.  Initially, I argue that photo manipulation is similar to the techniques of the 
Sophists who repeatedly tricked their audiences by making weak arguments appear 
stronger by carefully employing deceit.  I then continue by exploring the role of “truth” 
among the Greeks while also turning to Heidegger for some insight.  If, as Heidegger 
noted in The Essence of Truth, that truth for the Greeks meant “unhiddenness,” then the 
manipulated images are certainly hiding elements of the truth via alterations.  Finally, I 
turn to Plato’s Theaetetus to examine the connection between knowledge and perception, 
and link this idea to the creation of false memories by viewing altered photographs.   
With photo manipulation, there is a definitive point of departure between fact and 
fiction.  Unfortunately, the only one who truly knows the difference is the producer or 
editor of the image, and not the intended audience.  Manipulated photos are not easily 
spotted, and it often takes a careful eye and the magnification power of computer aided 
drawing tools, such as Photoshop, to pinpoint the infraction.  The difficulty of sighting a 
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manipulated photo is why there have been so few well-documented cases of manipulated 
news photos.  In April 2003, the Los Angeles Times’ photojournalist Brian Walski 
digitally combined some of his photos from Iraq by selecting certain elements from two 
different photos to create a false composite (Kitalong 43).  That photo, which ran in 
several papers across the country including the LA Times and the Hartford Courant, 
ended up becoming a disgrace to the profession, resulting in Walski’s firing (Kitalong 
43).  Instances like the discovery of Walski’s manipulation might have some correlation 
to the 2005 Consumer Reports WebWatch national poll revealing that “30% of Internet 
users said they have little or no trust in news sites to use pictures that had not been 
altered” (Ritchin 31, emphasis mine).  And if general trends in Internet news readership 
have only increased from the time of that poll, then a similar study today might yield 
even less trust in images.   
These numbers are startling for a few reasons.  First, photojournalism offers 
“proof” to readers—the images should maintain a level of continuity between what is 
written and what is shown.  Second, the trust in images is waning, causing a rift in 
effectiveness of journalistic proof, which is not entirely dissimilar to the discovery of 
plagiarism cases of reporters, including The New York Times’ Jason Blair and Zachery 
Kouwe (“Times Reporter”; “Time Business Reporter”).  Furthermore, objectivity and 
accuracy for both reporters and photojournalists is critical to the sanctity of the 
profession.  As photography reporter Frank Van Riper noted, “news photographs are the 
equivalent of direct quotations and therefore sacrosanct” (qtd. in Kitalong 45, emphasis 
in original).  The Associated Press, too, has warned its photojournalists about photo 
tampering: “The content of a photograph will NEVER be changed or manipulated in any 
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way” (qtd. in Brugioni 5).  Although these professional boundaries have been set, many 
newsrooms still take liberties to edit out what is “journalistically irrelevant,” removing a 
Diet Coke can, for instance, to “clean up” a shot (Brugioni 8).  If photojournalism’s task 
is capturing and reporting the reality of events, then these blurred ethical standards of 
reporting become trickier to ignore.  If the audience displays a growing distrust in the 
visual and written proof of professional reporting, then certainly the ethical boundaries of 
the press are at stake.  Even within the journalism community, doubts swarm about the 
promise of photojournalism’s future: “The next great photographers—if there are to be 
any—will have to find a way to reclaim photography’s special link to reality” (qtd. in 
Richtin 185).  What’s even more important is the rhetorical nature of these images—the 
photos are not doctored to “soften the blow” of disturbing images, but rather they are 
manipulated to increase affective appeal in the audience.  
Let me briefly return to Brian Walski’s case to illustrate.  Walski combined two 
different photographs, borrowing essential elements from each to create a more widely 
appealing, and ultimately more persuasive, image.  In the composite image, Walski 
grafted a British soldier onto the background of a separate photo of seated Iraqi civilians 
(Richtin 35).  Even though some argue that Walski’s alteration is quite similar to any 
photojournalist who snaps a series of staged photographs, what is at stake is the creation 
of a false event.  If photographers alter the coloration and layout of images specifically 
for the manipulation of emotional appeals, then the intended use of the original photo is 
altered, too.  The final photo represents an event that never occurred, or at least it did not 
occur in the way it is presented visually.  By viewing the altered image, the audience is 
reacting to the manipulated event, and not the actual one.  As a result, I am interested in 
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the intersection of the manipulated image and the (newly created) intentional use that the 
viewer receives from viewing the manipulated image.  When dealing with manipulated 
images, where do the ethical boundaries of actuality end and potentiality start?  Does 
creating memories out of altered images distort the intended use?  Should the images, and 
those who alter them, live up to specific codes of ethics with particular attention to the 
formation of memory?  Furthermore, if prosthetic memories can also become 
autobiographical memory (as discussed in the previous chapter), what happens when 
these false memories are internalized?  Do these fake memories become organic even 
when they are based on false grounds?  
Before I continue, let me take a moment to explain exactly what types of 
photographic manipulation I am interested in.  For my purposes here, photo manipulation 
can be placed in two camps: aesthetic and photojournalism.  The aesthetic type of photo 
manipulation involves using technologies to rearrange, add, subtract, and otherwise 
change the look of the piece to increase pleasure or even disrupt the reception of the 
image.  I am not interested in aesthetic manipulation in this chapter.  I am, however, very 
much intrigued by photojournalism’s use of manipulation; in particular, the ways that 
photos are used to provide additional “proof” of an event.  When news organizations use 
photos as evidence, they are entering into an ethical obligation with their audience: we 
(the news organization) are presenting these facts to you (the public) as a responsible and 
legal representation of the event.  Visual media theorist W.J.T. Mitchell suggests that 
images of earlier historical events were more easily staged because viewers did not have 
access to a broad range of images against which to crosscheck their validity (43).  Video 
clips of an Italian cement factory “passed” as images of Chernobyl because no one knew 
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what Chernobyl should have looked like (Mitchell 40).  I argue that these slippages are 
no longer as easy, since more widely accessible means of taking pictures has led directly 
to the increase in available “proof.”  There are several Web sites that invite users to 
contribute personal photos of recent vacations to their large databases.  Microsoft’s 
project Photo Tourism asks users to upload personal photos of exotic or tourist locales.  
Photo Tourism then compiles the images to create a 3D rendering of the location.  In 
other words, if an event like Chernobyl were to occur today, sites like Photo Tourism can 
provide visual details of a specific location compiled directly from amateurs’ photos.  
Fake photos might be easier to create, but they are also becoming more difficult to pass 
off as the real deal.  
When an event occurs and there is documentation (or provenance, in the art 
world) to “prove” its existence, we go along with the story.  Unless it is proven 
otherwise, the event becomes a part of our personal or national histories.  However, we 
usually do not realize that we have been duped until long after the fact.  Stories like “The 
Balloon Boy Hoax” in 2009, for example, when a reality TV obsessed family used their 
children to rouse the media into believing their youngest son was whisked away in a 
homemade air balloon.  Fortunately, the young Falcon Heene was not harmed—and it 
was later discovered that he never made it into the balloon after all.  During one (of the 
many) television interviews, Falcon stated that his parents “did that for the show” causing 
the Heene’s elaborate plan of Reality TV fame to come crashing down (“6-Year-Old”).   
 But before Falcon ‘spoiled the story,’ anyone watching the news that day 
remembers images of the jiffy-pop shaped balloon causing the media frenzy.  The 
difference between actuality (Falcon was never in the balloon) and intended perception 
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(the Heene’s wanted the public to believe their son was ‘carried away’ by the airborne 
vehicle) is similar to the tension I wish to look at in this section.  Now, while the balloon 
boy story was proven false rather quickly, this chapter interrogates the instances of 
manipulation that have greatly impacted the views of certain historical events, like 
Tiananmen Square, very prominently.  On the grand scale, photographs of Stalin’s armies 
or pictures of UFO sightings, or the company Abraham Lincoln kept have been doctored 
to heighten solidarity or strike fear in order to be remembered in a certain way.  Because 
we rely on images – and often those taken by journalists we should trust – the notion of 
photo manipulation becomes a bit thornier with the ease of photoshopping and 
enhancement.2  
More regularly, we use our cell phone or other digital cameras to snap a quick 
picture of someone famous, a humorous billboard, or a random passerby doing something 
oddly amusing.  These images bolster the stories when we retell them later on.  By 
viewing the pictures, our friends and family don’t dismiss the story, but render it 
believable instead.  Photographic proof has often been a source of evidence, 
strengthening our claims by providing a layer of visual truth.  A widely publicized 
example has been the exposé of Sabrina “Thumbs-Up” Harman.  Photographs SPC 
Harman took as evidence that the Army had lied about a death of an inmate at Abu 
Ghraib were alternatively used against her as “proof” of tampering with evidence.  On the 
one hand, the Army stated that by unzipping the body bag and moving bags of ice to take 
                                                
2 Even though I will not spend time discussing the ethics of digital enhancement in terms of beauty 
magazines, it is worth acknowledging its effects on the public in general.  The influence of such images 
creates a strong memory in the minds of young females (and more increasingly young males) that they 
must live up to a specific image in order to be taken seriously or even considered worthwhile.  While I am 
not disregarding the importance of gender disparities of image formation because of technological tools, I 
will not be discussing that here and I save that conversation for others.  
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photographs of the dead body, Harman was tampering with the evidence of the inmate’s 
death.  On the other hand, Harman argued that she took the photos to prove that the 
inmate was actually murdered, but the Army was passing it off as an accidental death.  
In a letter to her partner, Kelly, Harman stated, “Yes, they do beat the prisoners 
up and I’ve written this to you before. I just don’t think it’s right and never have. That’s 
why I take the pictures – to prove the story I tell people. No one would ever believe the 
shit that goes on” (Morris, emphasis mine).  Harman’s photographs indicate that while 
she knows her memory of the event is correct, relating that to others might prove 
difficult, even impossible.  The photographs of the dead body – her shareable, 
photographic proof – clearly eradicate any doubt of her claim that the inmate had not died 
of a heart attack as the Army had claimed, noted by the massive amount of blood in his 
nose and other physical signs of abuse (Morris).  By taking the pictures, Harman was 
creating evidence of an event that she knew would be difficult, even impossible, to prove 
without photographs.  Not only did Harman take the photos because she did not want to 
forget the horrific events, her allegations that she was falsely convicted rested in her 
photographic evidence.  
The case of “Thumbs-Up” Harman illustrates two ideas: that photos are relied on 
to stand witness for absent audiences but they can also be misleading, misguided, and 
inaccurate.  W.J.T. Mitchell argues that for many, photographic proof is nearly identical 
to scientific objectivity: “The photographic procedure, like these scientific procedures, 
seems to provide a guaranteed way of overcoming subjectivity and getting at the real 
truth” (28).  The photograph should be the end-all, be-all object of supporting evidence; 
but with the availability of inexpensive and free manipulation software, photographs are 
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becoming less reliable because of the possibility of alterations.  Digital photographs can 
be altered in order to bolster the claims of an argument; in Brian Walski’s case, neither 
photograph was provocative enough on its own but the strong composite was widely 
published across the country.   
Dino A. Brugioni, one of the founders of the Central Intelligence Agency’s 
photographic interpretation center, names four different types of photo manipulation 
which he argues are equally unethical: removing details, inserting details, photomontage, 
and false captioning.  Removing details purposefully crops parts of the image to draw 
attention to a specific focal point.  The omitted details would have distracted the audience 
or are deemed irrelevant by the photo editor.  The second type, inserting details, is 
exactly the opposite: the photo editor enhances the photograph by inserting images, 
multiplying audiences, or adding small but significant features that were absent in the 
original scene.  When a photo editor merges two different photographs, it is called a 
photomontage.  A photomontage might take the top of one photo and place it on the 
bottom of another, or the photo might be a composite of two or more photos with the 
intent to create a new scene, like the Walski case.  Lastly, false captioning is the incorrect 
labeling of a photo, leading the audience to believe that what they are viewing is actually 
something else.  For instance, one of the more well-known cases of false captioning is 
Robert Capa’s “Death of a Loyalist Soldier,” whose validity has been widely debated.  
Some argue that Capa’s “Death” either did not take place at the location that he claims 
and others argue that the soldier was merely slipping as the photograph was being taken, 
then falsely labeled to incite empathy (Mitchell 40).     
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When news organizations take the liberty to distort the image through any of 
these four tactics, they are altering the persuasiveness of the text in such a way that brings 
the readers along on a journey that might not have been intended by the original picture.  
That is to say, the manipulated photo stands in for the actual event, creating a new 
memory – a false memory – of the occasion.  I am not discrediting all forms of 
photojournalism—there are many more examples of untouched photos than manipulated 
ones.  Photojournalism provides readers with a level of accuracy that text is not always 
able to accomplish.  However, when altered images are used to be persuasive pieces in 
themselves or along with accompanying text, then their rhetorical boundaries become 
confused and even unethical.  The images become unethical because they no longer 
represent the truth, and are encouraging their audience to remember a situation in a way 
that did not actually occur.  These events are then documented and remembered 
incorrectly by the masses that trust the images, thus creating a moment of disconnect 
between the actual event, the manipulated representation, and the formation of prosthetic 
memories.    
Sophistic Images  
 By employing one of the four types of photo manipulation, editors and 
photographers are increasing the rhetorical nature of the image itself.  Essentially, they 
are making the weaker image much stronger by repositioning our gaze towards the most 
persuasive aspect of the image.  Editors might crop the edges, enlarge the overall size, or 
change the coloring to emphasize specific affective appeals.  Two well-documented cases 
of photo manipulation can help explain this idea.  On the cover of its February 1982 
issue, National Geographic presented an image of the Egyptian pyramids, but “abridged 
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the space between one pyramid and another” (Rosler 39).  As a result of this image, many 
questioned if the abridgement duped the believing public into thinking that the pyramids 
were closer together (Rosler 39).  For some this adjustment was simply bringing 
additional, necessary information into a smaller frame, but other readers became 
immediately distrustful of the magazine’s photographers because of the artistic freedom 
they used to augment the image (Rosler 41).  The cover was not large enough to contain 
both pyramids and appear visually enticing; to increase the cover’s rhetorical appeals, the 
editors moved the pyramids closer to one another.  The resulting image is more exciting 
because it situates the pyramids by emphasizing their enormity.  In actuality, the 
pyramids are that large, but they are not in the close vicinity as the manipulated photo 
presents them.  National Geographic strengthened the image by altering the weaker 
image into one more visually convincing.   
 Another example, also on a magazine cover, is the infamous mug shot of former 
football star O.J. Simpson.  Two magazines – Newsweek and Time – featured Simpson’s 
mug shot on the covers of their June 27, 1994 issues with one glaring difference: the tone 
of his skin color (Clayssen 74).  On the Newsweek cover, Simpson’s mug shot was 
printed without any manipulation, but a quick glance at the Time cover indicated that one 
of the photos was altered.  On the Time cover, Simpson’s skin tone was noticeably darker 
and many suggested that Time altered the image to make Simpson “look diabolical” and 
incite racial bias against him (Clayssen 74).  By darkening his skin tone, the Time cover 
hoped to draw on some of their readership’s possible prejudices and provoke a certain 
reaction (of fear, perhaps) in their audience.   
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The instances of manipulated cover photos points to an interesting connection to 
ancient rhetoric: the Sophists.  Just as the Sophists made weaker arguments appear 
stronger, the cover photos accomplished the same task by altering the original, but 
rhetorically weak, image.  Sometimes when I think of the Sophists, a clichéd phrase 
comes to mind: “by any means necessary.”  Many rhetoricians, myself included, often 
describe the Sophists as tricksters, people who utilized deceitful tactics in order to appeal 
to their paying customers.  These tactics were not often kosher, since the Sophists would 
merely learn about their customer, and imitate or “flatter” them to gain trust.  We can see 
a resurfacing of ‘Sophists’ in today’s culture—Sophists are people who have moderately 
advanced knowledge about many topics because they know where and how to find and 
apply it.  Unlike someone who has techne, a Sophist does not master one subject but 
rather dabbles in several.  Rather than hanging a shingle and advertising one quality skill, 
Sophists can match the needs of their customers via flattery or “dinner party knowledge”: 
just enough knowledge to appear well-informed, but actually only enough to make it 
through a superficial conversation.  A Sophist is customer conscious—they ask, “How 
can I better serve my clients?”  The paying educational customer was a new idea 
introduced by the Sophists, a notion that is not at all foreign to anyone swimming in 
thousands of dollars of financial aid debt today.  While it is unfortunate to hear our 
students moan when they “feel that they deserved a better grade” simply because “they 
paid for the class” (or, more annoyingly, that “the customer is always right”), can we 
learn anything about customer care from the Sophists?  I have often thought “sophistic 
rhetoric” to be a redundant term—if we are dazzling someone with our rhetoric, are we 
not ‘tricking’ him or her into something they did not previously believe?    
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The Sophists were skilled in the art of deceit, a skill quite different from rhetoric 
in general.  The difference lies in the way someone is manipulated into believing one side 
or another.  The Sophists would learn about their “clients” in order to provide the best 
service possible—the Sophists would imitate their clients by learning about their interests 
and motivations.  In Plutarch’s “How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend,” for example, we 
encounter the ideas of flattery, imitation, and responsibility.  Plutarch notes that a flatterer 
is someone who acts like a friend, but with selfish, reciprocal intentions—a flatterer is a 
“counterfeit copy of ourselves” (4).  If Sophists utilize flattering discourse to appeal to 
their customers, then the element of pure persuasion is tainted from the start.  Like the 
magazine covers, the images were manipulated to present a more flattering, appealing, 
and persuasive final version that might rake in more customers.  The Sophists only 
present what their audience wants to hear, not the messages that are necessary to evoke 
truth.  The National Geographic cover would still have looked appealing with one 
pyramid, but bringing a second one closer only added excitement to the issue’s theme.  
Whether emphasizing exciting and timely facts or manipulating a photo to increase its 
persuasiveness, all types of alteration are intended to shift the audience’s original 
interpretation towards a new perspective.    
At stake, then, are the larger consequences of rhetoric. In “Encomium of Helen,” 
Gorgias argues that, “Speech is a powerful lord, which by means of the finest and most 
invisible body effects the divinest works: it can stop fear and banish grief and create joy 
and nurture pity” (52).  Just as the flatterer can play up to anyone, discourse can do the 
same.  Discourse, flattery, and the Sophists are tricksters one in the same: “The effect of 
speech upon the condition of the soul is comparable to the power of drugs over the nature 
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of bodies.  For just as different drugs dispel different secretions from the body, and some 
bring an end to disease and others to life, others make the hearers bold, and some drug 
bewitch the soul with a kind of evil persuasion” (“Gorgias” 53).   
So far, this logic still aligns Sophistry and rhetoric, but the two depart rather 
quickly from here.  There is additional motivation for the Sophists—money. Most people 
find rapport with others who are similar in one way or another, and the Sophists made 
this natural relation their advantage.  For Socrates, Sophistry was as uncouth as one could 
get; rather than exploring philosophical truths for the sake of pure understanding, the 
Sophists were driven by money and ensuring client satisfaction.  Even though the 
Sophists claimed they were in the same business as the “true rhetoricians,” and while 
Plato, Socrates, and Aristotle’s hostility has been the main source of information about 
the Sophists, still many scholars of antiquity refuse to accept their teachings as valid 
forms of rhetorical instruction (Kerferd 4).  Rather, Socrates and others dismissed their 
foray into for-profit education as a means of deceiving anyone by any means necessary.  
Socrates taught in order to share knowledge with others, and he would never imagine 
charging for philosophical inquiry because it was natural to question and understand the 
outside world.  The Sophists, on the other hand, recognized that they could attract more 
customers simply by widening their reach—if they promised to know a little about 
everything, then their services would certainly become attractive to more customers.  To 
accomplish this task, the Sophists transformed weaker arguments into much stronger ones 
by embellishing and manipulating their customers through pleasure.  The pyramids 
looked more pleasurable because there were two large structures on the cover instead of 
one (or even two separated by their actual distance).  Darkening Simpson’s skin tone, 
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while not pleasurable, certainly was an attempt to strike a reaction in Time’s paying 
customers by communicating a strong, albeit racist, message.  As the Visitor states in 
Plato’s Sophist, “One part of the wage-earning type approaches people by being 
agreeable, uses only pleasure as its bait, and earns only its room and board.  I think we’d 
all call it flattery, or expertise in pleasing people” (222e7-223a1).   If pleasure is the goal 
of the Sophists, and there is not one specific route to achieve pleasure in all audiences, 
then Sophistry cannot be a techne.  This logic, however, has prompted many before me to 
disqualify rhetoric as a techne, too.  To explain, since rhetoric proceeds by persuading 
people via pleasure, then there cannot be one straightforward method of rhetorical 
persuasion. However, techne can be messy (T2) as long as it aims towards the end 
function.  In other words, if rhetoric aims at persuasion through pleasure, then it can be 
considered a techne.   
 But what does all this mean for photo manipulation?  I have suggested that 
altering photos is similar to the Sophists’ technique of making weaker arguments appear 
stronger, but is this manipulation considered a techne?  Photo manipulation is one form 
of techne simply because it reroutes the boundaries of the natural object in order to 
present an artificial construct.  While photography cannot escape the limits of the frame, 
we can avoid the temptation to crop people out of a shot, enlarge or edit the image to 
create a more stimulating and persuasive end result.  The content of the photograph is 
where we can see techne coming into play.  When I snap a photo, the content of the photo 
cannot change itself into something more persuasive.  In order to make a weaker image 
stronger (let’s say my friend blinked in one of the photos), I can later retouch and 
manipulate that image to make it more persuasive (that we were all attentive and had our 
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eyes open).  An outside agent must manipulate the content of the photograph—it cannot 
manipulate itself.  Photo manipulation, in this sense, can be considered a techne because 
of the necessary outside agent altering the content.   
Hiding in the Shadows: Photo Manipulation and Unhiddenness  
When I perceive my favorite piece of art, I am drawn to it for several reasons.  
Even if my number one choice happens to be someone else’s, too, the details we each 
find pleasure in will likely be different.  I might attend to a certain color palate while 
another might notice the narrative of the scene itself.  There will always be conflicting 
interpretations of the same work, and any attempt to verbalize the visual will likely cause 
confusion.  But what causes these differences of interpretation are not in the artwork 
itself; rather, interpretation becomes a matter of individual experiences forming one’s 
perception.  In this next section, I suggest that photo manipulation leads to a “hidden” or 
untruthful presentation of a given event because it purposely disguises and deceives its 
audience.  Even though the audience is often kept in the dark about the actual image, it 
does not negate the fact that the manipulated image is passed off as the real deal.  In The 
Essence of Truth, Heidegger examines one of the most recognized philosophical 
dialogues, Plato’s cave allegory.  For Heidegger, the importance of the cave allegory lies 
in what it means to know truth and how one acquires knowledge of the truth itself.  The 
shackled prisoners in Plato’s cave know the shadows reflected on the wall not as 
shadows, but view them as reality since they have never seen anything else (Republic 
VII.514a-b4).  Their perception of what is real is informed only by what they have seen 
projected on the wall in front of them.  However, when one of the prisoners is unshackled 
and is able to roam away from the cave, he is in disbelief at the world around him.  The 
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cave is the only “reality” he has known, and his new experiences outside the cave appear 
faulty and unbelievable (Republic VII.516a-b).  After some adjustment, the freed prisoner 
realizes that what he has experienced as reality has always only been a false 
representation, a shadow, and that his new perception of the outside world is actually the 
truth.  For Heidegger, this new way of perceiving is the major divide; while truth is 
revealed through unhiddenness (i.e., being unshackled and “seeing” for the first time), the 
un-true is hidden by the shadows.  
For Heidegger, complete truth is more than what we know to be “true.”  Truth 
must be revealed through complete transparency.  The cave dwellers thought the shadows 
were true, and they were proven wrong only after the unshackled man discovered 
otherwise.  The shackled cave dwellers, for instance, believed the shadows as truth.  
Since they had nothing else with which to compare the shadows, there was no need to 
conceptualize that the projections were anything but reality itself.  The actual truth was 
hidden—they could not access any other form of truth because they were physically 
unable to move.  When the unshackled prisoner realized that people moving about 
outside of the cave created the shadows, he then linked their movements to the shadows.  
The correspondence between the outside world and the mere shadows in the cave is 
truth—an understanding of the reality beyond the cave (Heidegger 2).   
When Heidegger argues that, “truth as correctness is grounded in truth as 
unhiddenness,” this statement becomes a critical moment for understanding manipulation 
and memory (26).  Because photo manipulation has the possibility to significantly alter 
memory, then the means of producing that manipulated photo lies in some sort of 
hiddenness.  By taking the form of one of the four types of photo manipulation described 
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above, hiddenness leads to a misrepresented truth.  Walski’s case, for one, hid the fact 
that there were two images used to create the final montage, and the end result was a false 
representation passed along as truth.  When an audience (unknowingly) views a 
manipulated image, the nature of photojournalism allows the photo to be perceived as 
truth.  Memory, then, can become skewed merely by the implication that the photo 
represents truth.   
The audience does not recognize, however, that the truth is actually hidden by 
manipulation, thus leading to false memory creation.  In a series of experiments, 
researchers questioned whether manipulated photos of well-known events could alter 
existing memories.  In the article “Changing History: Doctored Photographs Affect 
Memory for Past Public Events,” Dario Sacchi et al purposely alter the iconic image of 
Tiananmen Square.  In the actual photograph, one man is facing down four tanks in the 
middle of an empty street.  To alter the image, the research team added large crowds on 
both sides of the tanks, creating a more populated atmosphere than the original event.  
The creation of the second image was intended to test the level of memory 
reconstruction—how do visual alterations affect the way we remember an event 
incorrectly?  To characterize the photo alteration’s possible affect on memory, the 
researchers coined the term “post-event misinformation”: the process that “can lead 
people to recall events differently from the way they actually occurred, or even to recall 
wholly false events that never occurred” (Sacchi et al 1066).  By showing the participants 
the altered image, the researchers hypothesized that it would result in a “source-
monitoring error,” a memory error that links actual events with an incorrect false 
representation (Sacchi et al 1066).  In this situation the subjects remembered viewing 
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iconic images of Tiananmen Square, but wrongly identified the additional crowds as a 
part of the original photo.   
These results point to the complexity of manipulated photographs on the creation 
of memory.  By selecting an iconic photograph for their experiment, one that is extremely 
recognizable worldwide, the research team was purposely toying with the likelihood of 
memory manipulation.  The photograph was edited only slightly, but the entire rhetorical 
appeal of the image changed by inserting large crowds witnessing the event.  Even 
though the iconic image was mass-produced, the inserted crowds symbolized that the 
single-man protest had become a spectacle.  As a result an altered photo “may have a 
stronger effect than merely influencing our opinion; by tampering with our malleable 
memory, they may ultimately change the way we recall history” (Sacchi et al 1021).   
The suggestion that manipulated photos not only change our personal memory but 
also influence the ways we recall history is a significant shift in how we view prosthetic 
and autobiographical memory.  Because we have the ability to create memories of events 
at which we were not present, we make that memory based on the experience at a 
distance.  This memory then becomes part of our collection—the stockpile of memories 
we have saved over our lifetime.  This collection, however, functions differently than we 
might imagine.  Rather than a file cabinet full of neatly sorted and easily accessible 
memories, the collection serves as a repository that can be searched, compiled, and even 
made into new memories.  There is no doubt that many people have viewed the 
Tiananmen Square photograph, but our attention is usually directed toward the ‘main 
event’—the protester.  By focusing on the protester rather than on the periphery details 
(e.g., whether or not there were crowds lining the streets), the subjects in the study could 
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reasonably endorse the altered photograph.  The idea of a crowd watching an important 
event is not unusual at all—many important, and memorable, scenes occur in front of a 
large audience.  Based on similar past experiences, our memories are prone to 
manipulation because they combine similar or repeated events with built-in expectations. 
By blending the expectation of a crowd with the actuality of the single-man protest, the 
brain concluded that the altered photograph was a likely possibility.  
Returning back to the cave allegory, the known reality (the original Tiananmen 
Square photo) and the newly introduced one (the photo with additional crowds) highlight 
the tension between our memories, our knowledge, and the possibility of their 
manipulation.  While some might say that the still-shackled prisoners were not 
“manipulated” in the way I am using the term, I argue that “manipulation” is indeed 
similar to the ways we are duped when looking at false images.  If we view only the false 
image (like the National Geographic cover or Walski’s photo), then we do not know 
otherwise.  Like the cave dwellers, we cannot distinguish between what’s real and what’s 
simply a projected image or manipulated photograph.  The Tiananmen Square experiment 
shows that viewing another image that closely resembles the original, but is manipulated 
ever so slightly, can cause changes in seemingly embedded memories.   
Theaetetus: Perception into Knowledge 
 Until this point, I have argued that memory can be manipulated by viewing an 
altered image.  Manipulation occurs because the brain finds the image possible—it 
connects related memories in order to verify the likelihood of the current photo.  If, 
however, truth is discovered through knowledge and understanding, then photographs run 
the risk of distorting the truth, hiding it from the audience.  As Heidegger argues, 
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unhiddenness – pure transparency – is truth.  But how do we acquire the knowledge in 
order to understand truth?  In Theaetetus, Socrates examines the relation between 
knowledge and perception by questioning if they complement or hinder each other.  Since 
it is impossible to define anything through its own definition (e.g., “a man who does not 
know what knowledge is will not understand ‘knowledge of shoes’ either”), Socrates asks 
whether we can understand a thing if we do not know already what that object is 
(Theaetetus 147.b4-5).  How, then, can we understand anything if we do not have some 
sort of previous knowledge?  To begin, Socrates asserts that knowledge is perception and 
we only perceive what we actually know.  Rather quickly, this logic becomes muddled 
when Socrates introduces memory: when we are trying to remember an object, do we not 
know what the object is at the time we are trying to recall it?  Can we know and not-
know simultaneously?  For Socrates, the moment in question is the lag time between 
recognition and naming (Derrida would later call this “différance”): “If a man has once 
come to know a certain thing, and continues to preserve the memory of it, is it possible 
that, at the moment when he remembers it, he doesn’t know this thing that he is 
remembering” (Theaetetus 163.d1-6)?  In other words, in the moment we perceive an 
object, there is a small gap before we are able to identify it.  The gap might mean that we 
truly do not know what it is, but that would mean that we know nothing because there is 
always a slight delay in perception and identification.  This is troubling for Socrates 
because it hints towards the idea that all knowledge must be presupposed somewhere—
how would we acquire the knowledge of something without actually knowing it?  As a 
result, Socrates concludes that, “perception and knowledge could never be the same 
thing” (Theaetetus 186.e9-10).   
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 Even though Socrates asserts that perception and knowledge are not the same, he 
notes the heightened possibility of false judgment: “in the case of things we do not know 
and have never perceived, there is no possibility of error or false judgment” (Theaetetus 
194.b1-2).  If we do not have knowledge of the object, how can we be certain that the 
thing we perceive is true?   
Knowledge is agreed upon and shared perception—if I rename my computer a 
“typing machine,” it will quickly become confused with other antiquated technologies.  
Instead, to be recognized as a computer, the name for the machine I am using has been 
determined by consensus, not by my own perception and naming process.  False 
judgment, then, is something different than “a misapplication of thought to perception; 
because if this were so, we could never be in error so long as we remained within our 
thoughts themselves” (Theaetetus 196.c4-7).  Even if I call decide to call this computer a 
typing machine, not many people would ever agree with me and start calling their PCs 
the same.  However, false judgment is different from an imbalanced interpretation.  Even 
if I decide, “So what, I like ‘typing machine’ so that’s what I’ll call it,” my proclamation 
will be correct to me only because that is how I have perceived and named this device.  
‘Typing machine’ is no different than ‘PC’ or ‘MacBook’ if and only if that is my 
personal perception.  In this case, my personal perception cannot be a false judgment 
because that is my perception of the object.  On the contrary, it is unlikely that ‘typing 
machine’ will bring to mind ‘MacBook’ for anyone else.  Because it is neither recognized 
nor perceived by that name by the majority, calling my computer a ‘typing machine’ 
becomes a false judgment.   
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 Manipulated photographs might be considered false judgments only if we can 
identify that they are incorrect.  If we view a photo that we do not know is altered in any 
way, there is no verification process to show us that there is another reality (the true, 
untouched image) somewhere else.  False judgment can only happen if we recognize 
another option; it cannot occur if we are introduced only to one route.  In the next section, 
I look at some rather interesting studies that have been conducted on the premise of false 
judgment—personal memories.  While we expect that our autobiographical memory is 
accurate, these studies indicate that it is far from perfect, and is actually rather susceptible 
to misinformation, alteration, and even implantation.  What happens, then, if we lose 
control over our own “expert knowledge” of our personal experiences?  How can we trust 
our own memories knowing that they can be so easily tricked?  As a result, the notion of 
rhetorical memory becomes twisted, too—our autobiographical memories can even 
‘persuade’ one another to be recalled differently. 
Memory Manipulation: Cognitive Misattribution 
 Because memory is a highly persuasive and malleable construct, it can be 
distorted and skewed quite easily.  Like rhetoric, memory is not always trusted; in fact, 
the studies that I explore in this section suggest that memory is much less reliable than we 
think.  I argue that rhetorical memory – memory that we employ with the intent to 
persuade – needs to be reconsidered in light of its cognitive malleability.  Over the years, 
rhetorical scholars have debated the meaning of “rhetoric”—is rhetoric merely the 
“available means of persuasion” as Aristotle argued, or is it more specific?  Some might 
even label rhetoric as pure manipulation, as noted above by the distrust of Sophistry and 
more recently by the many evening news talking heads claiming any political movement 
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that garners some type of support is “mere rhetoric.”  Such “mere rhetoric” is often 
sloughed aside because popular pundits note that it is only a ploy of powerful politicians 
to sway us to their side.  And while this might be true to a certain extent, those of us in 
rhetoric studies must understand how true rhetoric keeps its audience in the loop. Rather 
than persuasive activities being squandered away as mind-numbing ‘mere’ rhetoric, I 
argue that recent studies in psychology on memory offer some interesting commentary on 
how easily autobiographical memory can be persuaded.  
Memory Re-creation 
 One of the most interesting and important studies of memory creation is one 
familiar to anyone who has taken an introductory psychology course, and it illustrates the 
malleability of memory and the heightened possibility that our brains unconsciously fill 
in missing links.  The basic structure of the DRM Paradigm (named after the original 
creators of the test Deese/Roediger/McDermott and pronounced “dream”) is a list of 
“semantically related words, such as sour, candy, sugar, bitter, good, taste” which each 
participant is required to learn and keep in her memory for a short time (Hicks and Marsh 
375).  A bit later, when the participants are asked to recall as many words from the list, 
most will respond by naming some of the items on the list, but many will also add a 
“missing link” word even though it did not appear in the original string of words (Hicks 
and Marsh 375).  For the list of words above, Jason Hicks and Richard Marsh identified 
“sweet” as the critical lure—the non-presented, albeit related, word that most participants 
claimed to be one of the original words.  This study, replicated dozens of times with 
various word combinations, highlights the likelihood that our memory changes and adds 
to our original perceptions over time.  As proven by the DRM Paradigm, even though we 
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believe we are recalling the correct information, our memory incorporates related ideas or 
words, filling-in-the-blanks to round out the event.  Even though “sweet” was not one of 
the words, most participants recall it due to its relation to the other words.  The DRM 
Paradigm is critical to understanding that memory is constantly made within our own 
minds, and that stable memories are almost impossible.  Although information 
technologies promote stability, viewing or hearing other accounts of the event can 
manipulate our memory long afterwards.   Studies like the DRM Paradigm indicate that 
we are constantly prone to the creation of false memory—even when we think we 
remember an event one way, our unconscious is likely to link it to other seemingly 
related events and it becomes remembered differently.   
 False memory creation is a result of content borrowing from other events, as 
noted in the article “Compelling Untruths: Content Borrowing and Vivid False 
Memories.”  Content borrowing, or phantom recollection, is defined as a process “in 
which details from presented items are errantly borrowed to corroborate the occurrence of 
the false memory item” (Lampinen et al 954). The incorrect insertion of the word “sweet” 
when trying to recall the original list occurs because there has been some previous 
relation between “sweet” and the other words on the list, such as “candy” or “sour.” The 
connection between “sweet” and “sour” or “sweet” and “candy” is based on conceptual 
familiarity, “a biased search for episodic memory for details that would corroborate the 
feeling of familiarity” (Lampinen et al 955). To further illustrate exactly how content 
borrowing works, Lampinen et al provide another example:  
Imagine a participant is listening to the DRM list for the critical lure doctor. The 
list includes the word physician. Imagine that upon hearing the word physician, 
the participant is reminded that he or she has an appointment in the coming week. 
On a later recognition memory test [a test where participants indicate if the word 
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was on the ‘old’ list or is a ‘new’ one], the participant is presented with the word 
doctor. Because the word is semantically related to a large number of presented 
items (i.e., the entire DRM list for doctor), the word will likely seem highly 
familiar to the participant. The participant may then search his memory for 
content that is consistent with having previously encountered the word doctor. 
This memory search may lead the participant to retrieve a memory for having 
thought of the upcoming appointment. The participant may then conclude, ‘Yes, I 
remember hearing the word doctor because I remember thinking that I have a 
doctor’s appointment coming up.’(955). 
 
The relation between “physician” and the critical lure “doctor” was created because the 
participant thought about her upcoming doctor’s appointment.  The two words were 
related via a familiar connection—the appointment and the semantic similarity between 
physician and doctor.  
To look at another example, the Microsoft search engine Bing has created an 
entire ad campaign based on the failure of conceptual familiarity.  The television ads for 
Bing humorously portray people searching the Internet with broad key words that yield 
scattered, and oftentimes unrelated, results.  In one commercial, for instance, a wife asks 
her husband if he has booked their tickets to Hawaii yet, to which his response is a series 
of related, but off-topic, words: “Hawaii. Hawaii 5-0. Book ’em Dano” (“Bing Search 
Overload”).  Microsoft names the problem with other search engines “search overload” 
and I suggest this is similar to the process of “content borrowing” demonstrated by the 
DRM Paradigm.  Bing promotes clear and simplified searching that abandons the 
unnecessary items we usually encounter when using search words like “Hawaii + plane 
tickets.”  The commercial illustrates that searching for certain combinations on search 
engines other than Bing will result in a collection of links that may be somewhat related, 
but were not related to your original intentions.  Just like the DRM Paradigm’s “content 
borrowing,” the Bing commercial’s “search overload” skews the original search by 
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adding excess material.  Lampinen et al argue that a similar “overload” occurs during 
content borrowing: “this search process sometimes yields details that were associated 
with actual studied items, but the participant may incorrectly attribute these details to the 
critical lure, resulting in an errant binding of the features” (955).  Just as “sweet” was 
unconsciously related to “sour” in the DRM Paradigm study, “Hawaii + plane tickets” 
was incorrectly linked to the television show “Hawaii 5-0” in the Bing ad.   
 The results from the DRM Paradigm studies indicate that we create our own false 
memories.  False memories are a troubling idea, especially since we believe we are in 
control of our own minds.  Moreover, false memories are particularly prevalent in 
eyewitness testimony, causing many juries to wrongly convict someone based on 
incorrect evidence.  Several studies have shown that eyewitness testimony is often tainted 
by interactions with others, reading about the event, or content borrowing from previous 
experiences.  These previous experiences are not limited to the eyewitness’ own past, but 
can be borrowed from television shows or movies in which a similar crime occurred.  
Content borrowing from prosthetic memory (i.e., memories created from mass media 
representations) are highly problematic.  For example, let’s say that I am in a bank while 
it is being robbed.  I have provided a statement for the police, and later I am called back 
to identify the perpetrator.  However, since the robbery I have viewed an episode of Law 
& Order that involves a bank robbery, and I have also watched a local news report of the 
crime.  The time lapse, however small, between my own experience during the bank 
robbery and a televised portrayal of the crime might cause me to misidentify the actual 
robber because I have unintentionally picked up details from others and added to or 
substituted them for my own.   
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 Unintentional identification, or unconscious transference, is what Daniel Schacter 
names the “sin of misattribution.”  One of the more famous instances of misattribution 
occurred in 1995 during the FBI’s search for the Oklahoma City Bomber.  In the original 
search, the agents were looking for two suspects (John Doe 1 and John Doe 2) based on 
information that the two suspects had rented a van from Elliott’s Body Shop (Schacter 
91).  The description of John Doe 1 matched Timothy McVeigh, who was later sentenced 
to death for the bombing.  The description of John Doe 2, however, was not related to the 
bombings at all.  In fact, the mechanic who described the two suspects to the FBI 
misattributed another pair who rented a van similar to the one McVeigh rented, but 
visited the shop on the following day (Schater 91).  The two men were identified as Army 
Sergeant Michael Hertig, whose description was similar to McVeigh’s, and Private Todd 
Bunting, who was characterized as John Doe 2 (Schater 91).  Although they had no 
connection to the bombings whatsoever, the mechanic “had correctly recalled Bunting’s 
features, depicted in the infamous picture of John Doe 2 circulated nationwide, but had 
misattributed them to the wrong episode a day earlier” (Schacter 91-2).  Two vans, two 
different days, one confused memory.  The mechanic unconsciously transferred 
information from one event into his memory of the other.  
 Misattribution is a common problem with false memory, and it occurs so frequently 
that police interrogators and attorneys must be instructed about how to handle witnesses.  
More specifically, Christopher Chabris and Daniel Simons identify one of “the illusions 
of confidence” as the unknowing morale boost professionals give to an eyewitness that 
directly leads to their persuasiveness on the witness stand (110).  The illusion of 
confidence is bolstered, for instance, when a detective offers positive feedback after 
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identifying a criminal in a line-up.  The more positive feedback the witness receives, the 
more persuasive his testimony will appear in court, and it is more likely that a jury will 
believe a confident witness over one that is insecure.  Unfortunately, several studies have 
shown that such positive reinforcement often leads the witness into remembering the 
event differently, causing an innocent person to be wrongly convicted.  The moment of 
eyewitness identification and positive feedback is what James Lampinen and Jennifer 
Scott et al name “the post-identification feedback effect”: “a kind of memory distortion in 
which the feedback alters participants’ memory reports for their prior confidence, 
witnessing conditions and decision-making strategies” (“Good You Identified” 1039).  In 
1999, former Attorney General Janet Reno created a task force of law enforcement 
professionals with the intention to prevent the feedback effect and ensure fair and 
unbiased testimony.  In their findings, Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law 
Enforcement, one of the most important goals is to “improve the criminal justice system’s 
ability to evaluate the strength and accuracy of eyewitness testimony” (Reno 4).  The 
guide provides law enforcement officials practical tips about how to handle witnesses 
from the first 911 phone call, to their first interview at the scene, and even during line-
ups.  Because positive feedback has been proven to interfere with the witnesses’ ability to 
remember the event correctly, the guide also discourages law enforcement from using 
any form of feedback.   
 To illustrate the illusion of confidence more clearly, I turn to an example from the 
recent text, The Invisible Gorilla.  In July 1984, twenty-two year old Jennifer Thompson 
was raped near her college campus (Chabris and Simons 109).  During the sexual assault, 
Thompson made sure to memorize details of her attacker—clothing, race, height, and 
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facial hair (Chabris and Simons 110).  Thompson was so certain that her memory was 
correct and the detectives continually reinforced her testimony with praise (Chabris and 
Simons 110).  The more praise she received, the more confident and persuasive her 
account of the attack became.  Since the attack occurred before DNA testing was 
available, the jury returned a guilty verdict based primarily on Thompson’s confident 
testimony (Chabris and Simons 110).  Ten years after the original trial, DNA testing 
actually exonerated the accused man, Ronald Cotton (Chabris and Simons 111).  Even 
though Thompson was absolutely certain that her memory of her attacker was correct, it 
was later discovered that the repeated positive reinforcement she received during the 
follow-up interviews and line-up identification actually created a false memory from 
which she gained excessive confidence.  Thompson’s memory had failed her, but her 
confidence was persuasive enough to convince the jury to convict the wrong man.   
 Not only does positive reinforcement shore up confidence in false memories, but 
other studies have also proved that false memories can actually be implanted in our own 
minds with the aid of tools such as Photoshop.  In the article “A Picture is Worth a 
Thousand Lies,” Kimberley Wade et al exposed twenty subjects to manipulated photos in 
which the subjects themselves were placed.  Wade and the other researchers asked the 
subjects to provide several childhood photos from “moderately significant events” (e.g., 
birthday parties or family holidays) (598).  The research team then scanned, cropped, and 
digitally inserted one of the photos into another image, creating a composite image of the 
subject on a hot air balloon ride as a child (Wade et al 598).  After creating the composite 
photographs, the research team interviewed the subjects three times over a span of several 
weeks (Wade et al 597).  During each interview, “subjects thought about a photograph 
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showing them on a hot air balloon ride and tried to recall the event by using guided-
imagery exercises” (Wade et al 597).  In contrast with narrative induced false memory 
(i.e., making up a story in which the subject was a participant in the action), the 
manipulated photograph proved to increase the subjects’ memory of the event because it 
was ‘hard evidence’ that they experienced the hot air balloon ride.  Moreover, the results 
strongly indicate that, “photographs may require less constructive processing than do 
narratives to cultivate a false memory” (Wade et al 602).  These results suggest that 
photographic evidence, even manipulated photographs, tend to be more reliable and 
increase the possibilities of false memory creation via suggestibility.  Interestingly, even 
though the photo was doctored and the subject never participated in a hot air balloon ride, 
“the subjects often said something like, ‘Well, it’s a photograph, so it must have 
happened’ when looking at the hot air balloon photo” (Wade et al 602).  As a result, the 
research team identified three possibilities for memory creation.  First, the photo was 
largely accepted as “authoritative evidence,” noted in common “it’s a photo, so it must be 
true” responses.  Second, “it is also possible that the seeming authenticity of the 
photograph prompted the subjects to search their memory for event-consistent 
information” (Wade et al 602). The doctored photograph “planted the seed” of a false 
memory, and over the course of the three interviews, each subject searched their 
memories in order to create a false memory of the event they realized they had 
‘forgotten’ (Wade et al 602).  Finally, the researchers argue that “photographs do not 
require less constructive processing, so much as subjects are less likely to resist the 
accuracy of the photograph” (Wade et al 602).  This study has shown that a doctored 
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photo will greatly increase the likelihood that anyone can be persuaded to create false 
memories about themselves.    
Furthermore, because the photograph was significantly more persuasive than the 
narrative alone, I argue that the combination of digital technologies (e.g., Photoshop), 
memory, and techne collide in an interesting way.  The photograph took the place of the 
individual’s authority over their own memory—even though the subjects did not 
experience the hot air balloon ride, the photograph indicated that they had.  Rather than 
trusting their expert knowledge of their own pasts, the photograph superseded most 
subjects’ doubts by creating a false memory of the event.  With this experiment, techne 
and memory intersect because we tend to believe that we have control over our 
memory—how could we forget a hot air balloon ride?   Typically “people tend to think of 
photographs as frozen moments in time, place faith in them, and see them as reliable 
representations of the past” (Wade et al 598).  What is most fascinating about these 
results is since neither the photograph nor the false memory was reliable, the subjects’ 
memories were manipulated by their own doing.  The memory manipulation occurred in 
the individual—with some slight prompting from the photograph, they created their own 
memory of the event that never occurred.  Although photographs are snapped to capture 
memorable events, the manipulated photos in this experiment indicate that memorable 
events can be mentally created through cognitively associated events.  Similar to memory 
misattribution, these individually created manipulated memories were the result of the 
subjects’ attempts to remember an event that did not occur.  Led to believe that they 
participated in a hot air balloon ride, the subjects searched their memories for any 
similarly attributable events.  If they remembered spotting a hot air balloon in the air once 
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or if they have heard stories of others adventures, then these false indicators sparked the 
relation between pictorial evidence and personal memory creation.    
 Other studies, too, have shown that memory distortion is a result of personalized re-
constructions of events.  In one analogy, remembering is likened to “the activity of a 
paleontologist, who reconstructs the skeleton of a dinosaur ‘out of a few bone chips’” 
(Mazzoni 21).  By looking at the doctored hot air balloon photograph, the subjects 
believed that they actually participated in the event.  Although they did not recall the 
event before viewing the photograph, the image was one ‘bone chip’ that aided in the 
reconstruction of the full skeleton.  The one piece was enough to visually construct the 
whole, even on false premises.  Through relation and misattribution, the subjects created 
the memory based on previous experiences and the (false) fact that they were 
photographed in the balloon.  In a process that Giuliana Mazzoni calls “imagination 
inflation,” the human brain combines and reconstructs “experiences from pieces of 
retained information combined with knowledge, beliefs, suggestions, and the information 
provided by situational cues” (25-27).  The result of imagination inflation is an increase 
in created memory—the brain actually “remembers” more that it stores because it is 
constantly making new memories according to situational necessity (Mazzoni 25).  With 
the hot air balloon experiment, the subjects created the memory of being in the balloon 
because the photograph was “evidence” that they had been there and had merely 
“forgotten” the experience.  Over the three interviews, the subjects likely created 
connections from other related memories to the main ‘bone chip’ in order to excavate a 
recollection of the fake event.  Even in the presence of a photograph, “a memory is never 
the faithful reproduction of the original event, because in addition to the fragments of the 
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original event, it includes also parts of the individual’s pre-existing knowledge. […] 
From this perspective, memory errors are the rule, rather than the exception” (Mazzoni 
21).  
Another effect of memory re-creation is noticed when flashbulb memories are 
tested.  Flashbulb memories (FBMs) have a “‘live’ quality that is almost perceptual. 
Indeed, it is very much like a photograph that takes immediate mental ‘pictures’ during 
extraordinary or emotional situations” (Greenberg 365).  FBMs are mental images of 
national events experienced prosthetically (such as 9/11 or the Challenger disaster) or 
even personal events like the birth of a child or the death of a parent.  Typically, the 
events that cause FBMs are rare and emotional—we remember these situations because 
they are entirely out of the ordinary and occur very few times in one’s lifetime.   In “The 
Effects of Affect and Input Source on Flashbulb Memories,” John Neil Bohannon III, 
Sami Gratz, and Victoria Symons Cross identify two ways FBMs are constructed and the 
related effects these gathering mechanisms have on the retention and formation of later 
memory.  In the first situation, people who hear the news from another person “usually 
hear the bare bones of the fact itself (e.g. ‘Princess Diana is dead!’), and thus remember 
the typical, self-related flashbulb features relating to their personal discoveries” 
(Bohannon et al 1023).  When hearing information from others, it is likely that people 
will remember other sensory events, such as what they were eating or watching, in 
connection with receiving the news.  In the second case, people who gather their 
information primarily from media outlets “are quickly informed of the facts about the 
event itself. (e.g. ‘At 11:58 this morning the shuttle, Challenger carrying five men and 
two women, exploded 70 seconds after lift-off from Cape Kennedy’)” (Bohannon et al 
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1023).  Those who are informed by the media are less likely to remember sensory details, 
but are more likely to recall information about the event itself.  Whether the individual 
remembers personal details or factual information, the likelihood of the FBM undergoing 
some change is high because “people who were shocked by horrendous news should be 
both more likely to repeat their ‘stories’ and seek out more information about the events” 
(Bohannon et al 1028). Like other types of memory, FBMs are reconstructed; however, 
even though FBMs are “snapshots” of rare moments, some argue that FBMs (particularly 
ones of national events) are more likely to change as a result of constant media attention. 
As a result of people seeking out information and re-telling their experiences, FBMs are 
very malleable and are at risk of becoming misattributed to other details we pick up from 
others. 
We believe that our memories of FBMs will remain concrete; no matter how 
much time passes, we say to ourselves, “I will always remember exactly what I was 
doing when X happened.” Consistent with other forms of memory, however, FBMs are 
equally as prone to reconstruction.  To test this idea, several studies have been conducted 
immediately following extreme events.  Creating an experiment to judge FBM accuracy 
is difficult: researchers cannot plan extreme events in advance, nor can the studies be 
conducted retroactively.  To study FBM, memory researchers find volunteers (usually 
from undergraduate psychology courses) immediately following the event.  These 
volunteers are asked to describe situational moments such as how they learned of the 
event, what else had they done that day, etc.  To determine if the volunteers’ recollections 
have changed, researchers question them at various intervals (e.g., one week, twenty 
days, two months) after the initial interview.  For instance, former President Bush came 
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under heavy criticism when he incorrectly recalled seeing the first plane hit the World 
Trade Center tower.  One of memorable images from that day was President Bush 
learning about the news from one of his aid’s whispering in his ear.  President Bush, like 
most others that day, did not see footage of the first plane until much later in the day.  
Moreover, President Bush was not informed about the attacks until after the second plane 
hit, which made his recollection of the first plane’s collision fodder for the 9/11 skeptics.  
In later interviews and press conferences, several journalists noticed inconsistencies in his 
memory of the event: in one account he noted that his chief of staff, Andy Card, informed 
him of the attacks, but in another he stated that senior advisor Karl Rove had delivered 
the news (Greenberg 363-4).  The events of September 11 are a good representation of an 
event that causes FBMs, and many were surprised that the President could not accurately 
or consistently recall what happened.  After heavy scrutiny from the press, memory 
experts declared that President Bush’s slip-ups were typical human error.  As exhibited 
across the DRM Paradigm, misattribution, and false memory creation, this instance of a 
rehashed FBM is not uncanny.  As Greenberg notes, “we might expect that [President 
Bush] would be better off than the average university undergraduate—however, like so 
many others, he appears to be suffering from a near-textbook case of false recall” (368).   
 
Remaking Memory: Conclusion 
 With all the studies pointing to the possibilities of remaking memory, I wonder 
what effects these have on new interpretations of the canon of memory itself.  If the 
canon of memory was designed to be the mechanism ready for debate and argumentation, 
then how reliable is it if recent studies have indicated that biological memory is actually 
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very flexible?  Memory, I argue, might be the point of invention rather than the point of 
storage that we have believed it to be for millennia.  Digital archives and photo 
manipulation are just two examples of the creative instincts of contemporary memory.  
Memory is no longer just a trope of storage capacity, but rather it is aligning itself with 
techne more powerfully by questioning the limits of expert knowledge while becoming a 
productive structure capable of influencing and creating other memories.  Contemporary 
memory is drastically different than is has been defined in the past, and we will benefit 
from examining the new forms of this canon on rhetoric studies today.   
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Chapter 5 
Reply All: Networks, Memory, Forgetting 
When I began preparing to write my dissertation, I received some sage advice 
from a committee member about the dual blessing and curse of writing on digital 
technologies: while a certain example might be ‘cutting edge’ and exciting at the time of 
writing, by the time the publication hits the press, that fashionable gadget will be out of 
style.  That concern has resonated throughout these pages, especially when I had to find 
new examples for the now defunct Google Wave, update terms from PDA to Blackberry 
to Smartphones, and even consider new(er) forms of computing—Apple’s tablet, iPad.  
In the short span of two years, technology that seemed fresh and exciting is now 
antiquated and laughable.  These changes, however, bring me to the point in this 
dissertation where I must forecast the future of memory studies.  My goal throughout this 
dissertation has been to answer two questions: Does the tension between interactive 
technologies and rhetoric re-shape the nature and relevance of the canon of memory?  Do 
interactive technologies affect the ways we remember and persuade?  Here, I introduce 
one final question: what can we do with digital memory that changes the ways we 
practice rhetoric? 
In this final chapter, I look at the shift from systems of rhetorical memory in 
antiquity to those of contemporary memory networks.  Ancient memory networks were 
personalized—one orator would create one effective memory system to store, locate, and 
recall details.  Today there is one memory network (which I will explain shortly), and it 
must be accessible and searchable by many.  There is one critical distinction between the 
two systems that will drive this chapter: the type of system that is created to maintain 
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memory and promote what information architect Peter Morville calls “findability.” 
Morville defines findability in three ways: “a. the quality of being locatable or navigable; 
b. the degree to which a particular object is easy to discover or locate; c. the degree to 
which a system or environment supports navigation and retrieval” (4).  In what follows, I 
suggest that contemporary memory networks both benefit and falter from a wide user 
base.  On the one hand, the growing number of users allows people to create their own 
memory spaces within the larger system.  On the other hand, the downfall is that at the 
same time users input material to be stored or shared, the network itself also creates and 
outputs new information about the recently uploaded data.  By participating in what 
communication theorist Mark Andrejevic calls the digital enclosure, “the creation of an 
interactive realm wherein every action and transaction generates information about 
itself,” uploaded digital memories both retain information about personally relevant 
events while at the same time adding to the existing body of knowledge by creating new 
information in which others will participate (2).   
The critical issue with contemporary memory is quickly becoming how our 
memories are recollected.  If we do not “tag” our pictures on Flickr, others will be unable 
to find them through search words alone.  With digital memory, we must be as aware of 
the programs we create to organize and access our stored material as we are with the 
content we place in external systems.  Therefore, control of the networks (even small, 
personalized networks like bookmarking systems) becomes critical to our understanding 
of how memory functions.  More and more, digital memory is replacing natural, 
biological memory. As a result, by relinquishing control of our biological systems to the 
techno-neurological swarm, we must introduce some form of control apparatus or system 
  
165 
 
 
 
in order to retain access to our own memories.  Even if our biological memory can at 
times seem inaccessible, with thoughts buried so deeply in our unconscious that we do 
not know they exist, we have the capability to overcome the limits of biological 
mechanisms through digital organizational systems and control units.  This sense of 
control over nature (we can store and remember much more with digital tools) suggests 
that techne becomes a means to controlling what is natural and biological by shifting 
control away from internal, personally controlled systems into external, poly-techne 
memory networks.  This chapter focuses on specific questions of digital protocol and 
network theory to conceptualize how techne can be the future of digital memory.  More 
specifically, I hone in on one of my definitions of techne – as a force that renegotiates 
sources of power – and how the shift from biological to digital memory is rapidly 
becoming a means of participating in a controlled memory environment.   
I divide this final chapter into three sections: optimization, responsibility, and 
digital collaborative pedagogy.  Each section looks at the stakes and possibilities for the 
future of memory studies from a different perspective.  First, optimization examines the 
creation of and participation in a network—how can we participate effectively in order to 
better capitalize on the memory system?  I look at Search Engine Optimization as a 
model of what I call “digitally preferred memory,” the process by which popular 
memories receive the most attention while smaller events and alternative perspectives 
become stifled.  Next, I question what it means to be a responsible memory maker.  In the 
article “Essjay’s Ethos,” James Brown, Jr. questions “originality” and the blurred 
boundaries of “mine” and “yours” on the Web.  I will use this discussion to interrogate 
responsible memory in the sense that shared memories, once uploaded, are no longer 
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individual memories, but can contribute to the formation of prosthetic memories for an 
unknown audience.  Finally, I take a look at what collaborative pedagogy might look like 
by employing the ideas of memory collectivities, hive mind thinking, and classroom 
participation in a growing knowledge-base.  I update Kenneth Bruffee’s classic 
definitions of “collaborative pedagogy” by inserting some new approaches via memory 
making activities.  
Optimus Prime: Search Engine Optimization and Digitally Preferred Memory 
The shift from internalized, mnemonic devices into externalized, collaborative 
memory collectives prompts me to question the change in how we use and construct 
memory networks. Whether internal or external, memory is useless if it cannot be 
recollected.  Internalized, mnemonic devices were designed for one person to remember 
some specifics in preparation for an upcoming speech.  Aside from that one person, no 
one else was privy to the intricate details of the individualized ‘storehouse.’  Each 
storehouse was a unique method of visual and spatial clues to aid recollection.  Internal 
memory allows for tricks that don’t make sense to anyone else.  Such tricks are why 
mnemonic devices are so effective—mnemonic devices are like little ‘inside jokes’ that 
trigger memories.  On the contrary, externalized, collaborative memory collectives must 
be accessible by an infinite number of people.  Each person can contribute to the memory 
collective, but there are ‘digital social rules,’ or what I am calling e-tiquette, which must 
be followed.  Examples of e-tiquette include proper and relevant tagging (e.g., 
dissertation, writing, grad_school) or using hashmarks to indicate topics (e.g., 
#dissertation).  The effectiveness and importance of e-tiquette rests in “findability.”  If no 
one can find the saved material, then the memory is prone to digital erasure.  Because 
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digital collectives are bound by e-tiquette, external memory cannot be personalized like 
internal memory.  Rather than mnemonic devices that succeed in light of difference, 
memory collectives thrive on findability and similarity. 
 One of the most interesting ways I see techne lending a hand with contemporary 
memory is by looking into the connections between search engine optimization and 
memory preference.  Search engine optimization (SEO) is the process by which the 
probability of keyword searches is analyzed to detect and promote the probability of 
certain search results receiving the higher percentage of popularity (Morville 112).  
Marketing and advertising strategists use SEO as a tool to increase product placement 
and drive consumers toward their goods.  However, using SEO not as a marketing 
strategy, but rather as a memory strategy might become problematic for rhetoric studies 
writ large.  In particular, SEO will favor privileged or preferred perspectives on certain 
events—some memories will receive the majority of hits, while other memories will be 
buried among the unpopular and unrelated search results.  Among those that suffer from 
the buried results will be the rhetoricians.  If access to a wide variety of persuasive 
resources, means, and pathways is one of the upsides of digitally networked memory, 
then the downfall rests in the same system.  While SEO is necessary to sort through the 
sheer quantity of information, it comes with a steep cost for rhetorical practices. 
The unpleasant side-effect of SEO is what I call “digitally preferred memory.”  
Digitally preferred memory is the process whereby popular search results receive the 
most attention and the least interesting (or least funded) will be forgotten about.  The 
process of digitally preferred memory is actually a self-fulfilling prophecy: the higher the 
search ranking, the greater likelihood of hits.  Personally speaking, rarely do I search 
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beyond the sixth or seventh (or tenth, on a really good day) page of Google results.  I 
recognize this as a fault of my own—I know there are thousands, perhaps millions, of 
additional results that I skip in order to save some time, but the truth is, the results that 
are ignored might be beneficial.  I tend to stick to the top results—not only on Google, 
but also on journal and library databases.  I refine my search terms to lower the number 
of results, both trying to limit the number of items I have to sift through but also with the 
hopes of finding one, perfect gem.  These gems, if I ever find them, are no accident—
they are carefully calculated to appear via specially crafted (even suggested) search 
terms.  If I do not see the article or book I think is right, I can choose pre-selected 
Boolean search term groupings (e.g., dissertation AND procrastination).  The control 
over the results that I believe I have is a mirage—my magical grouping of search terms is 
not unique.  SEO is based on the combination of selected search terms and the probability 
of their relation to a specific text.  Stochastic techne (T2), then, helps steer researchers 
around the limitations of search terms—different terms can lead to the same ends.  For 
example, let’s say I search for “dissertation AND procrastination” or “writing AND grad 
school.”  The same article, while located with different terms, could likely be among the 
results.  If, however, I changed the search terms even slightly to “writing AND effective 
techniques,” I will broaden the search because I am not limiting the type of writing, but I 
am also running the risk of not locating the one ‘gem’ I hope to find.  Although there may 
be millions of results from a simple key word search, the vast majorities of those hits are 
never attended to and become digitally forgotten. 
What does digital forgetting look like?  Becoming digitally forgotten is not a 
result of anti-participatory, Luddite behavior; instead, being digitally forgotten is the 
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result of being left behind on what Wired magazine editor-in-chief Chris Anderson 
characterizes with the term “the long tail.”  Anderson uses the long tail as an optimistic 
business model—it is beneficial to offer more products to fewer people than it is to have 
fewer products available to everyone.  Statistically speaking, the long tail represents the 
probability of a select few popular “hits” receiving the most attention while the remainder 
are forgotten about.  The long tail is derived from the image of these results: the most 
popular and frequent hits have very high points on the y-axis of a graph and the numerous 
other results trail out in a thin line across the x-axis.  The results along the x-axis look 
like “a long tail”—think of a rat’s skinny, long tail.  Digital forgetting occurs because the 
majority of information is lost among the long tail results, thus a select few popular ideas 
remain at the helm of digital memory. The higher the search ranking, the more 
preferential treatment the result will receive.  Unfortunately, the opposite holds true, 
too—because there are so many results tucked away in the long tail, there are only a 
selected handful of results that receive regular attention for any given search term 
combination. 
Being forgotten in the long tail arouses some interesting concerns with digital 
rhetorical memory, in particular the availability and accessibility of the means of 
persuasion.  SEO not only increases the likelihood of certain links appearing more 
prominently in a search, but because these favored results have been paid for, less 
important (and arguably less funded) hits will never receive as much attention as their 
optimized counterparts.  For memory, SEO has the capability to force certain memories 
into the long tail.  Smaller events, or even alternative perspectives, could be suffocated by 
popular search terms or corporate sponsorship of a single track of memory.  Take, for 
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example, online shopping trend suggestions like Amazon or iTunes recommendations. 
These recommendation-bots are some of the most popular examples (and sometimes the 
most off-putting because of their precision) of SEO and the digital enclosure.  The more 
popular an item becomes, the more likely it is to appear in one of the first pages of 
suggested search results, leaving the least popular links to be lost and forgotten among 
the results.  Our participation in the digital enclosure happens automatically whenever we 
send an e-mail, purchase an item on Amazon, or place money in our mutual funds.  The 
information we are providing is collected in order to “serve us better”—or, at least, to 
increase our desire to purchase a tailor-made (optimized) suggestion based on the trail of 
digital information we leave behind. All of our digital communication is tracked, sorted, 
and compiled to automatically offer ‘premium’ choices based on our preferences.  The 
digital enclosure works by the user providing information in order to receive (without 
asking) more information about herself.  There is one catch—as Andrejevic points out, 
the digital enclosure is asymmetrical.  As users, we provide the content but we do not 
have access to exactly what content is being collected or, for that matter, how the 
information is being put to use (41).  
But another, more symmetrical, way to consider digital enclosures and memory 
collectives is via folksonomies.  A folksonomy is a digital system that allows users to 
sort, identify, and group similar items in order to facilitate findability.  There are several 
well-known examples and many collaborative websites, such as Delicious or Flickr, that 
use a well-known folksonomy—tagging.  On the social bookmarking site Delicious, users 
have the option of adding a “tag,” a short (often one word) description of the article’s 
topic.  Delicious often provides “suggested tags”—frequently used words in the article 
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itself or other popular tags used by members who have saved the same article.  Delicious 
users can also embed “tag clouds” in their blogs or personal web pages.  Tag clouds are a 
collection of word tags that represent frequency and popularity of a topic by the size of 
the word itself—the larger the font, the more popular the topic. Contributing to a tag 
cloud or other tagging system is not an isolated process, and participants must select 
popular, even generalized, reference tags in order for the saved links to be connected to 
those similarly tagged.   In the article “‘Folksonomy’ and the Restructuring of Writing 
Space,” Jodie Nicotra notes that in order to locate related tags, as well as have our saved 
links recognized by others, we must use the popular tags rather than ones personally 
meaningful to us.  For instance, Nicotra states that Delicious might suggest the tag 
“marathon” for an article about training for a race (W272).  Using the tag “marathon” 
will automatically link it to others searching for articles about marathons or running 
(W272).  If, however, I tag it with “26.2 mile run,” then the likelihood of someone using 
that obscure tag decreases, and the memory is not as accessible as it could be with a 
popular tag like “marathon” (W272).  How might memory studies falter because of 
standardized participation, like using popular, recommended tags?  Our memories must 
be stored in a very specific fashion in order to be recalled, linked to, or recommended 
later.  If I use “26.2 mile run” rather than “marathon,” then the memory runs the risk of 
being forgotten and left in the long tail.  However, abiding e-tiquette by selecting popular 
tags over less useful ones increases the possibility of retrieval while also fortifying the 
continued recollection of properly classified digital memories.   
As a result, folksonomies are significant to memory studies for a few reasons.  
First, Nicotra indicates that a folksonomy, “moves away from traditional hierarchies and 
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classification systems”  (W260).  Rather than relying on SEO or corporatized sponsored 
results, a folksonomy is a collectively organized system that has been compiled entirely 
by the users’ identification tags.  By “disrupting the idea of single authorship,” a 
folksonomy shows “how multiple, collective subjectivities ‘write,’ enabling possibilities 
for configurations and systems to emerge as a result of activity of the so-called hive mind 
that could not have been anticipated or conceived of by an individual author working 
alone” (Nicotra W260).  Next, because a folksonomy can only occur by purposeful, 
collaborative effort (think of the “marathon” v. “26.2 mile run” example), these 
collections reshape the ways we think about writing, too: “‘writing” […] certainly has an 
expansive, performative aspect—not only is it ‘shared,’ as in produced by multiple users, 
but it is conceived of as the building of a space rather than the production of a text 
(Nicotra W263).  Finally, all objects must contain properties or characteristics that 
promote findability.  Nicotra rightly argues that, “if your ideas of what the site is about 
don’t match up to others’ ideas, it is essentially useless, a rhetorical failure (W266, 
emphasis mine).  A rhetorical memory failure is nearly identical—if a site never receives 
attention and is lost in the long tail, it is a rhetorical memory failure because of the 
doubtful probability of being recollected. 
 Rhetoricians have long questioned the responsibility of their profession, and it is 
critical consider how these new digital means of persuasion inform and shape the future 
of rhetorical memory studies.  In the next section, I question what happens with our 
voluntary and involuntary contributions to the digital enclosure.  If optimization suggests 
that a selected group of memories will receive all the attention, then should the memory 
makers themselves uphold certain forms of responsibility?  
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Yours, Mine, Ours: Responsible Memory 
In his 2009 Society for Literature, Science and the Arts talk, multi-media artist 
Casey Alt described all writing composed and shared on social media sites, like Twitter, 
as “responses answering to no one” (1).  We post updates and thoughts to social media 
platforms because we want people to listen or, more likely, because we want to tell 
people something.  No matter how mundane our Facebook status update is, the point is to 
share some information to an audience from our personalized, privileged perspective.  
Our profiles indicate that we have hundreds of “friends,” but are these virtual connections 
actually reading what we have to say?  Have they blocked our posts? Does everyone 
check Facebook or their Google Readers as much as I do?  I don’t wish to start this 
section sounding like I have a digital fetish, but these are important questions to ask 
regardless if we check for updates once a week or once a minute.  For anyone who 
participates in these mediums, Alt’s suggestion is a frightening realization.  In fact, the 
assumed audience we think we have might not actually be listening or, worse still, might 
not be there at all.  What is the purpose of a status update if no one is reading it?  For 
rhetoricians, the suggestion of an assumed or non-existent audience stirs up some 
additional concerns about responsible persuasion.  With an assumed audience, the entire 
rhetorical situation becomes confused—what kinds of rhetoricians are we if we don’t 
even know if we have an audience to persuade?  If a rhetorician speaks and no audience 
hears the talk, is it still persuasion?  In order to be responsible contemporary rhetoricians, 
must we take into account the possibility of a non-existent audience? 
Alt proceeded by taking his suggestion one step further: what if Tweets are not 
simply answering to no one, but those status updates could actually increase the 
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“possibility for response without responsibility” (1, emphasis mine).  Here I find some 
interesting connections between a non-existent audience, the responsibility of response, 
and contemporary memory.  Even though we cannot be certain if anyone is listening, 
social media is kindled by a compulsion to write, to update, or to post just in case 
someone is wondering.  With digital memory, we upload, share, post, or mail any number 
of items, fully intending to return to these stored memories later.  But really, how often 
do we revisit our saved memories?  (Or, if you’re like me, how many forgotten 
passwords lock you out from your memory storage locations?)  With digital memory, the 
more we save, the more infrequently we will return to them if only because the sheer 
quantity deters us from spending quality time with the past.  To recall digital memories, 
we usually have to consciously search it out via search terms or by looking in a specific 
folder.  If our search terms are spelled incorrectly or are ineffective, then we cannot 
locate specific information.  In order for digital memory to function effectively, an 
organizational system must become equally important as the memories themselves.  
Whereas biological memory is prone to happenstance (like Proust’s madeleine arousing 
thoughts of a past long forgotten), if we do not participate in a digital memory network, 
then the possibility of recall is dramatically reduced.  Or to say it another way, if we 
cannot organize and systematize our digital memories, it becomes unlikely that anyone 
will recall the memories. 
But alongside the anxiety about whether our memories will be remembered or 
whether an audience exists, interactive technologies and social media have yet to witness 
a slump in participation.  Even in the face of recent publications forecasting the demise of 
our intellect, much less our ability to do anything, books like The Shallows, Distracted, 
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and The Dumbest Generation all preach technophobia against increased participation in 
social and interactive media.  Between April 2009 and August 2010, for instance, 
Facebook more than doubled its active accounts—from 200 million to over 500 million 
and counting (“Facebook | Statistics”).  Twitter accounts have not only become the space 
for personal updates and links to interesting articles, but Bloomberg Businessweek 
magazine has noted the rise in “social media managers,” individuals who are hired by a 
company to design and maintain a digital presence with frequent Tweets or Facebook 
updates about “secret sales” for their followers or notices about when seasonal items are 
ending (e.g., “Only 1 week left of Sam Adams Summer Ale—buy now!”) (Gillette).  
Increased participation across all social media indicates a few important points.  For one, 
this increased participation highlights a shift in our personal communication—from face 
to face (f2f) into digital.  Of course we still interact with people f2f on a regular basis, but 
this shift towards digital interpersonal communication had been forecasted long ago and 
is becoming more commonly acceptable and preferred, among corporations and 
consumers alike.  And while digital interpersonal communication still does not sit well 
with everyone, companies are actually encouraging their customers with incentives for 
using less expensive services, like automated machines and e-bills.  For example, in order 
to scoot around some of the new federal banking regulations, Bank of America has 
announced that they will begin charging $8.95 per month for certain in-person 
transactions that cannot be accomplished through an ATM (“B of A to Roll”).  Bank of 
America’s favoring digital over f2f transactions is one small factor indicating the switch 
to active participation in a larger, networked consumer base.  Additionally, it is becoming 
more likely for someone to participate in some form of social media (i.e., someone might 
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have a Facebook page but does not use Twitter), thus any social participation equals an 
interaction with, contribution to, and consumption of the collaborative digital network.  
Oftentimes, this participation is involuntary, and we end up generating more information 
than we consume (a by-product of Andrejevic’s “digital enclosure”).  If we take a good 
look at the productive possibilities from all these digital outlets, it is becoming more 
unlikely that we are responding to no one, as Alt suggested, but we might instead be 
responding to everyone—without even knowing to whom we are replying or what our 
responses actually say.  This unknown message coupled with an unknown audience only 
increases Alt’s concern about responsible response.  How does this massive “reply-all” 
affect the ways we persuade, remember, and create memories for not only ourselves, but 
everyone else, too?  As a result of the increasing utilization of cloud storage, collective 
knowledge bases, and social media spaces, the responsibility of memory is no longer 
individual responsibility. 
 Take, for instance, the rise in “amateur journalism”—individuals who are not 
employed by any professional news organization but still report on breaking news stories.  
The cable news channel CNN frequently promotes its user-centered news gathering 
feature called “iReport,” described on the website as, “the way people like you report the 
news” (CNN iReport).  iReport is not the only outlet of its kind, and most local news 
stations, news papers, and magazines are increasing the call for first-hand videos and 
accounts of major events.  On the iReport homepage, there is a section named 
“Assignment Desk.” By clicking on any of the popular, pre-selected news topics, users 
can contribute their videos, stories, and opinions to the collection of user-generated 
content.  iReport might sound similar to the archives I discussed in chapter three, but 
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there is a difference—iReport is not dealing with memory (at least not immediately) but 
instead asks for perspectives as the events are occuring.  iReport, then, is something of a 
present-history collective—historical perspectives being cultivated from typically non-
privleged viewpoints and collected with little time passing between event and reporting.  
Outlets like iReport not only invite ‘amateurs’ to contribute to popular news stories, but 
they also provide varied perspectives often unavailable from the newsroom alone.  For 
example, if I wish to learn more about Hurricane Earl, I might be click on the approprate 
iReport link where I can find users’ images, stories, and comments.  As opposed to 
sending one journalist to cover the story, CNN has hundreds of reporters—contributing 
for free.   
 Even though the concept of iReport is along the same lines of other user-
generated content sites like Wikipedia, there is one major set-back, indicated by the 
following “warning” that pops-up on each page: “The stories in this section are not 
edited, fact-checked or screened before they post” (CNN iReport).  Unlike Wikipedia 
who employs staffers to sweep false material, iReport has a considerable gap between 
“vetted” stories, and ones yet to be verified.  A quick look indicates that there have been 
481,408 iReports submitted as of today (September 4, 2010), but only 31,037 of those 
have been verified.  Interestingly, iReports does not “pull down” or “discontinue” the 
non-vetted reports, but only alerts users that it might not be entirely trustworthy.  If 
iReports does not ‘take responsibility’ for users’ posts and yet still makes these available 
to everyone, then at what point does user contribution lead to irresponsiblity?   
 The future of memory studies must consider the growing likelihood that everyone 
will experience more events prosthetically.  Sites like iReport encourage varied 
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perspectives while at the same time providing a space for people to share their eyewitness 
accounts.  As someone who does not live on the Eastern Coast, I visited iReport to see 
some snap shots of Hurricane Earl.  There are hundreds of photos—large waves, sunsets, 
views of the storm approaching.  Simply by flipping through the iReport photos, I 
experienced the hurricane prosthetically.  In fact, I even (gasp!) viewed and (double 
gasp!) found the ‘non-vetted’ images more interesting.  Even though the unfiltered photos 
were more interesting, because iReport invites stories from everyone, there are bound to 
be unclear, misguided, and untruthful representations of events.  Moreover, CNN does 
not remove the stories after the event has passed, transforming the present-history making 
site into a digital archive of sorts.  The possibility of unsound user contributions making 
their way into small versions of digital archives makes me wonder about the future of 
responsible memory.  Although I do not have any solutions at this point – after all, this 
entire chapter is one large speculation for the prospects of memory studies – but in this 
section I pose some questions: Who’s responsible for the memory?  Do we even need to 
be concerned with responsibility?  How can the ethics of digital memories be considered 
if their use is determined afterwards?   
 In the essay “Essjay’s Ethos: Rethinking Textual Origins and Intellectual 
Property,” James J. Brown Jr. investigates the limits of an “originary” text through the 
lens of Wikipedia.  Like iReport, Wikipedia thrives on user-contributed content.  Unlike 
iReport, Wikipedia maintains its ‘credibility’ because it requires that updates are based 
on outside sources (which are linked to at the bottom of each page) and not professional 
or personal expert knowledge.  Like techne, just because I say I have a skill does not 
mean that is useable—I cannot talk a big game without being able to prove my skill set 
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repeatedly.  Wikipedia ensures that so-called “expert knowledge” does not trump tried-
and-true material.  For iReport, “expert” knowledge is the main force behind the quantity 
of content and the success of the site.  The difference between the two sites is that iReport 
relies on personal perspective while Wikipedia strives to be a composite of “pre-vetted” 
information.  Brown argues that the Web in general, and Wikipedia in particular, 
“exposes the difficulties of intellectual property by making it difficult to determine where 
‘my’ text ends and where ‘your’ text begins” (W239).  For memory studies, determining 
what’s “yours” and what’s “mine” should be easy—after all, my memories will certainly 
be different from yours.  This is not the case anymore, and sites like iReport point to an 
interesting shift in how we construct “my” memory from the collection “your” memories. 
 The result of participating in one collective memory network lies in the 
responsibility of contributions as well as responsible organizational methods for 
information.  Once participants fully understand the consequences of their passive and 
active contributions to the memory network, then we might gain a better understanding of 
how contemporary memory creation functions.  The contribution of knowledge is not the 
main problem here; instead I am concerned with what happens afterward—are these 
contributions relied on as the digitally preferred memory of the event, or are they 
forgotten within the long tail?  Responsible memory is not only content, but it is also 
ensuring accessibility, whether that means describing a site with predictable search terms 
or using favorable word tags.  
Perhaps an alternative perspective on digital memory could be a blend of memory 
and invention.  As research in the humanities as well as social and neurological science 
has suggested, if memories are heavily prone to re-creation, then memories actually 
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become the productive site of invention.  When we begin to question the originality – 
much less the origin – of a memory, that quest becomes quickly tangled.  Instead of 
thinking of memory as either “mine” or “yours,” digital spaces encourage the production 
of collective spaces: “we” shape and invent “our” spaces together.  
Digital Collaborative Pedagogy 
In this final section, I suggest that collective practices are beneficial for classroom 
productivity, and offer some thoughts about digital collaborative pedagogy. The 
networked classroom expands well beyond the course Wiki page, beyond the Facebook 
friend requests from students, even beyond the (failed) attempts of using Twitter during 
lectures.  The digital classroom uses memory to make writing spaces available not only in 
a variety of settings (think: cloud computing), but more towards the consumption and 
production of texts, both for classroom use and as contributions to future knowledge 
collectivities.  One of the interesting ways to think about this shift occurs right inside our 
classrooms—our students use social media and there is a distinct desire from the students 
to incorporate these technologies into our pedagogical practices.  Rather than relying on 
rigid platforms like Blackboard, the classroom has become a flexible, multimodal space 
in which all participants can produce and consume knowledge.  As it has been named 
elsewhere, our students are becoming “prosumers,” a fusion of producer and consumer, 
and this combination can translate into some exciting upgrades for college writing 
curriculum.  
Here, I offer some ideas about the possibilities of updating Kenneth Bruffee’s 
notion of collaborative pedagogy based primarily on his text Collaborative Learning: 
Higher Education, Interdependence, and the Authority of Knowledge.  Bruffee’s 
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pedagogy is designed around one basic idea, knowledgeable peers, and he uses these 
formations as the basis for the construction of knowledge for the students, from the 
students.  Bruffee defines collaborative learning as “a consensus among the members of a 
community of knowledgeable peers—something people construct by talking together and 
reaching agreement” (3).  As the instructor, it becomes critical to learn the language of 
the peers—how can we become knowledgeable peers with our students of different 
educational backgrounds, levels, and interests than our own?  As a writing teacher, I 
prefer to rely on the students’ ability to create knowledge among themselves.  For 
instance, before any in-class peer-review activity begins, I encourage my students to 
reflect on the most difficult part of the writing assignment: Did the introduction cause 
you pain?  Were the transitions especially tricky? What about researching—could you 
locate sources?  When they read one of their peer’s papers, the students use these 
reflections in order to respond effectively as experts—even though they are only 
reviewing drafts, they have all experienced the assignment individually and now together.  
By initially examining the difficulties of the assignment, each student recognizes himself 
or herself as a writer.  Although some problems are indeed more significant than others, 
the collective experience of writing separately plays into Bruffee’s concept of 
collaboration.  Bruffee states that, “when [teachers] have successfully organized students 
to learn with one another instead of isolating themselves or competing against one 
another,” the importance of support groups function not only as knowledgeable peer 
groups, but also as a path to forming knowledge collectively (7).  The instructor must not 
isolate the individual in the classroom, but transform the classroom into a hybrid space of 
teaching and learning, consumption and production, authority and decentralization.   
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As another example, I have created a “database” or “cloud” system assignment 
for my advanced Technical Writing course.  The database/cloud assignment requires 
students to utilize a flexible, sharable platform, like a Wiki or a Google Doc, and input 
their developing research each week.  At the end of the semester, each team will have a 
large database of research questions, contact information, and other important materials.  
This system becomes the main source of information for their final project proposal and 
also serves as the “knowledge reference center” for the entire group. Returning briefly to 
Jodie Nicotra, she suggests that, “In terms of the Web, prosumption has less to do with 
economic consumption than with acts of creative and rhetorical production” (W273).  By 
contributing to a space of collective knowledge, the students are participating in 
collaborative activity, leading towards informed writing based primarily upon knowledge 
deemed credible by their peers.   
In the end, this shift towards a prosumer classroom is the first step for a new 
model of digital collaborative pedagogy.  Contemporary memory benefits from these 
collective spaces not only because the students are contributing to a knowledge base, but 
at the same time they are also learning what it means to be responsible memory makers.  
As the old cliché goes, you only get out of something what you are willing put to put into 
it.  For collaborative memory systems, the quality of information students contribute to 
their databases is tied directly to the quality of their final product—if they use shoddy 
sources just to complete the assignment and get it off their backs, then it shows in the 
end.  As responsible memory makers, learning to control how much and what kind of 
information is accessible becomes equally important to the quantity of digitally available 
means.  
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Future, Present, Past: Where Do We Go from Here?  
Neurologist and author Oliver Sacks notes that neurology’s favorite word is 
“deficit,” largely because neurological research always involves the loss of something – 
loss of memory, loss of speech, loss of identity (3).  The field of rhetoric has been dealing 
memory deficiency—as a discipline, rhetoric seems to have forgotten about memory.  
But mourning the loss of memory is not productive, nor is it representative of what I have 
suggested throughout my dissertation.  My focus in this dissertation has not been on the 
loss of memory on the individual level, but the evolution of memory as a participatory 
system.  Alongside digital adaptation, our memory has undergone a transition from a 
biological storehouse to a technological network.  However, this shift ignores one of the 
most interesting factors of contemporary memory research—do these new tools of 
remembrance help or hinder the long-term status of the memories we make?  I have 
argued that two specific memory situations – digital archives and memory manipulation – 
indicate a significant increase in the production of memory making activities. In relation 
to digital memory, the memories we upload are not bound to some ethical or moral 
standard.  In relation to techne, the digital memory is value-neutral—its use is not 
determined completely in advance, but only afterwards by future (and often unknown) 
users.  Because digital memory is value-neutral, it only reinforces the suggestion that the 
future of memory studies become more concerned with responsible contributions to the 
networked swarm.  If we ignore the call for ethical memory making, it is not far-fetched 
to suggest that the effectiveness of rhetorical memory could become clouded with 
uncertainty, tainted by unethical contributions, and forgotten again.  As a rhetorician, I 
am keenly aware of the importance of memory for various rhetorical practices.  In order 
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to maintain a superior quality of memory studies, the field of rhetoric all must contribute 
to the techne influenced, memory-task at hand—actively participating in the creation of 
digital memories, gaining control over those memory contributions by taking 
responsibility for their content, and ensuring the proper use of others’ memories. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 Figure 3.1: The Wayback Machine, Search Results, amazon.com 
 
 
Figure 3.2: archive.org homepage 
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Figure 3.3: Yahoo! on December 20, 1996 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Yahoo! on June 15, 2010 
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Figure 3.5: eBay on October 22, 2002 
 
 
Figure 3.6: eBay on June 16, 2010 
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Figure 3.7: Amazon on October 13, 1999 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Amazon on June 16, 2010 
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Figure 3.9: The September 11 Digital Archive Homepage  
 
 
Figure 3.10: Satan in the Smoke (Phillips) 
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Figure 3.11: “In seat 3B on American Airlines 313 at LaGuardia Airport, NY” (Jacobson) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.12: “Riegel Apt.” (Edwards) 
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Figure 3.13: “just prior to the plane impact with the South tower” (Cremin) 
 
 
Figure 3.14: “From the terrace of my highrise apartment in Union City, NJ” (Brown) 
 
 
Figure 3.15: “April 2001 i misse u 2 girls u stil in my heart” (Calvário Florindo) 
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Figure 3.16: “Bee_Towers” (Tran) 
 
Figure 3.17: “Flight 93 Crash Site” (Pacelli) 
 
Figure 3.18: “Pentagon 2” (Graney) 
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Figure 3.19: “Lubbock, Texas” (Velasquez) 
 
 
Figure 3.20: The Soweto ’76 Live Demo Homepage  
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My dissertation answers two questions: Does the tension between interactive 
technologies and rhetoric re-shape the nature and relevance of the canon of memory? Do 
interactive technologies affect the ways we remember and persuade? I argue that my 
interpretation of techne suggests possibilities for the creation and production of new types 
of memory in combination with digital media. To interrogate this connection, I suggest 
three interpretations of the Greek concept, techne: as a process that is inherently 
productive; as a force that renegotiates contemporary sources of social power; and as a 
skill that balances expert knowledge with instrumentality.  I explore the creative 
possibilities of "making memory" in several examples such as digital archives, photo 
manipulation, and digital collaborative pedagogy. 
In Chapter One, I begin by reviewing how memory has been employed since its 
characterization as one of the five canons.  Starting with Plato’s “Phaedrus” and ending 
with Merlin Donald’s Origins of the Modern Mind and Collin Gifford Brooke’s Lingua 
Fracta, my thorough treatment of memory illustrates that even though memory has 
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persisted through the centuries, it has not been properly adapted as a foundation of 
rhetoric for use in connection with information technologies.  
Chapter Two is a critical exploration of techne as well as an argument that states 
how techne and memory should be thought of as complimentary forces.  New 
technologies afford users the possibilities to create and replicate memories, thus 
understanding techne as a characteristic of digital memory is critical for contemporary 
rhetorical practices. 
Chapter Three is an exploration of three digital archives: The Wayback Machine, 
The 9/11 Digital Archive, and The Soweto ’76 Archive.  By looking at digital archives, I 
argue that visitors are encouraged to participate in memory making, indicating a shift 
from consumerist trends of memory towards productive memorial spaces. I use the term 
“technemonic” to suggest the devices, spaces, or tokens (digital or otherwise) that we 
make or collect to remember a particular event. 
In chapter four, I argue that memory is a persuasive construct—it is not a concrete 
structure, as we tend to think it is, but rather it is extremely fluid and easily subjected to 
recreation by the slightest suggestive details.  I examine two specific vectors of memory 
manipulation: external photo manipulation and internal cognitive manipulation.  
Chapter Five questions the implications of technologies used through the process 
of techne to change the canon of memory.  This final chapter will discuss how 
technologies have always affected memory and why those influences are critical to 
contemporary rhetoric studies.  In particular, Chapter Five will deal with the new sources 
and boundaries of control individuals have (or do not have) over their digital memories. 
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